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 Abstract 
 
We investigate the practical use of Taylor-type rules in Trinidad and Tobago, which is in 
the process of implementing market based monetary policy and seeks to implement 
flexible inflation targeting in the presence of a managed exchange rate. This is 
motivated by the idea that normative Taylor rules can be shaped by the practical 
experience of developing countries. We find that the inflation – exchange rate nexus is 
strong, hence the country may be unwilling to allow the exchange rate to float freely. 
We contend that despite weak market development the Taylor rule can still be applied as 
the central bank is able to use moral suasion to achieve full pass through of the policy 
rate to the market rate. 
 
Our evidence rejects Galí and Monacelli’s (2005) argument that the optimal monetary 
policy rule for the open economy is isomorphic for a closed economy.  Rather, our 
evidence suggests that the rule for the open economy allows for lower variability when 
the rule is augmented by the real exchange rate as in Taylor (2001).  We also reject Galí 
and Monacelli’s (2005) hypothesis that domestic inflation is optimal for inclusion in the 
Taylor-type rule.  Instead we find that core CPI inflation leads to lower variability. 
Additionally, our evidence suggests that the monetary rule, when applied to Trinidad 
and Tobago, is accommodating to the US Federal Reserve rate. 
  
Further, we expand the work of Martin and Milas (2010) which considered the pass 
through of the policy rate to the interbank rate in the presence of risk and liquidity. By 
extending the transmission to the market lending rate, we are able to go beyond those 
disruptive factors by considering excess liquidity and spillovers of international 
economic disturbances. We found that these shocks are significant for Trinidad and 
Tobago, but it is not significant enough to disrupt the pass through. As a result, full pass 
through was robust to the presence of these disruptive factors.  
 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
 
This work could not be possible without the indulgence of very important individuals.  I 
wish to thank my primary supervisor Professor Christopher Martin, who began the 
active and keen supervision of the study at Brunel University, and continued when he 
moved on to Bath University.  He would have gone through several drafts while we 
communicated both face to face and from overseas via email. 
 
I also wish to thank Dr. Anja Shortland who kindly filled in at Brunel in the absence of 
Professor Martin.  Her comments were incisive and facilitated the completion and 
submission of the thesis. 
 
I must also thank the staff of the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago for the data 
support.  Further, I am indebted to the Deputy Governor, Dr. Shelton Nicholls, for 
giving me insights with respect to monetary policy as practiced in Trinidad and Tobago. 
In addition, I benefitted from the comments of the staff at their internal Research 
Department seminars. Here, I am particularly grateful to Dr. Alvin Hillaire, senior 
director of research, for his useful comments.  
 
Thanks must also be expressed for the comments of the delegates to the Annual 
Monetary Studies Conference conferences of the Caribbean Centre for Money and 
Finance. 
9 
 
 
10 
Chapter 1 
 
Implementation of Taylor type rules in nascent money and 
capital markets under managed exchange rates 
 
 
1.0   Introduction 
 
The literature on the Taylor rules has been largely developed through normative 
theoretical studies with regard to guiding interest rate decisions of the central bank. 
Taylor (2010) observed that rules at the start of the century were motivated by the 
need to avoid monetary excesses in order to avoid hyperinflation.  This was followed in 
the middle of the century by Friedman proposed constant growth rate with the same 
idea of avoiding hyperinflation. Taylor (2010) then pointed out that in contemporary 
times the rules are developed to avoid instability in price and output. According to him 
rules have been developed to avoid monetary excesses in a bid to avoid triggering 
economic recessions.  In this context he remarked that the absence of rules would lead 
to ‘chaotic monetary policy’.  
 
New tools have been ushered in by the development of dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium models (DSGE) in the presence of rational expectations and sticky prices. 
The downside of the literature on the implementation of monetary rules in DSGE 
models is that these studies have been developed through restrictive assumptions of 
perfect markets so that a change in assumptions can lead to different conclusions. In 
this respect the practical usefulness of the Taylor rule depends on how well it can be 
adopted in the real world, where perfect conditions often do not exist.  
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Accordingly, we contend that the theoretical building of monetary rules is incomplete 
without empirical validation to discover its practical application. We note that the real 
world is replete with subtle variations in exchange rates and market structures 
stemming from the historical evolution of the financial markets. Consequently mere 
simulations of theoretically derived models are incomplete, since findings are based on 
assumptions made in setting up the model.  
 
We therefore investigate to see whether the monetary rules are empirically validated 
in a small open developing country with limited markets. In reality, countries are at 
different stages of transition to market based monetary policy, so the question arises 
as to the universality of Taylor type rules across countries with unique circumstances. 
The unique circumstances include the type of managed float, smallness of and 
dependency of the economy, trading pattern of the country, stage at which it is at 
exercising market based monetary policy. 
 
The thesis use a case study to examine how Taylor type rules perform in shallow 
internationally integrated financial markets under managed exchange rates. This 
exercise is executed with the idea that it can provide guidance in the formulation of 
simple policy rules for those economies wishing to implement flexible inflation 
targeting while developing money and capital markets. By flexible inflation rate it is 
meant that the policy maker objective is to put a positive weight on real output in 
forecasting inflation and adjust the conditional inflation towards the inflation target.1 
 
In essence the study provides a test case concerning the universal implementation of 
Taylor rules for market based monetary policy. It raises the question as to whether 
empirics can be used to provide guidance on the normative design of Taylor-type rules. 
The case study used is with respect to Trinidad and Tobago, a small open energy based 
economy with a managed float that is making a transition to market based monetary 
                                                 
1
 See Svensson (1999) for an elaboration on this. 
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policy. The economy is resource intensive, been an oil producer in which the 
government is the major recipient of foreign exchange. The exchange rate is a 
managed one in which the central bank is able to judiciously supply foreign currency to 
the foreign exchange market as opposed to using demand instruments to subdue 
demand. 
 
The study is largely an empirical one in which we compare our findings with the 
analytical models in the literature. In particular we benchmark the empirical model 
with the DSGE as developed by Galí and Monacelli (2005).  Their model allows us to 
formally derive the new Phillips curve given market imperfections through price 
stickiness and monopolistic competition. In addition the demand side is developed 
through the IS equation. An important feature of their model is that it is isomorphic in 
the sense that the same monetary rule that maximises welfare in the closed economy 
form also maximises welfare in the open economy. Thus we would like to see if their 
conclusion is validated empirically against the alternative that the rule must be 
augmented when applied to the open economy.  
 
My major contribution In Chapter 2 is to show how the theoretical results posited by 
GM can be crudely laid out in a graphical linear two dimensional form.  This simplifies 
the analysis of GM conclusions by superimposing openness on the closed economy 
model. An advantage of doing so is that it shows graphically how the IS and Phillips 
Curves become flatter as the economy becomes more open.  Further it provides a 
visual picture of how the natural rate of output expands with openness of the 
economy.  Using this we are able to graphically illustrate that the open economy is 
isomorphic to the closed economy in that the IS and Phillips curve become flatter as 
openness increases. In so doing, we are able to show that the natural rate of output 
expands with openness.  
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We then use the rest of the thesis to empirically discover how the findings deduced by 
GM compare to the empirical results obtained when the study is applied to a small 
open economy with a managed float where the exchange rate is not determined in a 
competitive market and 2), the small open economy is subject to spillovers from larger 
economies. This is in contrast to GM where they formulated their theoretical model 
under the assumptions where the economies are assumed to be atomistic to the rest 
of the world and the exchange rate is determined under competitive market 
conditions. We therefore argue that theoretical model by GM is incomplete without 
examining how the results can apply to the real world where these assumptions are 
violated.    
 
In order to apply the Taylor rule to Trinidad and Tobago, we consider the practical 
experience of that country as it seeks to make a transition from the use of direct 
controls to market based monetary policy upon which we can apply Taylor-type rules.  
We then compare the transmission for the Trinidad and Tobago market with the 
advanced industrialised countries, which we use as the first best given their greater 
market sophistication and longer experience with market based monetary policy.  Here 
we examine whether disrupting factors to the transmission mechanism for the Trinidad 
and Tobago market, offset the effectiveness of Taylor-type rules. These frictions are 
excess liquidity and spillovers of international disturbances. This allows us to 
investigate the extent to which the transmission mechanism from the policy rate to the 
market lending rate is effective as portrayed in theoretical models. 
 
We contribute to the literature in three major ways.  First we consider how a country 
with an underdeveloped capital market can still achieve pass through from the central 
bank policy rate to the private sector market lending rate. This is an important area of 
research for those countries seeking to make a transition from the use of direct 
monetary policy to market based monetary policy given their limited state of money 
and interbank markets. 
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We further contribute to the debate with respect to whether the policy reaction 
function for an open economy should be isomorphic or augmented compared to the 
closed economy, by exploring the empirical evidence emanating with respect to 
Trinidad and Tobago. In addition we also use GMM estimation to see how the variables 
used in the theoretical studies compare as candidates for the reaction function. 
Coming out of our empirical research we arrive at suggestions for the monetary rules.   
 
We also contribute to the literature by investigating whether the effectiveness of the 
Taylor-type rule may be thwarted by spillovers of international spillovers. To our 
knowledge, these issues have not been resolved in the literature. Yet, we consider this 
to be a useful area of research as the transmission may be fraught with frictions that 
open economies such as Trinidad and Tobago must grapple with. 
 
The GM model applied to a small open natural resource economy is appropriate, in that 
it is readily lends itself to analyse the applicability of the Taylor rule for an open 
economy. This therefore guided the derivation of the hypotheses to be tested. However, 
the model is limited as it assumes that the exchange rate is determined in a competitive 
environment in an autonomous economy. In essence, we suggest that though the GM 
model is useful for a nascent market, it may benefit from customising the monetary 
policy in terms of augmenting the real exchange rate.  
 
2.0   Rational for Study 
 
The study is developed by first critically analysing the workhorse DSGE model by Galí 
and Monacelli (2005).  This is undertaken in Chapter 2 where the Taylor rules are 
located within the theoretical construct of the general economy. In this model all 
market imperfections are removed, leaving price rigidity through Calvo (1983) pricing 
as the only remaining market imperfection. They used an IS and New Phillips open 
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economy equations in a DSGE framework, in which they fit the monetary rule to 
achieve stabilisation as the only intervention by the central bank. They simulated the 
model under flexible exchange rates.  
 
Our contribution to the theoretical literature developed by Galí and Monacelli (2005) is 
to develop a graphical analysis to examine how the closed economy model can be 
extended to the open economy.  By doing so we are able to show that open economy 
IS and Phillips curves are flatter than the closed economy version. We argue that the 
simple representation of the canonical form of the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model is 
useful for putting together the relation between interest, inflation and the output gap. 
Through this we are able to show the effect of openness on the natural rate of output.  
We also show how the open economy Phillips curve collapses to the closed economy 
version when the price elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic goods 
and between variety of goods in country i disappear. This therefore is illustrated 
following Galí and Monacelli (2005) conclusion that the open economy is isomorphic to 
the closed economy.  
 
The successive chapters arise principally from the limitations of Gali and Monacelli 
(2005) model. We note three limitations of the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model.  First 
it is predicated on a simulation where there are perfect conditions.  We therefore 
investigate how our case study in chapter 3 departs from the theoretical model 
constructed by Galí and Monacelli (2005). Secondly, in chapter 4 we test the hypothesis 
that the Taylor rule is isomorphic. Thirdly, we test the implications of excess liquidity 
and spillovers to the pass through from the policy repo rate to the market lending rate 
confronted by the central bank of Trinidad and Tobago (CBTT), given that the exchange 
rate is not determined by perfect capital market but instead is influenced by 
speculation in the market.    
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2.1   Development of Hypotheses 
 
For chapter 3 we examine the case study with respect to Trinidad and Tobago, noting 
the departure of the real world from the perfect conditions simulated in Galí and 
Monacelli (2005) model.  Moreover in view of the fact that the Taylor rule applies to 
market based monetary policy, to apply the rule, it is useful to study the degree of 
market development in order to study the existence of market based monetary policy 
in the market to which the study is applied. The chapter therefore picks up the 
discussion with respect to the development of the market in preparation for market 
based monetary policy. Accordingly, Trinidad and Tobago is used as a case study of a 
country seeking to make the transition to the use of market based monetary policy.  
That country embarked on a new style of monetary policy from in 1993, when it begun 
taking steps to move to a market based one.  Hence it departed from a fixed exchange 
rate peg and started trading securities across the market to kick start the development 
of a money market.  The 91 day Treasury bill rate is the most frequently traded security 
in the money market.  The Repo policy rate was introduced in May 2002 as the policy 
rate of the central bank.  Thus the market based monetary policy begun to take root. 
 
To execute the study, the Trinidad and Tobago market is benchmarked against the UK 
and US markets the last two been developed markets. Three key findings emerge from 
this chapter.  Firstly, it shows the sensitivity of inflation and exchange rates to changes 
in each other in the short run. Accordingly, changes in the exchange rate act almost 
immediately on the inflation rate. Our results therefore suggest that for Trinidad and 
Tobago changes in the exchange rate impacts immediately on import prices and given 
that imports form a high percentage of consumption, then it would be reflected 
strongly in domestic prices. This is in contrast to the UK and US where changes in the 
exchange rate take a longer time to act on the inflation rate. This is particularly due to 
the fact that the inflation rate in these countries act through the marginal cost of firms. 
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As such, we point out that changes in the exchange rate takes a longer time to be 
manifested in changes in inflation rate in these countries.   
 
The evidence obtained show there is a nexus between inflation and the exchange rate. 
As a result we pay attention to the determination and measurement of both variables. 
The open economy allows for a richer set of measurement and determination of 
inflation. We therefore elaborate on the measures of inflation used by the central 
bank. Domestic inflation proxy is the producer price index, and CPI inflation measured 
in terms of headline and core inflation.   
 
The exchange rate is primarily managed through sales of foreign currency as the 
central bank is the major receiver of foreign exchange in the economy, with the bulk of 
foreign currency accruing through energy exports.  This allows the central bank of 
Trinidad and Tobago (CBTT) to judiciously supply foreign currency to the market and 
therefore act as a monopsonist supplier of foreign exchange.  As a result, the central 
bank is able to manage the exchange rate with the goal of reducing its volatility. 
 
Secondly, we investigate the autonomy of the private sector in Trinidad and Tobago 
with respect to the determination of market interest rates.  An important finding 
emerging from the chapter is that market determined interest rates in Trinidad and 
Tobago are closely tied with the US and UK economic cycles.  However, we find some 
deviation in the short run of the Treasury bill rate in Trinidad and Tobago from the 
short run rates in the UK and US markets.  As a result the evidence suggests that if 
there is to be any autonomy it may exist only in the short run with respect to the 
determination of interest rates.  
 
The central bank is at the stage of undertaking development of money and interbank 
markets to facilitate the pass through of the short-term policy rate through the term 
structure of interest rates. In developing these markets the central bank has had to 
18 
take strong liquidity absorption measures to increase the likelihood of a predictable 
relationship between the short term interest rate and the policy rate. As a result the 
central bank engages in measures to forecast liquidity to decide on the timing of 
intervention and intervention measures.   
 
The third important point that emerges from the chapter is that whereas the advanced 
industrialised countries are able to rely on the transmission of the policy rate through 
the market system, a small market like Trinidad and Tobago is able to use moral 
suasion to do so. The shallowness of the markets has allowed the CBTT to use moral 
suasion. Its ability to use moral suasion stems from (1) the smallness of the market, (2) 
its ability to tie this with coercive powers given its monopoly as a regulator and (3) its 
ability to use information sharing as an inducement for financial institutions to 
cooperate.  Thus, developed countries rely on the market mechanism while Trinidad 
and Tobago rely on moral suasion to conduct market based monetary policy in view of 
its under developed money and capital markets. Moreover, the country is able to take 
advantage of the smallness of the market in terms of the small number of financial 
institutions in the market. 
 
In chapter 4 we conduct an empirical investigation to investigate whether augmenting 
the Taylor rule would yield superior stabilising results with respect to lower variability 
of inflation and output gap, when compared to the traditional Taylor (1993) rule. Thus 
the major hypothesis investigate the question raised by Galí and Monacelli (2005) and 
Clarida (2000) that the optimal monetary reaction function developed for the closed 
economy is isomorphic to the open economy. The assumption that the rule is 
isomorphic suggests the parameters developed for the closed economy are welfare 
maximising for the open economy.  This arises in their model because of the 
assumption that constant elasticity of substitution and perfect capital mobility giving 
rise to the law of one price at all times.  
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The alternative hypothesis is that it is optimal for the monetary rule for the open 
economy to be augmented, is explored by Taylor (2001).  He showed that augmenting 
the rate can lead to lower variability of inflation and the output gap. Taylor (2001) 
considers the real exchange to be the candidate variable by which the rule can be 
augmented, since the condition of perfect capital mobility which gives rise to 
purchasing power parity (PPP), may be violated.  Perfect capital mobility may deviate 
from fundamentals as a result of speculative activities and therefore the law of one 
price is not maintained at all times. Accordingly, external disturbances may not only act 
on the terms of trade as in Galí and Monacelli (2005), but also on the exchange rate 
according to Taylor (2001).  
 
The method of investigating the null hypothesis that the Taylor rule for the open 
economy is isomorphic is influenced by Clarida (2000). They specify a target rate in 
relation to economic conditions, upon which a policy rate is smoothed and pursued in 
response to the target rate. The economic fundamentals are assumed to be captured in 
terms of the PPP. Deviations are assumed to occur where the real exchange rate 
deviate from the PPP owing to the fact that capital is not perfectly mobile.  For 
example, speculation may occur causing the exchange rate to vary from fundamentals.   
We examine the real exchange rate in three ways, in terms of spot real exchange rate, 
deviation of the real exchange rate from its median or trend.  
 
In applying our study to Trinidad and Tobago, our findings support Taylor (2001) that 
the augmented rule for the open economy reduces volatility of inflation and output 
gap.  As such, the rule is not found to be isomorphic as asserted by Galí and Monacelli 
(2005) and Clarida (2000).  Moreover our evidence does not support their conclusion 
that domestic inflation is the best measure of inflation. Instead, we find that the core 
measure of inflation rather than domestic inflation to be more stabilising as it yields 
the lowest variability of inflation and the output gap. We also find that given Trinidad 
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and Tobago is a small open economy, the reaction function is accommodative to US 
monetary policy when domestic and headline inflation measures are used.  
 
The new style of monetary policy plays on the idea that the pass through of the policy 
rate impact on the market interest rate then onto demand in the economy.  However, 
there are certain frictions that can be disruptive and therefore affect the smoothness 
of this transmission.  As a result in chapter 5 we test the hypothesis that the pass 
through of the policy rate to the market rate is sensitive to frictions arising from excess 
liquidity and spillovers of international disturbances. The rational for this is that the 
predictability of the effects of changes in the policy repo rate by the central bank can 
be disrupted by these market frictions. We are interested in whether excess liquidity 
and spillover of international spillovers must be taken into account by the CBTT when 
they seek to make changes in the repo policy rate in a bid to affect the market lending 
rate. 
 
The chapter is fashioned off Martin and Milas (2010) where they examined the pass 
through of the base rate in the theoretical construct of the economy by Galí and 
Monacelli (2005) with respect to the new Phillips curve to the IS equations. In their 
model, they examined the transmission from the base rate in the money market to the 
interbank rate which was represented by the 3 month Libor rate. The 3 month libor 
rate is used as the benchmark money market rate, which is therefore the floor to 
private sector cost of credit to the private sector.  In developing their model they 
allowed for disruptions emanating from excess liquidity and risk in the UK market.  
 
Here we extend beyond Martin and Milas (2010), by considering the transmission from 
the repo policy rate to the retail credit market rate.  Accordingly, we use the repo 
policy rate as the base rate, but the prime lending rate is used in place of the 3 month 
Libor rate. The prime lending rate is used as the representative lending rate of 
commercial banks, given that they are the major financial intermediary in the economy 
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and loans are the dominant financial instrument.  A major difference here is that the 3 
month Libor rate is signifies the cost of credit to private sector financial institutions in 
the UK, while the prime lending rate as used for Trinidad and Tobago signifies the cost 
of credit commercial bank customers. 
 
By extending the transmission from the policy repo rate to the market lending rate it 
allows us to investigate the effect of excess liquidity and spillover of international 
disturbances on the prime lending rate.  Given the disruptive nature of excess liquidity 
on the pass through to the market rate, it is evident that banks are not forced to react 
to changes in the repo rate once they have excess liquid resources. 
 
In addition, the spillovers of international disturbances may be likely owing to stability 
resulting from the managed float in Trinidad and Tobago, a liberalised capital market 
and strong dependence on trade and capital links with the US and UK markets.   As a 
result, disturbances originating in these developed markets may spillover to the 
financial sector in Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
The spillovers could take place through multiple transmission mechanisms.  This can be 
through bank loans, foreign direct investment and through trade effects. It can arise 
through deepening financial and trade integration, through liberalisation of the 
financial sector and through strengthening of foreign direct investments.  Owing to the 
various transmission mechanisms, spillovers can occur at various speeds.  It can take 
place instantaneously, but lags can arise owing to the fact that international banks can 
lend to various points of the Trinidad and Tobago economy, causing financial flows 
from the domestic banking system to occur at differential flows.  Moreover, it can take 
place through effects of trade and lagged effects on financial flows arising therewith on 
the banking system. From an examination of financial data between Trinidad and 
Tobago with the UK and the US, we averaged the time lag between spillovers and 
Trinidad and Tobago to be six months. 
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We found full pass through of the repo rate to the market rate.  In addition our results 
showed that excess liquidity and spillovers are significant to the pass through. However 
we found that the magnitude of importance of the spillovers is not significant enough 
to offset the transmission of the repo rate to the market rate. 
 
The findings emanating from chapters 4 and 5 must be taken with caution. Violation of 
statistical and model assumptions should be noted here GMM estimation techniques 
were used.  In particular, the small data size poses severe limitations as use of GMM 
techniques require large data size. The inferences drawn can therefore only be treated 
as preliminary given the small sample size.  Moreover, estimation is limited by the 
frequency and quality of data available. For example, real time data are not available 
for Trinidad and Tobago with respect to the variables used in the reaction functions. As 
such we used the highest frequency of data commonly available which turned out to 
be quarterly.  
 
3.0   Conclusion 
 
In summary, the major findings emanating from the thesis suggests that a country with  
underdeveloped money and capital markets can still achieve pass through of the repo 
policy rate through moral suasion. Secondly, the empirical evidence obtained rejects 
Galí and Monacelli (2005) hypothesis that the monetary rule that is optimal for the 
closed economy is isomorphic to the open economy.  Instead we find that the 
augmented Taylor rule lead to lower variability of inflation and output gap.  We also 
find that core inflation, rather than domestic inflation as Galí and Monacelli (2005) 
posited, was superior for stabilisation.  We also contend that the measure of inflation 
rate is relevant to the choice of the variable to augment the rule by. Here we find that 
when the Federal Reserve rate is used as the variable to augment the rule by, the rule 
turned out to be accommodative when domestic and headline inflation rates are 
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considered.  However when the real exchange rate is used in the reaction function of 
the central bank, the rule turns out to be aggressive with respect to inflation whether 
measured in domestic or CPI terms.   
 
Finally, we find that external spillovers are significant to the pass through from the 
policy rate to the market lending rate in Trinidad and Tobago, but it is not significant 
enough to disrupt the transmission mechanism. Moreover, excess liquidity is found to 
potentially be offsetting to the transmission and should be taken into account in 
setting the policy rate, even though it did not offset the full pass through of the 
transmission mechanism. Further we contend that the full pass through is obtained 
owing to the use of moral suasion by the central bank. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review of the Application of the Transmission 
of the Taylor Rule to the Open Economy   
 
 
1.0  Introduction 
 
The chapter reviews how the Taylor rule fits into the open economy Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium (DSGE) literature.  As such, it begins by briefly reviewing the 
Taylor (1993) rule.  However, given the fact that the Taylor (1993) rule was initially 
developed for a closed economy, the impetus towards the open economy following the 
seminal work of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) is examined.  Their open economy 
theoretical framework is regarded to have kick started the incorporation of the Taylor 
(1993) rule into the DSGE framework. Accordingly, they introduce market 
imperfections through price stickiness and imperfect competition into the analysis.  A 
general limitation of their model is that the transmission of disturbances is sensitive to 
the nature of price stickiness assumed.  To this end, Galí and Monacelli (2005) explores 
the idea that the stickiness can be modelled using the Calvo (1983) model and go on to 
develop a theoretical model to express the macro-economy in terms of the IS and the 
new Keynesian open economy Phillips curve. It then uses this as a framework for 
analysing the implications of different monetary regimes for the open economy. A 
limitation of their analysis is that they do not include the exchange rate directly into the 
Taylor rule. However, Batini and Levine (2007) recognized that the exchange rate can 
have important expenditure switching effects. They along with Shi and Xu (2008), 
among many others, suggest that the exchange rate should be included where the 
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country is constrained by the availability of foreign exchange, as exchange rate 
stabilisation can be used to bring about the stabilisation of prices.  
 
The novelty of our analysis is that we show how the Taylor (1993) rule can be crudely 
represented by a simple graphical framework. We begin by examining the rationale for 
monetary rules.  This is followed by an outline of the Taylor (1993) rule in a closed 
economy context. We then seek to locate the rule in an open economy context. This 
allows us to briefly examine the seminal contribution of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).  A 
deeper discussion of the study by Galí and Monacelli (2005) is then undertaken.  To this 
end we explore the household’s problem, the effect of openness on prices and 
international risk sharing. Further, we seek to define both the uncovered interest rate 
parity and the terms of trade. This is followed by a discussion of firms and their 
marginal cost and price setting. This sets the stage for a discussion of the interactions 
between households and firms from which we can derive the IS and open economy 
Phillips curves.  The monetary policy function is then incorporated into the model.  We 
then suggest a graphical framework to capture the canonical representation of the model.  
Some limitations of the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model are then noted before we 
conclude the chapter.  
 
2.0  Rationale for monetary policy rules 
 
Monetary rules are designed to close the monetary transmission gap running from the 
final target of monetary policy to the operating instrument, see Taylor (1995). In this 
regard, attention is paid to devising simple rules in a closed economy context, with the 
objective of minimising the variability of output and inflation, see Svensson (2003).  
Svensson (2005) points out that an advantage of a simple rule is that it allows the central 
bank to incorporate its limited knowledge of a narrow set of variables into the rule.  As 
such, the policy instrument can be determined by the information available to the central 
bank with regards to economic fundamentals, expectations and the timing of economic 
shocks.  In view of this, Haung et al. (2002) observes that simple rules have the 
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advantage of allowing for transparency and consistency so that rules can be easily 
understood by the market. Nevertheless, rules are considered to be the starting point of 
analysis rather than a substitute for judgement. 
 
With interest rates being the main operating instrument of the major central banks, the 
literature has focused on developing reaction functions to this instrument.
2
 The most 
popular of these rules since the 1990s, has been the Taylor (1993) rule. This rule is set as 
a function of available information on inflation in relation to its target and the output 
gap. The rule does not explicitly use money supply targets given the observation that 
large shocks in money demand can cause high volatility of interest rates and exhibit 
more statistically unreliable relationships between quantity variables, see Clarida et al 
(1999).
3
  In contrast, financial market prices have been shown to exhibit more 
statistically reliable relationships. Since Taylor (1993), attempts have been made to 
incorporate rules concerning the open economy and incorporating market imperfections 
into the analysis. 
 
3.0  Outline of the Closed Economy Taylor Rule 
 
The original Taylor(1993) rule was can be expressed in the form: 
 
yhii ytt
*
             3.1 
 
where  is the short-term nominal interest rate,  is the inflation rate as a  percentage 
change in prices, y  is the percentage deviation of real output from its trend both 
                                                 
2
 Clarida et al. (1998) pointed out that the reaction functions are equally applicable where the central bank 
targets a narrow reserve aggregate once the implied objective is the expected short-term interest rate. 
3
 Taylor (1995) also pointed out that the definition of quantity variables also change overtime owing to 
changes in technology and regulations. 
27 
expressed in logs and i , y , h  and 
*  are constants and are greater than zero.4  
According to Taylor(1993) i  is the equilibrium real rate which is specified as close as 
possible to the assumed steady-state growth rate.   
 
According to Rudebusch (2001), the relationship between i ,  and y  in Equation 1 
can be generalised as: 
 
yi y               3.2
 
 
where 
*
1 ti .  is a constant which can be interpreted as the short term 
real equilibrium interest rate,  the parameters  and y  represents the short-run 
preferences of the monetary authority in terms of their attitude towards the short-run 
trade-off between inflation and output (See Ball (1997) and Siklos and Wohar (2004)). 
In comparison to the original Taylor (1993) rule in equation 3.1,  is equal to h1 .   
 
Taylor (1998) argues that if 1 , then this would suggest that the real interest rate 
would fall when inflation increased, and this would lead to an expansion in demand 
thus fuelling further increases in inflation. In other words, the optimal rule should be 
one where the nominal rate rises sufficiently to increase the real rate, which occurs 
when the coefficient of inflation in the Taylor rule is greater than unity, see Clarida et al 
(1999).  
 
                                                 
4
 The specification largely follows Taylor (1998).  For consistency with the rest of the chapter, the 
notation is adjusted from Taylor (1998) specification so that  replaces   as the nominal interest rate, r  
replaces 
fr , and y  replaces g . However, the parameter h  is maintained from Taylor 
(1998). 
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For the rule to lead to stabilisation, Taylor (1993) argues that 0y and 1  must 
hold. As Parrado and Velasco (2002) indicates, when the coefficient of inflation is 
greater than one in the Taylor rule, it suggest that the central bank is reacting 
aggressively to inflation by aggressively targeting inflation.  In describing the rule for 
the US economy, Taylor(1993) set i  at 2 per cent to capture the average real interest 
rate. 
*
t
 is the targeted rate of inflation of 2 per cent and 5.0h .5   He also takes 
*Y  
to be the average growth trend in real GDP which he found was 2.2 per cent with 
respect to quarterly US data for the period 1984q1 to 1992q3. Thus he defined y as the 
per cent deviation of actual output over 2.2*Y . 
 
4.0 Incorporation of the Taylor Rule into the Open Economy  
 
Taylor (1995) attempts to incorporate aspects of the open economy in the construction 
of the rule by assuming that open economy parameters enter the transmission 
mechanism through external price variables.  In effect, the exchange rate and or 
foreign interest rate are included alongside the short-term interest rate as the price 
variables in the Taylor rule model.  Taylor (1995) then suggest that a possible 
transmission can be where the short-term interest rate impact on the exchange rate 
and term structure of interest rate both in nominal and real terms and therefore on 
inflation and output, see Figure 1.  The Taylor rule then forms the bridge between 
policy outcomes arising from the open economy and the short-term interest rate. 
 
 
                                                 
5
 This formed the normative aspect of the Taylor rule as the coefficients were selected judiciously to push 
inflation back to its target and to steer the nominal interest rate in a countercyclical manner to output gaps, 
see Clarida et. al. (1999). 
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Figure 1: Transmission of Monetary Policy 
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5.0  Open Economy Transmission 
 
The impetus towards the development of new models to examine the effect of 
openness have been attributed by Lane (2001) to the seminal paper by Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1995).  Using microeconomic foundations conditional on a two country model 
with imperfect markets and sticky prices, they explored the implications for the 
domestic economy of the external economic disturbances captured through the 
exchange rate and the current account balance.   
 
The theoretical framework itself is instructive to subsequent attempts to model the 
open economy through microeconomic foundations.  Sticky prices obtain as prices in 
this model are assumed to be set one period in advance, but fully adjusted afterwards.  
Moreover, this mode of price stickiness lends itself to predicting that spillovers from 
the external to the domestic economy in the short-run with respect to inflation, 
consumption and money balances, manifests itself into permanent long-run changes in 
the exchange rate.  For example, following an unanticipated monetary expansion at 
home, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) shows in their model that the shock would lead to a 
permanent change in the exchange rate, given that purchasing power parity holds in 
the short run and long run. 
 
In investigating the relationship between exchange rate dynamics and the current 
account, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) use a two country model in which consumers 
produce differentiated goods.  Further, they assume that there were a continuum of 
producers on the interval 1,0z  with domestic producers on the interval n,0  and 
foreign producers on the interval 1,n . In addition, they define )(zc as the home 
consumption by the individual of product z .  Accordingly, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) 
define the aggregate consumption index as 
 
31 
1/
1
0
/1
dzzcC
             5.1
 
 
with C  been the domestic consumption index and 1  representing the elasticity of 
demand with respect to the relative price of foreign to domestic goods.  Similarly, the 
price index is defined as  
 
1
1
0
1
0
1*1
n
dzzepdzzpP
           
5.2 
 
where P  is the domestic-currency price of good z , 
*P  is the price of the same good 
overseas adjusted by e  the nominal exchange rate, so that one price can be 
maintained. 
It is also assumed that there is no segmentation of markets and that identical 
preferences exists in both home and foreign countries so that the law of one price is 
obtains such that 
 
*ePP                     5.3 
 
As a result, purchasing power parity is assumed to hold. 
 
Moreover, the individual z ’s dynamic budget constraint in the model is: 
 
ttttttttttttt TPCPzyzpMFrPMFP 1111         5.4 
 
where tF  is the stock of bonds, tM  is the stock of money held by a home resident in 
period 1t , )(zy  is the individual’s output and T  is the real taxes paid to the domestic 
government. Here, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) assume that the individual is endowed 
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with only one asset, a real bond and that the capital market is riskless. The total 
revenue obtained from the sale of good z is )()( zyzp tt . 
 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) employ a money-in-utility-function approach to define the 
preferences of the individual z  in terms of consumption sC , real money balances 
P
M
 and the disutility of work 2
2
zys , such that 
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1
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where 10  and 0 . 
Thus, maximising utility subject to the budget constraint gives  
 
t
t
t
t C
P
zp
zc               5.6 
 
where zct  is the home individual demand for product z .  Moreover, given the 
symmetry of the model, the demand function is similar for foreign residents. 
 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) then show that a differential between domestic and foreign 
consumption in the short run, such as what could arise from a monetary shock, can 
have permanent effects on consumption differences such that 
 
** CCCC               5.7 
 
where  denotes the percentage change from the baseline value in the short run and 
 denotes the percentage change in long run value. In addition, the effect of an 
33 
unanticipated differential in money in both economies is captured by the money 
demand equation: 
 
eeCCeMM
1
*
1
*           5.8 
 
assuming that interest parity holds in both the short run and long run, so that  is the 
exchange rate determined by the purchasing power parity in the short-term and e  
likewise for the long term. 
 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) consider the Dornbusch (1976) exercise of an unanticipated 
rise in domestic money supply relative to money supply in the foreign economy to 
obtain 
 
*
1
* CCMME              5.9 
 
Here all variables are constant as they are expressed in the steady state.  Substituting 
e  in 5.8 gives 
 
*
1
* CCMMe            5.10 
 
since 5.7 is assumed to hold and the supply shock is permanent so that  
 
** MMMM             5.11 
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Once ee  then short-term changes in the exchange rate is immediately carried 
forward to long term changes in the rate, as prices do not adjust in the short run. Thus 
from 5.8, this suggests that money differentials between economies are the same as 
consumption differentials between economies, so that economic agents expect a 
constant exchange rate. 
 
It must be noted that Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) model is constructed around the idea 
that price stickiness occurs as prices are set one period in advance, thus giving rise to 
short run and long run transmission effects.  However, another form of price stickiness 
that can be assumed is with respect to the use of Calvo pricing, which is employed by 
Galí and Monacelli (2005). 
   
6.0  The Galí and Monacelli (2005) Model 
 
In contrast to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Galí and Monacelli (2005) assume that there 
is a continuum of infinitesimally small open economies, with each been unable to 
influence world prices.6 Their theoretical analysis is based on the assumption of two 
sectors, households and firms.  In addition, they assume that capital markets are 
complete. Moreover, all goods are assumed to be tradable and prices are given in 
terms of domestic currency.  Goods markets are assumed to be monopolistic and sticky 
prices are assumed to exist, with Calvo-type staggered price setting used to model 
price setting behaviour by firms. This allows them to analyse the impact of external 
disturbances where there exist market imperfections and nominal rigidities under 
alternative monetary regimes. In general, rigidities are assumed to exist as a result of 
market imperfections, price stickiness and product differentiation arising from the 
assumption of monopolistic competition.7  
                                                 
6
 Justiniano and Preston (2006) points out that the analysis of the continuum of economies would be 
similar if the analysis is conducted with respect to a small-large country pair.  
7
 In their related model, Clarida et al (2002) further assume that rigidities exist with regards to wage 
determination in the labour market. 
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Galí and Monacelli (2005) show that the complex equations describing the economy 
can be reduced to two main expressions, the open economy new Keynesian Phillips 
curve which captures the implications of inflation and open economy IS curve which 
captures the effect of the real interest rate on the output gap. The coefficients of the 
variables in these two equations are influenced by the transmission of disturbances 
from the world economy to the domestic economy which in turn is affected by the 
substitution between varieties of goods and substitution between imported and 
domestic goods. Monetary policy exercised through the manipulation of the short-term 
policy rate can then be applied to see what are its implications for stability of the 
economy.  
 
6.1   The Household’s Problem 
 
The derivation of the consumption demand equations in Galí and Monacelli (2005) is 
outlined in Box 1.  The consumption of domestically produced goods depends on the 
elasticities of the consumption of domestic goods relative to imported goods and on 
the elasticity of substitution between a variety of goods.  In addition, the consumption 
of imported goods is influenced by the substitutability of domestic and foreign goods, 
the substitutability between goods produced in different countries and the 
substitutability of a variety of goods produced within each country.  Essentially, the 
utility function is maximised subject to a budget constraint, taking into consideration 
the various elasticities. This allows for the derivation of demand equations with respect 
to each category of goods within country, on imported goods across countries and on a 
variety of imports. 
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Box 1  Development of Demand functions 
Ct
U(Ct,Nt)
Consumption of locally 
produced goods depend 
on the substitutability of 
domestic and foreign 
goods 
Consumption of locally 
produced goods depend on 
the substitutability of the 
variety of combinations of 
goods
Index of imported goods 
depend on the 
substitutability of domestic 
and foreign goods and the 
degree of home bias
Summation of imported goods 
across countries depend on the 
substitutability between goods 
produced in different countries
Summation of 
variety of goods 
within country i
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Galí and Monacelli (2005) assume that external disturbances impact on a 
representative household which seeks to maximise its utility over its lifetime.  
Accordingly, consumer preferences for foreign goods largely governs the transmission 
of external shocks to the domestic economy. The utility function of the representative 
consumer is specified as  
 
0
0 ,
t
tt
t NCUE               6.1 
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where E is the expectations operator, 
t  is the household’s time discount factor as 
the household seek to maximise the expected present discount value of utility. tC  is a 
composite consumption index defined as a function of consumption of domestic goods 
and imported goods, and tN  is hours of labour.
8  
 
Aggregate consumption is decomposed into the consumption of domestically produced 
goods and the consumption of externally produced goods so that  
 
 
11
,
1
1
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1
1 tFtHt CCC
                 
6.2 
 
where tHC ,  and tFC ,  are indexes of the consumption of domestic and foreign 
produced goods respectively, expressed as a CES function.  The openness of the 
economy is given by , which is the weight on imported goods as we shall discuss 
below. 9 The elasticity of substitution between the demand for domestic and foreign 
goods is given by 0 . The model immediately suggests that external disturbances 
enter the economy through the extent of consumer preferences for foreign goods and 
the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods, assuming constant 
elasticity of substitution.10 
 
                                                 
8
 The consumption function is based on the lifecycle hypothesis.  It should be noted that the real money 
supply is not included in the utility function as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) model.  This is due to the 
fact that GM do not consider currency in their study as in OR. 
9
 An issue which arises here is the degree of home biasness,  which Justiano and Preston (2006) explicitly 
specified in their model.  Here it is assumed that consumers may exercise preference for goods purely 
because they are produced at home. To capture the degree of home bias, Galí and Monacelli (2005) 
allowed 1,0  to be an indicator of this. Another issue that has received attention with respect to the 
consumption function, is the degree of habit persistence which has been modelled by allowing for the 
lagged adjustment of consumption.  
 
10
 This is similar to Obstfeld and Roggof  (1995) where it was assumed that utility maximizing consumers 
exercised their preference to allocate their expenditure between foreign and domestically produced goods 
38 
Consumption of domestic and imported goods is given by the equations 
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and 
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where 1  is the elasticity of substitution between a variety of differentiated goods 
produced by monopolistic firms within country i  while the elasticity of substitution of 
goods produced across countries is given by .11 Moreover, it is assumed that there is 
a constant elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods in the utility 
function. It should be noted that to obtain the aggregate of imported goods, the 
j variety of goods are summed in two dimensions, between all country i ’s to 
obtain tFC ,  (6.1.4) and within each country i  to obtain tiC ,  (6.5).  Accordingly, tiC ,  is 
obtained from the summation of a variety j   of goods imported from country i . 
 
The representative household faces the decision problem of how to maximise its utility 
derived from a basket of goods subject to the budget constraint. The budget constraint 
is formulated so that households can spend no more than their return on capital ( tD ) 
                                                 
11
 1 is a standard assumption in the general equilibrium framework.  See for example Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977), Walsh (2003) and Justiano and Preston (2006). 
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plus their income from labour tt NW  with tW    
being the normal wage rate plus or 
minus lump-sum taxes and transfers )( tT all expressed in terms of domestic currency. 
As a result, Galί and Monacelli (2005) specify the representative household budget 
constraint in the model as: 
 
1
0
1
0
1
0
11,,,,, tttttttttitijtHtH TNWDDQEdidjjCjPdjCjP       6.6 
 
where 1,ttQ  is the stochastic discount factor for one period ahead nominal payoffs of a 
riskless bond held by the household. Woodford (2003) points out that the stochastic 
discount factor arises as the value of the household portfolio in the future depends on 
the state of the world in the future.  As a result when the portfolio choice is made, the 
household assumes that price would vary by a random factor. Moreover, utility in the 
future is valued less than current utility, hence causing the random factor to be 
discounted. 
 
Here it is assumed that the household has the choice of allocating its income on a 
variety of domestic goods represented by the first term on the left hand side, a variety 
of imported goods captured by the second term on the left hand side and the final 
term on left hand side which represents a portfolio of shares in firms.  As such, tHP , is 
the price index of the variety j  of domestically produced goods with 1,0j  such that 
1
1
11
0
,, djjPP tHtH ;  the price of a variety j  of imports from country i  is given 
by )(, jP ti   such that the price index 
1
1
1
,, djjPP titi  with 1,0i  .  Galí and 
Monacelli (2005) also assume that the representative household can make a complete 
set of contingent claims that are traded internationally so that 1tD  is the return on the 
portfolio at 1t in the future.  
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Maximising the utility function subject to the budget constraint yields the following 
demand equations:  
 
tH
tH
tH
tH C
P
jP
jC ,
,
,
,              6.7 
 
ti
ti
ti
ti C
P
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jC ,
,
,
,              6.8 
 
Equation 6.7 indicates that the proportion of expenditure on combination j  is inversely 
related to its price relative to that of other home produced goods depending on the 
elasticity of substitution. Similarly, based on the elasticity of substitution, equation 6.8 
shows that within country i  there would also be an inverse relationship between the 
price of variety j  and its consumption demand depending on the elasticity of 
substitution between varieties of differentiated goods.  In addition, import demand by 
the home country for goods produced in country i  would depend on the 
substitutability between goods produced by different foreign countries, so that 
 
tF
tF
ti
ti C
P
P
C ,
,
,
,               6.9 
 
with the price of aggregate imported goods given by 
1
1
1
0
1
,, diPP titF  and 
consumption expenditure on imports is 
1
0
,,,, tFtFtiti CPdiCP . 
 
As a result, the consumption mix between domestic and imported goods is given by 
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            6.11 
 
where 
 
1
1
1
,
1
,1 tFtHt PPP           6.12 
 
is the consumer price index (CPI). This suggests that if domestic and foreign prices are 
equal, then  measures openness, as it captures the proportion of expenditure on 
imported goods, with 0  implying a closed economy. In addition, the relative 
consumption expenditure on imported goods is based on the elasticity of substitution 
between imports and domestic goods.  
 
Combining the expenditure on domestically produced goods and expenditure on 
imported goods the budget constraint in equation (6.6) can therefore be simplified to: 
 
tttttttttt TNWDDQECP 11,          6.13 
 
As a special case, preferences can be assumed to take the form of a constant relative 
risk aversion utility function, such that 
 
11
,
11 NC
NCU            6.14 
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where is the coefficient of relative risk aversion which can be given as 
U
Uc  
and  represents the inverse elasticity of the labour supply, that is the is the effect 
of domestic output on employment.12  An important property of 6.14 is that the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion is assumed to be constant and increments of the 
marginal utility remains positive by dividing by the power.  It should also be noted that 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is given by 
1
 .   
 
Two demand functions can be derived using this utility function. To do so, (6.14) can be 
inserted into (6.1) and maximised subject to the budget constraint in (6.13), to derive 
and express the first order optimality conditions such that   
  
t
t
tt
P
W
NC              6.15 
and 
 
1,
1
1
tt
t
t
t
t Q
P
P
C
C
           6.16 
 
The equation obtained in (6.15) suggests that the current allocations by households on 
consumption and labour hours are equated with the real wage.  At the same time the 
domestic household intertemporal real consumption is equated with the investment 
expenditure on an internationally traded bond in domestic currency. 
 
Dividing (16) throughout by 1,ttQ the stochastic Euler equation becomes 
 
                                                 
12
 The definition of the coefficient of risk aversion  is called the Arrow-Pratt definition. 
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1
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with 
1,
1
ttt
t
QE
R  being the gross return on the riskless one period discount bond.13 
 
The log-linearised versions of (15) and (17) are 
 
tttt ncpw              6.18 
 
and 
 
11
1
tttttt ErcEc           6.19 
 
such that 11  and CPI inflation is 1ttt pp .   
 
6.2  Effects of Openness on Prices 
 
The bilateral nominal terms of trade can be defined as 
tH
ti
ti
P
P
S
,
,
, , that is, the ratio of 
the price of goods imported from country i in relation to the price of home produced 
goods. The relative demand by the consumer for domestic and foreign goods is 
assumed to impact on the bilateral terms of trade.  Given the large number of 
countries, the effective terms of trade is defined as:14  
 
                                                 
13
 The Euler equation is an intertemporal optimizing equation in which there are dynamic constraints, see 
Michael Wickens (2008). 
14
 The effective terms of trade can be thought of as the average of the bilateral terms of trade. 
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, diS ti            6.20 
 
which in log-linear terms can be approximated as 
 
1
0
, diss tit              6.21 
 
Galí and Monacelli (2005) then relate CPI inflation to the terms of trade by assuming 
that purchasing power parity holds. According to Wickens (2008), purchasing power 
parity holds where the purchasing power of consumers in the home country is the 
same as those in the rest of the world. Assuming purchasing power parity with  
tFtH PP ,,  , the CPI index described in (12) can be related to the terms of trade and 
approximated by 
 
ttHtFyHt spPpp ,,,1           6.22 
 
The relationships described in (21) and (22) are exact when 1 and the log of the 
effective terms of trade is tHtFt pps ,, .  Equation (6.22) therefore suggests that a 
change in the terms of trade has important effects on the movement of CPI inflation 
such that: 
 
 ttHt
s,             6.23 
 
where t is CPI inflation and domestic inflation is 1,,, tHtHtH PP .  
 
The exchange rate is introduced by assuming that it is market determined and the law 
of one price hold at all times with respect to import and export prices. As a result the 
price of the homogeneous variety j  is assumed to be set in the currency of the 
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domestic producer.  Hence jPjP itititi ,,,  for 1,0, ji , where ti ,  is the bilateral 
nominal exchange rate defined as the price of country i ’s currency in terms of the 
price of the home country currency.  Note that jP i ti,  is the price of variety j imported 
from country i  and expressed in terms of the producer price of that country.  As a 
result, the law of one price is maintained as firms exercise producer cost pricing.  This 
suggests that there is no market segmentation so that a single price exists in the world 
for tradable homogeneous goods expressed in the same currency.  Thus a single world 
price index adjusted by the nominal effective exchange rate can be obtained such that 
 
 
1
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tititF pedipeP
          
6.24 
 
where the log of the nominal effective exchange rate is given by 
1
0
,tit ee ,  the log of 
the domestic price index of country i  is given by jpp i ti
i
ti
1
0
,,  with the world price 
index is given by 
1
0
,
* dipp i tit .  As a result, the log of the terms of trade formula can be 
written as  
 
tHttt ppes ,
*             6.25 
 
Galí and Monacelli (2005) went on tos find the relationship between the terms of trade 
and the real exchange rate.  The bilateral real exchange rate is defined as the nominal 
exchange rate by the ratio of the CPIs between an external economy and the domestic 
economy, with both prices expressed in terms of domestic currencies such that: 
t
i
tti
P
P, .  The log of the real effective exchange rate can therefore be defined as 
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1
0
, diqq tit ,  where t
i
ttititi ppeq ,,, log  which takes the form of the nominal 
exchange rate by the terms of trade. Thus   
 
1
0
, dippeq t
i
ttit            6.26 
 
ttt ppe
*
                6.27 
 
Substituting (24) into (27) gives  
 
ttHtt ppsq ,             
6.28 
 
from which 
 
tt sq 1              6.29 
 
where (22) is substituted into (28). 
 
The equation suggests that there is a positive relationship between the terms of trade 
and the real exchange rate.  For example, if the price of home goods falls (increases) 
relative to the price of imported goods, then this would cause the terms of trade to 
increase (fall), as can be seen by considering the definition of the terms of trade where 
tHtFt pps ,,  .  The importance of equation 6.29 is that it shows that the real 
exchange rate would also increase (fall), assuming that α does not change so as to 
offset the result. 
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6.3  International Risk Sharing 
 
The absence of impediments to trade between economies in the Galí and Monacelli 
(2005) model can be offset by the fact that consumption may be disrupted by the risk 
of market failure.  To this end, Corsetti et al. (2008) note that the assumption of 
complete markets is necessary in order to smooth trade.  Wickens (2008) points out 
that the assumption of complete markets implies that each risk can be fully insured by 
the market. As a result, there can be a unique equilibrium price for each transaction as 
all risks arising from different states of nature are fully insured.  
 
Galí and Monacelli (2005) assume that households trade consumption risk 
internationally as international financial markets are assumed to be complete. 
International risk sharing was assumed to allow for the insuring of risk of every type, 
see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). As a result there is the smoothing of consumption 
across time and states of nature so that risk does not dampen consumption and 
consumption is maintained in congruence with the world economy.  
 
International risk sharing is obtained in the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model by 
including the nominal bilateral exchange rate so that the first order condition in (16) 
can be rewritten as 
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6.30 
 
The key difference between (16) and (30) is that whereas (16) equates the 
intertemporal consumption in the domestic economy with the price of the 
internationally traded bond in domestic currency, (30) equates the intertemporal real 
consumption in an external economy in terms of domestic currency against the same 
price of the internationally traded bond held in domestic currency. 
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It should be noted that the bilateral exchange rate is included since it is assumed that 
firms are engaged in producer pricing, so that the export price is adjusted by the 
bilateral exchange rate to account for what consumers in country i  pay. Moreover, 
equation (6.30) suggests that the price of future consumption demand  adjusted by the 
real exchange rate risk is equated with the price of the bond. As such, by combining 
(16) with (30), consumption becomes 
 
1
,ti
i
tit CC             
6.31 
 
where i  is a constant which depends on initial conditions where the environment is 
identical and symmetric such that each country do not initially hold net foreign assets. 
In this particular case it is assumed that 1i . As such risks are traded away with 
1iS  so that purchasing power parity holds for all economies.  Perfect foresight is 
assumed, thus allowing *CCC i .  The perfect foresight assumption is used to 
remove the complexities associated with uncertainty.  As a result, the consumers are 
assumed to make decisions on the basis of the intrinsic logic of the model as opposed 
to through the use of arbitrary assumptions on consumer expectations, see for 
example Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).  
 
Equation (6.31) can be approximated around a steady state and integrated over i  to 
obtain 
 
ttt qcc
1*
             
6.32 
 
where dicc it
1
0
*  represents the log of the index of world consumption. 
 
Substituting (29) into (32) gives 
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ttt scc
1*
            
6.33 
 
For equality (6.33) to hold, it is important that 1 .15  Thus according to Galí and 
Monacelli (2005), the assumption of complete markets allows for a simple relationship 
between domestic consumption with world consumption and the terms of trade. 
 
6.4  Uncovered Interest Parity and the Terms of Trade 
 
The interest rate arises in the model from the trading of bonds. The interest rate 
differential from the trading of a locally denominated bond and a foreign denominated 
bond is derived within an uncovered interest rate parity framework.  Both bonds are 
riskless with the domestic price of the foreign currency denominated bond being 
1,1,
1
, tittt
i
tti QER  and that of the domestic currency denominated bond is 
1,
1
tttt QER . Thus, assuming uncovered interest rate parity, the differential 
between domestic and external return in terms of domestic currency can be expressed 
as 
 
0/ ,1,1, titi
i
ttttt RRQE           
6.34 
 
Assuming perfect foresight steady state, then approximating (6.34) by log linearizing 
with respect to i  gives 
 
1
*
tt eErr             6.35 
                                                 
15
 If there is perfect substitution between import and domestic prices, such that , then this would 
necessitate a different form of the CPI and consumption indices. As such, the CPI and consumption 
indexes would from equations 6.12 and 6.2  to become  and   
respectively. 
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where *r  is the world interest rate. 
 
Substituting (6.25) into (6.35) gives 
 
11,
*
1
*
tttHtttttt sEErErs         
6.36 
 
Solving forward, (6.36) becomes  
 
0
1,
*
1
*
k
ktHktktkttt rrEs
         
6.37 
 
which suggests that the terms of trade are influenced by current and anticipated real 
interest rate differentials.  
 
6.5  Firms 
 
6.5.1 Technology 
 
In the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model, firms are assumed to be identical in cost and 
operate in monopolistic markets. Each firm produces a continuum of differentiated 
goods using linear technology.  As a result, the production function is specified as: 
 
)()( jNAjY tti             6.38 
 
where 1,0j  and tA is stochastic disturbance to technology which is assumed to 
follow an autoregressive process.16 As such, tt Aa log  which can be specified as an 
                                                 
16
 See Woodford (2003).   
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AR(1) process such that ttaaa 1 .  The linear technology suggests that there is a 
one to one correspondence between output and incremental increases in labour 
supply.  
 
Also, the first order approximation of the production function in equation (6.38) is: 
 
t
n
t
a
t
y              6.39 
 
 
In addition to technological innovations, external shocks are assumed to impact 
through the pass through of external prices on inflation via its effect on the marginal 
cost.17 To see this assume that the typical domestic firm has real marginal cost 
 
ttHtt apwvmc ,            6.40 
 
with 1logv  where  is the employment subsidy.   The subsidy plays the role 
of offsetting the distortion in the real wage created by monopolistic competition in the 
goods market. The real marginal cost is essentially the discrepancy between the 
marginal supply cost and the product price, that is the nominal marginal cost divided 
by the price level, see Rudd and Whelan (2002).  In this case it would be the wage rate 
in relation to the product price, subsidy and technological level in the last period. 
 
Summing all the differentiated goods of the firm, its output tY  is 
11
0
1
dj
tt jYY .  Accordingly, Galí and Monacelli (2005) relate the production 
                                                 
17
 This is also elaborated on by Justiniano and Preston (2006). 
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function directly to the employment index where 
tA
tZtY
djjtN
t
N
1
0 with 
1
0 dj
tY
jtY
t
Z  . 
 
6.5.2  Price Setting 
 
Borrowing from Calvo (1983), Galí and Monacelli (2005) assume that price adjustment 
is staggered thus causing price rigidities. These price rigidities give rise to the short-run 
trade-off between inflation and output.   
 
In each period, a randomly selected number of firms are assumed to set new prices 
optimally at tHp ,
_
 to maximise their expected profits.  For each firm, the probability of 
price being sticky is given by the constant  so that there is a constant probability of 
1  that it would receive the signal to re-optimize its nominal price. 18 Where the firm 
re-optimises it does so in a bid to minimise the variance between its price and the 
optimum price. Using a log-linear rule, the log of the forward looking new domestic 
price ( tHp ,
_
) in each period is a function of the proportion of firms that re-optimise.  As 
a result the new price can be approximated by 
 
tHktt
K
K
tH PmcEp ,
0
,
_
1
        
6.41 
 
where 
1
log  is the log of the optimal markup on the steady state. 
                                                 
18
 A variant of the Galí and Monacelli model as assumed by Justiniano and Preston (2006), is that the 
remaining firms set price )(, iP tH , using an indexation rule where 
.loglog 1,1,, tHtHtH iPiP  
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Here it is assumed that the firm which re-optimises its price take a forward looking 
view of its real marginal cost and therefore re-optimises its price taking these 
expectations into account.19 The firm takes a forward view of the real marginal cost 
since it expects the newly set price to exist for a while before it can be changed. 
Accordingly tHp ,
_
 is set as a weighted average of expected future marginal costs. For 
the flexible price limit which is obtained where 0 , Galí and Monacelli (2005) 
points out that the markup rule would be 
 
tHttH pmcP ,,
_
           6.42
 
 
6.6   IS and Phillips curves 
 
6.6.1   Examination of the Demand side 
 
The critical steps used to derive the IS curve in the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model are 
outlined in Box 2.  Essentially, the log linear specification of the inter-temporal 
optimality is substituted into the open economy equilibrium in order to derive the IS 
curve.   
                                                 
19
 Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003) also assumes that those firms which do not reoptimise their price 
update their price based on the long-run average gross rate of inflation.  
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Box 2:  Critical Equations for the Derivation of the IS Curve 
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In order to find market clearing between output and consumption, the production of 
variety j in the home country ( jYt ), can either be consumed at home jC tH ,  or in 
country i .  As a result, for a given variety 
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where jC tH ,  is the demand for variety j  in the domestic economy and the second 
equality follows from (9) to (11). Here jC i tH ,  is the demand by country i for variety j 
produced in the domestic economy.  Hence consumption of output is divided between 
the domestic and external economy.  It should be noted that in the domestic economy 
the consumption of variety j is inversely related to the price elasticity of substitution 
between the variety of locally produced goods, the terms of trade and the price 
elasticity of domestically produced goods to total goods available in the domestic 
economy. With respect to the external demand for the home country produce, the 
demand for combination j  is dependent on the degree of openness of the home 
economy, as well as the price elasticity of substitution across external economies and 
within economy i .  
 
Galí and Monacelli then show that the market clears when   
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given that  
11
0
1
1
djjYY tt , 
i
tS is the effective terms of trade of country i and tiS ,  
is the bilateral terms of trade of domestic goods to foreign produced goods. This 
suggests that home output clears where it is equal to home expenditure on domestic 
and externally produced goods. 
 
Where 1 and the typical household reflects symmetrical preferences 
across countries then the CPI index becomes 20 
 
                                                 
20
 Wickens (2008) suggests that perfect substitutes as would be obtained where 1 , would imply 
constant terms of trade and a single world price. 
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tFtHt PPP ,
1
,
            6.45 
 
The CPI equation noted in (6.22) is now expressed as a  Cob Douglas function by 
imposing the restrictions of constant and perfect elasticity of substitution.  As a result,  
is constant and now acts as the elasticity of substitution between imports and 
domestically produced goods. As noted in (6.12),  then becomes the proportion of 
domestic consumption allocated to imports and therefore the elasticity of imports to 
domestic consumption.  
 
As a result, dividing by tHP , , (6.45) becomes  
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Consequently, where 1  the market clears  in (6.47), given that the terms of 
trade are unity, with output in the economy equal to the real composite consumption 
index in an open economy context such that 
 
ttt SCY              6.47 
 
Galί and Monacelli (2005) point out that a first order log linear approximation can be 
derived around a symmetric steady state such that 
 
tttt qscy
1
tt sc
         
6.48 
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where 11 21.  Accordingly, 1 when 1 . This suggests 
that under these circumstances the open economy demand is extended purely by the 
degree of openness and the terms of trade when compared to the closed economy.  As 
such elasticity effects disappear from the equilibrium obtained in (48). However, the 
elasticity effects enter the equilibrium when 1 (<1) if and only if 1  (<1).  
Another point to observe is that the terms of trade is considered here to improve 
where tHP , > tFP ,  or 0ts , since this suggests that what is received for a unit of 
domestic good is higher than what the country must pay for the same unit of import. 
As such improvements in the terms of trade would have a negative effect on output, or 
according as suggested by Clarida (2007) it leads to a negative substitution effect.   
 
Moreover, world market equilibrium can be expressed as 
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where *ty  and 
*
tc  are indexes of world output and world consumption in log terms 
respectively. 
 
Combining (6.47) with (6.19) gives 
 
111
1
ttttttt sEEryEy
        
6.50 
 
11,1
1
tttHtttt sEEryE      6.51
22 
                                                 
21
 The steady state refers to the long run path when all past shocks have fully worked through the system. 
 
22
 To substitute  in 6.50 with  in 6.51,   can be expanded to be equal to 
.  Multiplying  and adding and subtracting 2 on the 
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*
11,1
1
tttHtttt yEEryE      6.52
23 
 
where 
 
0
1
            6.53 
 
which is impacted on by the degree of openness, substitutability between domestic 
and foreign goods and 112 .  
 
Equation (6.52) shows that all things being equal an increase in openness, increases 
 thus reducing the slope parameter, 
1
.24  This would suggest that output would 
be more responsive to a change in the real interest rate.   
 
6.6.2  Derivation of the IS curve 
 
The output gap is defined as  
 
_
ttt yyx              6.54 
 
                                                                                                                                               
right hand side gives .  This 
implies that . 
23
 Given that  is the perfect foresight steady state consumption, it is constant in the longrun.  Thus in 
the longrun,   directly impact  in equation 6.48, all things been equal.  Thus  is substituted in 
652 in place of  . 
24
 It can also be noted that the further  increases above one, the flatter the slope of equation (52) 
becomes.  However, Galί and Monacelli (2005) controls for this possibility by assuming that 1 , 
so that the slope is solely dependent on the degree of openness. 
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where the domestic natural level of output is expressed as 
_
y .  Galí and Monacelli 
(2005) derived 
_
y  as 
 
*
_
ttt yay             6.55 
 
with 
v
, 0
1
 and . 
 
As shown by (6.55), all things being equal, the natural level of output is increasing in 
world output. The equation is critical as it suggests that the natural rate would expand 
if there are technological progress, an increase in openness and or growth in world 
output. This is also supported by Wickens (2008) who notes that in an open economy, 
output can be expanded beyond domestic consumption as a result of an expansion in 
investments thus allowing output to increase, resulting in the export of surpluses. 
Moreover, imported capital goods can boost further production.   
 
From (6.52), a version of the IS curve with respect to the output gap can be derived as 
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6.56 
 
where the natural rate of interest is given by 
 
*
1
__
1 tttat yEarr         6.57 
 
From (6.52), the slope of the IS becomes flatter as openness increases.  According to 
Clarida (2007), the monetary authority gets more bang from every change in the real 
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interest rate the more open the economy is.  Consequently, we can draw the IS curve 
flatter for the open economy. 
 
6.7   Supply Side of the Economy 
 
The derivation of the Phillips curve can be traced through the intratemporal elasticity 
condition as shown in Box 3.  The movement from the closed to open economy Phillips 
curve is dependent on the specification of the marginal const with respect to firms.  
Galί and Monacelli (2005) arrive at the open economy Phillips curve through a series of 
substitutions into the closed economy Phillips equation. 
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Box 3:  Critical Equations for the Derivation of the Open Economy Phillips Curve 
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In broad terms the real marginal cost and expected inflation are assumed to have a 
critical influence on the current inflation rate. As a result domestic inflation is 
described as 
 
ttHttH mcE 1,,            
6.58 
 
where  
 
62 
11
             6.59 
 
and tmc is the log deviation of the real marginal cost from its steady state value.  The 
probability of an individual firm reopotimising is assumed to be independent of the 
probability of the time lapsed since the last price adjustment. Here it is assumed that 
the old price is relevant to the firm up to the period it is reoptimised.  Note that is 
like the odds of a firm reoptimising its price so that the inflation level is higher when 
the odds of a firm reoptimising its price increases.  
The real marginal cost in the closed economy can be expressed through the equation  
 
ttHtt apwvmc ,            
6.60 
 
Equation (6.60) can be expanded with substitutions to arrive at the open economy real 
marginal cost with respect to the impact of the terms of trade and the wealth effects of 
trade on domestic consumption as well as the world output.25  Adding tt pp  gives, 
 
ttHtttt apppwvmc ,          6.61 
tttt asncv  substituting from equations (6.18 and 6.22) 
 
tttt asyyv 1
*  substituting from (6.33, 6.40 and 6.49)     6.62 
 
The last equality suggests that the real marginal cost is increasing in world output, 
domestic output and the terms of trade.   
 
                                                 
25
 The terms of trade and the wealth effects are analogous to the substitution and income effects referred to 
by Clarida (2007). 
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Alternatively, the substitution effects captured through the addition and subtraction of 
 into the open economy, can be introduced to the real marginal cost equation such 
that  
 
tttt ayyvmc 1
*         6.63 
 
This suggests that the effect of a change in domestic output on real marginal cost is 
dependent on the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods and the wealth 
effect as a result of changes in employment which is spurred by changes in the wage 
rate.26 Note that the inclusion of the substitution effect would dampen the effect of an 
increase in world output on the marginal cost once .  It is also important to 
note that a change in world output comes through the substitution effect captured as 
 which is dependent on the degree of openness.  At the limit if as would be 
obtained when 0 , then there would be no spill-over from changes in world output 
to marginal cost in the domestic economy.  
 
In terms of the output gap, its relation with the real marginal cost becomes  
 
tt xmc             6.64 
 
So that the NKPC is 
 
ttHttH xE 1,,            
6.65 
 
with .  
 
                                                 
26
 The wealth effect referred to by Galί and Monacelli (2005), is analogous to the income effect referred to 
by Clarida (2007). 
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Critical here is the magnitude of the slope coefficient . The size of the slope depends 
on the substitution and wealth effects of changes in the output gap on account of 
openness of the economy and the degree of substitutability between goods. However, 
all things been equal, increases with expansions in the degree of openness given 
equation (6.53) providing that 1 . This therefore suggests that the slope  would 
be influenced by the degree of openness given its influence on   such that the slope 
of the new Keynesian curve becomes flatter as the degree of openness increases.27  
Nevertheless, by allowing , k reverts to that of the closed economy so that the 
slope would be dependent on the relative sizes of the intertemporal substitutability 
and the wealth effects akin to the closed economy.  From an examination of (63) it 
should be noted that external output does not act through the wealth channel on the 
real marginal cost of the domestic economy.  Rather a change in external output comes 
though the substitution effect. However, a change in domestic output comes through 
the combination of the wealth and substitution effect.  
 
6.8   The Monetary Reaction Function 
 
A monetary reaction function is needed to close the model as shown in Figure 1 in 
chapter 2.  For monetary policy to be optimum Galí and Monacelli (2005) contends that 
it should replicate the flexible price equilibrium in order to achieve a stable 
equilibrium.  This equilibrium is a steady state one in which the markup on real 
marginal costs are stabilized to their long-run level thus allowing domestic prices to be 
stabilized.  To attain such an equilibrium, all of the distortions assumed in the 
formulation of the IS and new Keynesian Philips curve were removed. These frictions 
were with respect to: 
1) Employment/wage distortion caused by market power of firms.  To remove 
this, Galí and Monacelli (2005) applied an employment subsidy  which is 
                                                 
27
 In Clarida (2007) the Phillips curve becomes flatter when the income effects outweigh the terms of 
trade effects. 
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incorporated in equation (6.39). As a result the employment subsidy 
neutralizes the market power of the firms. 
2) Terms of trade distortion arising from imperfect substitution between 
domestic and foreign goods. Equation (6.48) suggests that an implication of 
this is that an improvement in the terms of trade where tFtH PP ,, , would 
have a negative effect on output once 1.  Galí and Monacelli (2005) 
removes this distortion by assuming that the law of one price holds and 
they therefore consider the special case where 1.  This 
therefore allows for perfect elasticity of substitution so that the substitution 
effect is cancelled out. 
3) This left only the price stickiness distortion to be addressed.  This friction is 
addressed through the implementation of monetary policy. 
 
 Galí and Monacelli (2005) noted that the traditional Taylor rule is a possible form of 
the reaction function, where the central bank is assumed to adjust the short-term 
interest rate in response to the deviation of inflation or the output gap from their 
target values. Here it is assumed that the central bank only cares about domestic 
inflation and the output gap and manages it through the short term nominal interest 
rate according to the Taylor rule.  
 
Consequently, the central bank is assumed to be committed to the Taylor rule in an 
economy where the only remaining rigidity is price stickiness. Inflation persistence is 
ruled out as the central bank implements the Taylor rule around an inflation rate that is 
zero on average around a steady state equilibrium such that 
 
0,tHt xx                       
 (6.65) 
 
66 
This leaves r  to respond to short term deviations of output or inflation from their long 
run equilibrium path while the natural rate of interest is impacted on by the degree of 
openness.  In the model, openness impact on the sensitivity of inflation and output 
deviations to changes in the short-term interest rate. The monetary authority can 
therefore be assumed to follow the traditional Taylor rule, where 
 
txtHt xrrr ,
__
            
6.66 
 
Importantly, the exposure to external disturbances in this economy is realised through 
changes in the structural relationships that govern the IS and new Keynesian Phillips 
curve, rather than through their direct inclusion of such disturbances or exchange rates 
into the Taylor rule equation. 
 
7.0  Implications of the IS and PC for the monetary reaction function 
 
One way of analysing the importance of the Galí and Monacelli (2005) open economy 
IS and PC equations for the Taylor rule, is to see how openness extends the ideas 
espoused for the closed economy Taylor (1993) rule. For this reason, it is instructive to 
see how the open economy ideas add to the closed economy graphically depicted in 
Carlin and Soskice (2005).  To this end, we first replicate the closed economy model 
outlined by Carlin and Soskice (2005).   
 
Unlike Carlin and Soskice (2005) model, inflation persistence is not assumed as Galí and 
Monacelli (2005) rules out average inflation bias with inflation mean reverting to zero. 
The version of the Phillips curve specified by the former is based on the assumption 
that inflation is persistent so that inflationary bias is assumed to exist. Inflation bias is 
assumed to exist where expected inflation is greater than the inflation target.  As a 
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result the inertial rate of inflation is the shift factor of the Phillips curve.28 Monetary 
policy is therefore assumed to act with a lag of at least one year.  
 
To discover the implications of the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model, we superimpose 
our interpretation of the open economy equations. Our benchmark model as outlined 
in Carlin and Soskice (2005) is laid down with the use of bold lines. The IS curve is 
drawn separately and placed in the diagram above the Phillips curve to emphasize the 
implications of the latter for changes in the real interest rate. The natural rate of 
output (
_
Y ) is drawn vertical to capture the long-run equilibrium output. In this way, 
the difference between actual output and the natural rate in (54) captures the output 
gap on the horizontal axes of both diagrams.   
 
In the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model, inflation bias is assumed to be removed by 
government through an employment subsidy that is geared to offset the effects of 
market power on price.  Consequently the Phillips curve is based on a forward looking 
assumption as current inflation is related to expectations of future inflation. They 
therefore make use of the expectations hypothesis.  
                                                 
28
 By inertial inflation it is assumed that continuous change in prices take place on the basis of last period 
contract.  
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Figure 2 Equilibrium Determination and Monetary rule 
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We summarise the canonical representation of the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model in 
Figure 2.  Under the assumptions outlined in the study, three key results can be 
llustrated in the Figure: 
a) Increased openness allows the natural rate of output shown a *Y to expand 
beyond that of the closed economy, see equation (6.55).   
b) The open economy IS and open economy Phillips curves shown as IS* and 
PC* are flatter than their closed economy counterparts, once , see 
equations (6.52) and (6.65).   
69 
c) The open economy Phillips curve collapses to that of a closed economy 
Phillips curve once , see equation (6.53). 
 
8.0 Limitations of the Galí and Monacelli (2005) model 
 
Two principal limitations with respect to the Galί and Monacelli (2005) model can be 
noted.  Firstly, the incorporation of the external economy disturbances is incomplete.  
This is partly due to the fact that it does not allow for supply spillovers from the 
external economic cycles of the trading partners of the domestic economy to the 
marginal cost of domestic firms.  By assuming perfect intertemporal substitution and 
perfect substitution between domestic and foreign goods, they arrive at the law of one 
price..  As a result, by substituting 1 in (6.53) and (6.63) it can be seen that 
the terms of trade would be kept at unity and there is no spillover from external output 
to the marginal cost of firms in the domestic economy so that the marginal cost is 
shaped solely by domestic factors.  
 
Later, Clarida (2007) showed that supply spillovers from external output to potential 
domestic output and the real interest rate can be obtained by relaxing the perfect 
elasticity of substitution assumption when 1.  He supported this by suggesting that 
as foreign output rises the terms of trade improves for the domestic economy which 
pulls up the domestic output as labour reacts positively to higher rewards. Thus 
according to Carida (2007) the substitution effect  takes place which boost domestic 
potential output. 
 
Secondly, the manner of incorporation of the exchange rate into the model is limited 
for the following reasons: 
1. It assumes that the only price target of policy makers is the inflation target. It 
does not therefore consider the idea of policy makers targeting a hybrid of 
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inflation and exchange rate deviations. As a result different exchange rate 
regimes with varying degrees of floats were not considered. 
2. It assumes that the domestic currency is internationally acceptable as the 
means of payment.  This however, is not the case for emerging markets. 
3. It ignores the expenditure switching effect of the exchange rate.  This is 
particularly as a result of the assumption of perfect substitution such that the 
exchange rate is dependent on the parity relationship with respect to the terms 
of trade.    
Batini and Levine (2007) develop on the first two points.  On the first point, they 
investigate the use of the Taylor rule under different degrees of exchange rate 
flexibility in emerging economies and consequently recommend the inclusion of the 
exchange rate in the reaction function. They note that exchange rates may be unstable 
in emerging markets as these economies may often suffer external shocks and may be 
prone to suffering reversals in foreign exchange earnings.  Moreover, the availability of 
foreign exchange is a constraining factor to the maintenance of a stable exchange rate. 
Thus according to them, where exchange rate stabilization is therefore the choice of 
exchange rate policy, the country should consider the inclusion of the exchange rate 
into the Taylor rule in a bid to stabilize both inflation and the exchange rate. 
 
To construct their model, they assumed the existence of a two-block market: the 
emerging market and the rest of the world (ROW). The emerging market bloc consists 
primarily of households, firms and government. For the household sector they 
assumed that households exhibit a preference not only for consumption and labour, 
but also for real domestic and real foreign end of period currency balances.  Here, 
money acts as a substitute to both consumption and leisure. The demand for money 
balances are for transaction purposes which are influenced by the exchange rate 
movements. As such, foreign currency balances are required to allow the home 
country to engage in transactions with the rest of the world. 
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The production side in the emerging market is vertically integrated with respect to 
three types of firms, wholesale, retail and capital producing firms.  Retail firms buy 
wholesale goods sell and sell differentiated goods to households in domestic currency. 
Capital producers generate new capital and sell to wholesale firms.  Their gross 
investments utilize domestic and foreign final goods. The wholesale firms borrow from 
households through the use of domestic and foreign currency denominated bonds. 
However, changes in the exchange rate impacts on the cost of financing investments as 
firms must repay path of their debt in foreign currency. In addition, movements of the 
exchange rate also impact the expected discount profits of capital producing firms. 
 
With respect to the importance of the expenditure switching effect of the exchange 
rate, Shi and Xu (2008) contends that in an economy where the propensity to import 
consumption and capital goods is high, such as is typical of emerging markets, 
expenditure switching effects of exchange rate movements tend to be weak.  Instead, 
inflationary effects tend to dominate output effects. An implication of this is that the 
monetary authorities may find it desirable to include the stabilisation of the exchange 
rate into the reaction function in order to foster price stabilisation. 
 
9.0   Conclusion 
 
There is yet to be a complete theory of the transmission of open economy shocks as 
theoretical findings are sensitive to the assumptions made. Having started from the 
closed economy form, the open economy open economy DGSE models have focussed 
on applying monetary rules to the canocal framework containing the IS and open 
economy new Keynesian curve.  A dilemma in this respect, concerns whether it is 
sufficient to account for the effects of monetary policy on the open economy by simply 
allowing the slopes of the PC and IS while maintaining the same Taylor (1993) form 
which was predicated on closed economy version or whether the effects of the open 
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economy should be captured by incorporating another variable into the Taylor rule, 
such as the exchange rate. Here Galί and Monacelli (1995) suggest that the former 
where the open economy effects can be seen through changes in the slopes in the PC 
and IS equations. Nevertheless, Batini and Levine (2007) show that by altering the 
utility function to include domestic and foreign currency, there is a case for inclusion of 
the exchange rate in the monetary reaction function.   
 
Though Batini and Levine (2007) and Shi and Xu (2008) show the importance of the 
exchange rate in the monetary reaction function, one of the weakest part of the 
theoretical work is with respect to the application of the Taylor rule to managed floats 
where countries may vary in terms of the type of managed float they exercise. For 
example, the literature have not dealt with the situation where the central bank is the 
near monopoly supplier of foreign exchange in the economy.  Indeed, the various 
models reviewed still do not investigate the implications of a managed float where 
government is the major supplier of foreign exchange to the market.   
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Chapter 3 
 
Practical issues in transitioning to market based monetary 
policy 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
In this chapter we examine the economic conditions in the Trinidad and Tobago 
economy as it seeks to transition to the use of market based monetary policy for which 
the Taylor-type rule may be applied. Based on the IMF (2004) typology, we suggest that 
the country is at the second stage of money market development. According to this 
typology, markets at stage zero are those that are seeking to establish the functions of 
the central bank. At stage 1, countries develop financial intermediaries through which 
the central bank use rule based instruments. Those that are seeking to transition to 
market based monetary policy are at stage 2, which includes the development of the 
interbank market and money market instruments.  Stage 3 is the advanced stage that is 
typical of advanced industrialised countries such as the UK and the US where money 
markets are diversified and the central bank rely on the use of money market 
instruments. Accordingly, the Trinidad and Tobago economy is still in the process of 
transitioning towards a money market based monetary policy. We compare and 
benchmark the progress towards market based monetary policy with that of the UK 
and the US. 
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The novelty of this chapter is that we show that whereas the developed countries are 
able to use the market mechanism to induce financial institutions to respond to 
changes in the policy rate of the central bank, developing countries such as Trinidad 
and Tobago use moral suasion to achieve the same result, owing to a lesser stage of 
market development. In particular, changes in the Central Bank repo rate acts as a 
signal to market players, of how the central bank would like the commercial banks to 
adjust their interest rates.  The central bank is able to evoke this response through 
moral suasion. We have not seen this point emphasized in previous work. 
 
From chapter 2, it is noted that Taylor (1993) developed the rule directly for the US, a 
large and relatively closed economy. Later, the analysis is extended to open economies 
by Galí and Monacelli (2005) and Batini and Levine (2007) who developed open 
economy IS and Phillips equations to analyse the economy and derive optimal 
monetary policy rules with either fixed, flexible and managed exchange rates.   
 
Taylor (1998) contends that the results obtained from the application of the Taylor 
(1993) rule under these circumstances is insufficient to base decision making on, since 
the historical experiences of the economy should not be ignored. He therefore sought 
to complement the model-based approach with a historical analysis.  Here, we examine 
the particulars of the managed float as practiced by Trinidad and Tobago, in order to 
discover the underlying features of this economy that are pertinent to the application 
of the Taylor type rule.  
 
To begin the discussion, we examine the economic background of Trinidad and Tobago, 
noting its degree of openness to trade and capital flows through foreign direct 
investment (FDI). We also examine the importance of FDI and the energy sector to 
exports and government tax revenues.  We next turn our attention to price stability, 
showing the difference between headline and core inflation as well as domestic 
inflation.  We note that inflationary pressures results in the economy from factors such 
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as non-energy deficits, wage pressures, excess liquidity owing to the inability of the 
real side of the economy to absorb increases in energy inflows and the upward trend in 
food import prices.  
 
We then examine how Trinidad and Tobago measures inflation. The inflation rate is 
measured in terms of consumer price index, which can be divided into headline and 
core inflation. Also, we capture domestic inflation in terms of the producer price index. 
This allows us to represent imported inflation as the difference between headline and 
domestic inflation. The data show that CPI and imported inflation were elevated to 
higher levels in post 2003.  
 
In addition, we use a VECM to plot impulse response functions with respect to shocks 
in exchange rates and import prices. Here we find that shocks in the exchange rate 
have a large and persistent effect on import prices. What is important also is that these 
shocks rise between two to four months. Shocks in import prices also cause the 
exchange rate to depreciate within two to four months, but the effect is mild 
compared to the effect of the exchange rate on import prices. 
 
We then show that the cycles of the Trinidad and Tobago output gap roughly coincide 
with the US economic cycle. Following this, we examine the important issue as to how 
the central bank manages the exchange rate. We show that the central bank principally 
stabilises the exchange rate through judicious supply of foreign currency to the foreign 
exchange market.  
 
This is followed by an examination of monetary policy geared towards inflation 
management.  The new style of monetary transmission conducted by the central bank 
is examined.  Noting the perennial problem of excess liquidity, we discuss how the 
central bank engages in liquidity management. Here we note a direct causal 
relationship between increased energy receipts and excess liquidity in the economy. 
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This causes the central bank to rely on a combination of old and new instruments to 
arrest the excess liquidity problem, since the repo rate is more effective when liquidity 
is tight. However, in order to deemphasise the dependence on traditional instruments, 
we note the steps taken by the central bank to accelerate development of the money 
and capital markets. We also highlight the instruments traded in the money market, in 
which the 90 day Treasury bill rate was the most regularly traded. Here we give a 
detailed overview on the frequency of trading of the Treasury bill. We also outline the 
use of the repo rate by the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago (CBTT).  
 
We then compare the transmission mechanism in Trinidad and Tobago with that in the 
UK and US, noting that the UK and US have multiple transmission mechanisms which 
reflect their deeper financial markets. In contrast to Trinidad and Tobago, the 
transmission mechanisms in these countries are based on flexible exchange rates, 
more developed securities market and developed capital markets.  The result is that 
Trinidad and Tobago has limited market capacity to grapple with high liquidity that 
arises from rising oil prices. The major difference here is that the CBTT is forced to use 
moral suasion to guide the market as a result of underdeveloped financial markets.  
 
Further, we show that the Treasury bill rate in Trinidad and Tobago is highly correlated 
with and dependent on the Treasury bill rate in the US, so there is the absence of 
monetary independence with respect to determination of the rate of the principal 
instrument traded in the Trinidad and Tobago money market. The study is then 
concluded. 
.  
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2.0  Economic background in Trinidad and Tobago 
 
2.1  Economic Backdrop 
 
Trinidad and Tobago is a twin island republic located in the Caribbean. The smallness of 
the economy can be gleaned from the fact it consists of a landmass of 5,130 square 
kilometres and a population of just over 1.3 million.  In 2008, Trinidad and Tobago was 
ranked by the World Bank as number 56 in the world in terms of income per capita 
when the Atlas methodology was used and number 53 when purchasing power parity 
was used.29  Accordingly, per capita income was US$16,590 and 24,240 international 
dollars respectively.  As a result, the country is classified as a high middle income 
country, reflecting one of the highest levels of wealth in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. 
 
The economy is very open, exhibiting a high dependence on external trade. Total trade 
in terms of exports and imports was significant in relation to GDP, ranging between 75 
per cent to just over 100 per cent over the period 1997 to 2009, see Table 1. The 
import GDP ratio ranged between 32 per cent and 53 per cent during the period, but 
exports were higher in relation to GDP: over 40 per cent in most cases.30 The UK 
economy can also be considered to be open, with the degree of openness been over 
0.83. This is in contrast to the US where openness ranged between 11 and 14 per cent. 
As such, the Trinidad economy can be considered open relative to the US economy, but 
not the UK.   
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 Statistics obtained from the World Bank Database.  The ranking is based on 210 
countries. 
30
 This is similar to the UK economy where the aggregate exports plus imports also accounted for a high 
proportion of GDP. 
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Table 1  Openness of Trinidad and Tobago economy relative to US and UK (%) 
Year Dependence of 
Trinidad and 
Tobago on 
Foreign Trade 
TT Openness 
 
UK openness US Openness Growth 
in 
energy 
prices 
(%) Imports 
to GDP 
Exports 
to GDP 
(Exports plus 
Imports)/GDP 
(Exports plus 
Imports)/GDP 
(Exports plus 
Imports)/GDP 
1997 53 44 97 85 12  
1998 50 37 87 82 11 -0.29 
1999 40 41 81 87 11 0.28 
2000 41 52 92 102 11 0.56 
2001 40 48 88 97 10 -0.11 
2002 41 43 83 90 10 -0.02 
2003 34 45 79 85 10 0.17 
2004 37 48 84 83 11 0.31 
2005 36 60 95 91 11 0.38 
2006 35 75 110 95 12 0.19 
2007 37 63 99 86 13 0.10 
2008 37 69 106 97 14 0.40 
2009 32 43 75   -0.37 
 
Source: Trinidad and Tobago data were tabulated from the CBTT database. The Uk and US GDP data 
were obtained from the World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data.  UK and 
US trade data were obtained from the IFS online database. 
 
The Trinidad and Tobago economy exhibit a heavy dependence on trade and is 
therefore susceptible to disturbances occurring in external economies.  Exports are 
highly concentrated in favour of energy. The primary energy base is diversified into oil, 
natural gas and LNG.  In addition, the country also export petrochemicals, including 
methanol, ammonia, urea and nitrogeneous fertilizers. Other exports include steel rods 
and billets, light manufactures and services. As such, exports were dominated by raw 
materials and intermediate goods, which accounted for over 85 per cent of total 
exports between the period 1997 and 2009.  
 
Export revenues are boosted by rising energy prices, see Figure 3. Following an upward 
trend in oil and natural gas prices, the exports of fuels grew in importance to total 
exports, rising from 46.0 per cent in 1997 to 70 per cent in 2009.31 The percentage of 
                                                 
31
 Statistics were tabulated from the Annual Economic Survey, Trinidad and Tobago. 
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exports to GDP is highly correlated with energy prices as the correlation in yearly terms 
was 0.80 for the period 1997 to 2009. This is evident when exports to GDP ratio fell in 
2009 as the average energy price index dipped sharply by 37 per cent for 2009, after 
steady increases since 2003.   
 
Figure 3  Energy Price Index 
 
Source: IMF Notes -- Commodity Fuel (energy) Index, 2005 = 100, includes Crude oil (petroleum), 
Natural Gas, and Coal Price Indices. 
 
Stemming from its strong performance on the external current account, Trinidad and 
Tobago accumulated by far the largest gross international reserves in the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), as its official reserves grew 6.8 times from 1997 to 2009 to 
reach US$ 8.7 billion or 13.1 months of import cover by the end of 2009.32 The bulk of 
the reserves were in the hands of the central bank.  
 
                                                 
32
 See the Report on the Economic Performance and Convergence of the CARICOM Region 
(For the period June – December 2010). 
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2.2  Foreign Direct Investment 
 
The energy sector benefitted from foreign direct investments.  Moreover, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) is the major form of external capital inflows. Generally FDI was 
higher in the first part of the overall sample period starting as high as 17.4 per cent of 
GDP, see Table 2.  Total FDI into Trinidad and Tobago from the US is higher than that 
emanating from the UK.  However, FDI into the UK was elevated for the period 1999 to 
2003, reaching over 36.8 per cent of total FDI.  FDI into the US was as high as 74 per 
cent by 2005. It is instructive to note however, that FDI in Trinidad and Tobago fell back 
dramatically for both the UK and US in 2008, amidst the global crises. 
 
Table 2  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the US and UK to Trinidad and Tobago 
as a percentage of GDP 
 Total FDI in 
Trinidad and 
Tobago to GDP 
(%) 
US FDI to total 
FDI (%) 
UK FDI to total 
FDI (%) 
1997 17.42 48.3 5.5 
1998 12.07 71.7 13.6 
1999 9.41 42.7 36.1 
2000 8.30 46.5 37.5 
2001 9.41 44.6 36.8 
2002 8.73 44.6 36.8 
2003 7.11 46.5 36.8 
2004 7.48 69.9 17.0 
2005 4.60 73.8 17.5 
2006 4.78 71.0 17.0 
2007 3.95 69.2 19.2 
2008 10.73 14.4 5.2 
Source: Tabulated from the Trinidad and Tobago Central Bank Database. 
 
 
External energy revenue inflows were greater than what the real side could absorb in 
the short run. Instead, in most cases funds that could not be immediately absorbed 
through investments in the real side, tended to be accumulated as excess reserves held 
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by the banking system. As a result there was a high positive correlation between 
inflows of foreign energy inflows and the build up of excess reserves.   
 
2.3   Derived Government Revenues and Expenditure 
 
The energy sector grew in importance in financing of fiscal revenues as it grew from 
just under 23 per cent in 1997 to as high as 62 per cent by 2005/6 budget period and 
then hovered close to 50 per cent thereafter, see Table 3.  The sector benefitted largely 
from the upward trend in energy prices. 
 
 
Table 3  Importance of Fuel Exports as a percentage of GDP and Impact on Government Deposits in 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Year Importance of 
fuel to total 
exports 
(%) 
Contribution 
of energy to 
fiscal revenue 
(%) 
Growth in 
Government 
Deposits at the 
Central Bank 
(%) 
Non-oil fiscal 
balance  
1997 46.07 22.7  -5.7 
1998 43.82 17.7 -43.3 -6.3 
1999 54.10 20.8 64.6 -7.8 
2000 61.76 34.4 119.1 -7.5 
2001 59.93 27.6 24.5 -6.7 
2002 60.08 27.1 3.4 -6.4 
2003 64.64 36.9 25.5 -7.4 
2004  36.0 24.4 --7.7 
2005/6 70.20 61.9 99.3 -9.4 
2006/7 76.18 55.5 35.9 -14.4 
2007/8 66.07 57.1 -53.2  
2008/9 69.97 47.7 60.1  
Source: Tabulated from Central Bank database 
 
 
The government benefitted greatly from tax revenues accruing from the energy sector. 
The bulk of government revenues were derived from this sector and it came essentially 
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through corporation taxes levied on the energy companies. This in turn allowed the 
government to build up deposits at the central bank.  Government was then able to 
essentially draw from its deposits to increase fiscal expenditure. 
 
The period of the study was generally one in which there was strong economic growth 
that was accompanied by substantial annual increases in fiscal expenditure, see Table 
4.  Nevertheless, up to 2007, fiscal expenditure as a ratio of GDP remained fairly 
constant between 22 and 24 per cent. By 2008, the global economic crises which began 
in mid 2007 would have led to a slowdown in the economy and fiscal revenues 
declined.   
 
 
Table 4  Trinidad and Tobago Growth and Fiscal Expenditure 
 Real GDP Growth Growth in Fiscal 
Expenditure 
Total Fiscal  
Expenditure to GDP 
1997 7.32  24.4 
1998 7.48 6.8 24.6 
1999 8.98 12.5 24.6 
2000 7.25 8.2 22.2 
2001 4.2 10.4 22.9 
2002 7.92 8.8 24.3 
2003 14.4 10.8 21.3 
2004 7.8 21.5 22.0 
2005 5.8 21.7 22.3 
2006 13.5 20.2 23.3 
2007 4.6 5.9 21.6 
2008 2.3 11.3 19.5 
Source: Tabulated from the Trinidad and Tobago Central Bank Database 
 
 
It can be noticed in Figure 4 that the volatility in energy prices is positively associated 
with variations in government revenues which in turn are government deposits in the 
central bank. This confirms that government deposits tended to fluctuate strongly with 
energy prices, which in turn was externally driven.  Accordingly, fluctuations in 
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government deposits were largely driven by factors exogenous to the Trinidad and 
Tobago economy. 
 
Figure 4    3-Month Rolling Standard Deviation for the period March 1997 to October 2010 
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Source: Tabulated from Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago Website.  
 
As a result, the drawdown in government deposits in the central bank in turn was 
equivalent to non-energy fiscal deficits. This was due to the fact that government made 
draw downs to supplement fiscal spending and therefore to counter non-energy fiscal 
deficits. The non-energy fiscal deficits were inflationary since it implies increase 
spending power in the economy without reducing purchasing power parity.33   
 
                                                 
33
 There are also concerns that non-energy fiscal deficits are  not sustainable as it depends on non 
renewable energy output. 
84 
2.4   Inflationary Pressures 
 
Major inflationary pressures in Trinidad and Tobago can be attributed to non-energy 
fiscal deficits, import prices particularly with respect to food, wage pressures, wage 
demand pressures and persistent excess liquidity. The non-energy fiscal deficits arise as 
a result of government reliance on drawdown’s of deposits to finance its expenditure 
outlay.  Accordingly Inflationary pressures mounted as fiscal outlays lead to increases 
in non-energy fiscal deficits, see Figure 5.  The non-energy fiscal deficits are inflationary 
as government is using revenue derived from energy receipts to finance expenditure. 
Since the money does not arise from domestic economic activity and therefore 
correspond to debt instruments in the economy, it actually is outside money that can 
lead to increases in prices.  
 
Figure 5   Non-energy Fiscal Deficit 
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Source: Plotted from data extracted from CBTT Database. 
 
The rise in import prices can have a profound effect on inflation owing particularly to 
rising prices of inputs and final consumption goods.  This is particularly noticeable with 
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imported food inflation, see Figure 6. These prices have been volatile and rising since 
the mid 2000 period. The central bank therefore is under severe pressure to contain 
headline inflation. 
 
Figure 6   World Food Price Index 
 
Source: Extracted from Mundi data. 
 
Wage rate increases tend to be associated with increases in headline inflation, see 
Figure 7. Wages tend to be a large part of production costs, and therefore an increase 
in the wage rate has an impact on cost push inflation.34  Moreover, retail prices can 
move in tandem with wage rate increases, where the market structure allows firms to 
raise their prices to capture consumer surplus.  For these reasons we can expect a 
strong positive correlation between inflation and the wage rate. 
                                                 
34
 See Inflation.  Public Pamphlet Education Series No. 2, CBTT. 
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Figure 7  Inflation Wage Nexus 1997 to 2010 
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Source: Inflation data were obtained from CBTT database.  Wage index data obtained from Trinidad and 
Tobago central statistical office. 
 
The results also suggest that there is a positive effect of energy prices on inflation.  
Rising energy prices lead to buoyant demand conditions in the economy.  However, in 
the face of supply bottlenecks excess liquidity builds up. In effect, excess liquidity is 
driven by the inability of the economy to absorb increased energy revenues accruing to 
the government. Moreover, government expenditure leads to increases in the 
transmission of funds to the banking system in excess of demand for loanable funds, 
thus resulting in an involuntary accumulation of excess liquidity. In effect the 
correlation between energy price and excess liquidity is 0.38 immediately and 0.75 
with a lag of 8 months, see Table 5. 
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Table 5  Correlation of current energy price and autoregressive lags in excess liquidity 
 Auto regressive lags in excess liquidity 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Current 
change 
in 
energy 
price 
0.38 0.41 0.46 0.52 0.58 0.64 0.70 0.73 0.75 0.70 0.66 
Source: Author’s calculations using data derived from CBTT database. 
 
As a result the structural nature of liquidity in the market is often associated with 
government spending in the economy stemming from the monetization of energy 
windfalls.  Other factors that are critical to inflationary pressures include a rise in 
import prices; and credit expansion.35  
 
Previous monetary policy reports of the CBTT also attribute rising inflation to other 
factors including the pass through of wage costs to the consumer, the oligopolistic 
distributive market structure, increased demand in the context of declining excess 
capacity, rising construction costs, increases in real estate prices, increases in rents and 
rising transportation costs.   
 
3.0  Variables for Macroeconomic Stability 
 
3.1  Measures of Inflation indexes 
 
 
The CBTT uses the year on year percentage changes of the Retail Prices Index to 
measure inflation. This overall index is calculated as the weighted cost of a basket of 
consumer goods and services, as exhibited in Table 6.36 The weight is defined by the 
                                                 
35
 See the Monetary Policy Report, April 2007, published by the CBTT. 
36
 The Retail Price Index used by the CBTT excludes non-consumer prices such as the prices of capital 
goods, and the prices of goods and services consumed by enterprises and government. See “Inflation”, 
Public Education Pamphlet Series NO. 2, published by the CBTT. 
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CBTT as “(t)he expenditure share of an item in the market basket”.  They determine the 
weight by “...calculating the relative proportion of expenditure of households on an 
item to the total expenditures of households on all items using data from the 
Households Budgeting Survey” Inflation, Public Education Series, Pamphlet 2, pp15. 
  
 
Table 6  Composition of Retail Price Index  1997-2006 
Expenditure Categories Weight 
Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages 18 
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 2.5 
Clothing & Footwear 5.3 
Home Ownership 18 
Rent 2.4 
Water, Electricity, Gas and other Fuels 5.8 
Furnishings, Household Equipment and Routine Maintenance of the House 5.4 
Health 5.1 
Transportation 16.7 
Communication 4.1 
Recreation and Culture 8.5 
Education 1.6 
Hotels, Cafes and Restaurants 3 
Miscellaneous Goods and Services 3.6 
ALL ITEMS 100 
Source: Trinidad and Tobago Central Statistical Office's Website :http://www.cso.gov.tt 
 
 
The CBTT essentially targets headline inflation.  The targeted rate is made known to the 
public through the publication of the public education pamphlet on inflation and 
various issues of the Monetary Policy Reports published by the CBTT. In keeping with 
this objective, the October 2005 monetary report places the target as between 4 and 5 
per cent, while the April 2007 report which was written at a time when the actual rate 
shot up to just under 10 per cent, outlined a short term target of 7 per cent and a 
medium term target of 5 per cent. Two facts must be observed about the targeted 
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rate: 1) The target inflation rate is specified and published by the CBTT rather than 
enshrined through an Act of parliament and 2) the bank does not practice strict 
inflation targeting given other subsidiary goals the bank is allowed to pursue. These 
other goals include ensuring an orderly foreign exchange market and ensuring that 
there are adequate foreign exchange reserves.  
 
All the measures of inflation, CPI measures and domestic inflation are highly 
correlated, see Figure 8.  The CPI measures are headline and core inflation.  The main 
difference between these measures is that core inflation is adjusted to exclude food 
prices given that this is deemed to be the most volatile element in the CPI index and its 
effects are expected to be temporary.   
 
Figure 8  Trinidad and Tobago Inflation Rate 
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Source: Plotted from data obtained from CBTT database. 
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We use PPI as the proxy for domestic price index, given that it captures the price of 
domestically produced goods. The producer price index gives the change in prices from 
the producer perspective. However, it is not a perfect proxy of domestic prices. 
Domestically produced goods in the context of a small open economy still contain a 
degree of imported inputs. Assuming that domestic firms import inputs from foreign 
firms then domestic prices are influenced by inflation and the exchange rate from 
which inputs originate. Another important limitation is that the producer price index 
allows for the price received by producers for goods exported.  Here, if we allow for the 
producer to use producer currency pricing, then the price received for exports would 
be in concurrence with domestic prices. Thus, the producer price index would be an 
indicator of domestic prices, depending on the degree of producer pricing by domestic 
firms. Thus, two limitations of the producer price index as a proxy for domestic 
inflation would be in terms of the degree of imports of inputs to produce goods and in 
terms of the degree of producer pricing. 
 
The producer price index as used in Trinidad and Tobago consists of production of food 
and drink which includes food processing, bakeries, vegetable oils, and animal fats 
industry and production of alcoholic beverages. The index also includes the chemicals 
and non-metallic industry which includes the manufacture of tiles, ready mix concrete, 
wood and furniture industry, and printing and publishing industry. The chemical 
industry also includes the manufacture of glass and plastic product for the construction 
industries. The PPI also includes assembly-type and related industries, garment and 
footwear industries.  It is important to note that the producer price index is impacted 
on by the imported price of raw materials inputs into production. 
 
The inflation rate can be subdivided into domestic and imported components such that  
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where  is the weight on foreign inflation component of overall expenditure,  is 
the weight on domestic component of overall expenditure,  is the CPI headline 
inflation,  is domestic inflation and  is imported inflation. Consequently, imported 
inflation is  
 
  
 
We plot imported inflation in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9  Imported Inflation 
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Source: Plotted from author’s own calculations. 
 
3.2   Exchange Rate Pass-Through to Imported Inflation 
 
We use a VECM to examine the pass through of a change in the nominal exchange rate 
with imported inflation.  The advantage of using VECM is that it preserves long-term 
information and incorporates short run factors in the presence of non-stationarity. 
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Long term information is preserved by using cointegration of the level series and short 
run information is incorporated the differencing of the series to achieve stationarity. 
Another advantage of using VECM is that dynamic simulation can he achieved through 
the use of impulse analysis. 
 
 The VECM can be represented as 
 
  
 
where   is ;  with  being the adjustment coefficient to restore 
movement towards equilibrium, and  is the co integrating vector; .  Here 
. Thus the error correction mechanism is given by  and the model 
incorporates the long term into the short term adjustments.  The speed of adjustment 
is given by .  
 
The measure of the impulse response function is obtained from  which is a moving 
average of coefficients. Accordingly,  represents the response of variable  to a 
unit impulse of variable  in the i-th period. 
 
 
3.3   Unit root test 
 
 
We conduct unit root tests on imported inflation and the real exchange rate.  This is 
particularly important since both variables must be integrated of the same order  in 
order to be cointegrated. We use three unit root tests to investigate the stationarity of 
the time series with respect to imported inflation and real exchange rate.  These tests 
are the augmented Dickey-Fuller, the DF-GLS and Phillips Perrron, see Tables 7 and 8.   
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Table 7   Imported Inflation 
 Level Series 1st Difference 
Unit Root 
Test 
Intercept Trend and 
Intercept 
No trend 
and 
intercept 
Intercept Trend 
and 
Intercept 
No trend 
and 
intercept 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
-0.94 -2.67 0.24 -5.57*** -5.49*** -6.19*** 
DF-GLS  0.77 -2.56  5.68*** -6.02***  
Phillips 
Perron 
-0.94 -2.79 0.21 -6.27*** -6.21*** -5.19*** 
Notes: Study uses Newey-West band selection using Bartlett Kernel.  *** signify the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of a unit root at 1%. 
 
 
Table 8   Real Exchange Rate 
 Level Series 1st Difference 
Unit Root 
Test 
Intercept Trend and 
Intercept 
No trend 
and 
intercept 
Intercept Trend 
and 
Intercept 
No trend 
and 
intercept 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
0.86 -1.24 3.05 -
10.82*** 
-
10.97*** 
-9.57*** 
DF-GLS  1.75 -1.62  -10.75 -10.99  
Phillips 
Perron 
1.18 -2.88 3.71 -
11.61*** 
-
13.06*** 
-9.38*** 
Notes: Study uses Newey-West band selection using Bartlett Kernel.  *** signify the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of a unit root at 1%. 
 
 
The unit root tests unanimously show that imported inflation and the real exchange rate are 
each I(1).  Accordingly the results reject the assertion that the series are stationary at levels, in 
favour of the alternative that the series are stationary after first differencing. We therefore use 
94 
one lag to examine the degree of pass through and the speed with which a change of the 
exchange rate influence imported inflation, see chart 3. 
 
The cointegrating vector is found to be  
 
  
 
where   is the cointegrating vector.  
 
 
Using the bivariate VECM to investigate the association between the exchange rate 
(ER) and domestic inflation rate , the VECM equation is  
 
 
  
,   
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
We then examine the impulse response functions for the bivariate VAR, see Figure 10. 
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Figure 10   Impulse Response Function 
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Source: Generalised Impulse response functions calculated on data obtained from CBTT Database. 
 
The evidence shows that a shock in the exchange rate maximises the effect on 
imported inflation immediately after which shocks linger on, see bottom left hand 
graph in Figure 10. This is in contrast to the UK and US markets where it is noted by the 
bank of England Monetary Policy Committee and the US Federal Reserve that even 
though a change in the exchange rate have a direct effect on import prices, the effect is 
often delayed taking many months to take effect on domestic prices and even longer to 
impact on spending patterns. This is even though shocks to imported prices can have 
an indirect effect on the prices of domestic goods, since domestic goods compete with 
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the prices of imported goods. In contrast, our results show that the pass through of a 
change in the exchange rate in Trinidad and Tobago is much faster and more persistent 
than in the UK and US markets.  
 
The graph at the top right hand side shows that shocks in inflation persists on the 
exchange rate. Moreover, the effect of the shock on the real exchange rate do not 
decline, but remain virtually level. Consequently, the results show permanent effects 
on the real exchange rate.   
 
3.2  Output Gap 
 
 
Theoretically, the output gap is a measure of the difference between actual and 
potential output. The output gap can be indicative of inflationary pressures.  The 
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) (HP) method is frequently used in the literature for finding 
the output gap to measure the output gap, given that in many countries the gap is not 
measured on a real time basis.37 Real time output gap data are not available for 
Trinidad and Tobago. 
  
The HP measure is based on a two-sided measure that captures past and future trends 
in the time series. To develop the HP measure, a time series ( ) can be decomposed 
into a trend component ( ) and a cyclical component ( ). 
 
  
 
The trend measure is the component that would minimise the equation in 
                                                 
37
 A few countries which use real time data are UK, U.S. and New Zealand. Mishkin (2007) for example, 
pointed to conceptual and measurement difficulties in the operationalisation of this concept. One set of 
challenges include the inaccuracy that results when real time data are used, given that macro data are 
frequently revised. He also sited measurement difficulties, since different output gap measures produces 
differences in volatility of output gap and inflation. 
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Min  
 
  is a positive number to penalise the variability of the trend in growth. The time series 
becomes smoother for larger value of , becoming linear at the limit where . 
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) suggest that for quarterly data  should be set at 1,600. 
 
The output gap is plotted for Trinidad and Tobago, using the conventional measure 
where the gap is defined as the log difference between actual output and its trend, see 
Figure 11. Inflationary pressures may be likely to be built up where the output gap is 
positive, while deflationary pressures may exist where actual output is below 
equilibrium level. This allows us to examine two distinct periods: where the output gap 
was predominantly positive for most of the periods 1997 to 1999 and 2002 to the end 
of 2008.  Interestingly the output gap was negative for the period 2009 through to 
2010. The latter showed a slowdown in aggregate demand and therefore an easing in 
inflationary pressures in keeping with occurrences in the world economy. The global 
slowdown was triggered in the US since mid 2007 and spread to other developed 
countries thereafter.  
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Figure 11   Trinidad and Tobago Output Gap  
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Source: Graph drawn from author’s calculation using CBTT database. 
 
 
4.0  Exchange Rate Management 
 
The sale of foreign exchange by the CBTT fulfil the dual role of assisting to reduce 
excess liquidity and minimising the volatility of the exchange rate. Excess liquidity may 
not necessarily tend towards exchange rate instability since the latter would be 
impacted on by other factors such as external capital inflows. Moreover, the lumpiness 
of foreign exchange inflows generated by the earnings of the export sector when 
accompanied by uninterrupted domestic demand for foreign exchange, often can lead 
to temporary shortages in the foreign exchange market which can cause the rate to 
fluctuate within narrow bands. The fluctuations tend to be within narrow bonds, 
partially owing to confidence by the market on the ability of the central bank to back 
the exchange rate. At times the central bank intervenes in the market through net sales 
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to authorized dealers to satisfy the demand of individuals and firms.  Authorised 
dealers are dominated by commercial banks, but they include to a lesser extent some 
non-banks and bureaux de change.  The CBTT defines authorised dealers in foreign 
exchange as “entities licensed by the central bank and include commercial banks and 
the non-bank financial institutions”.  See Central Bank website: http://www.central-
bank.org.tt/the_bank/index.php?pid=1007. 
 
To smooth the demand and supply for foreign currency, the central bank in 1993 
instituted a sharing arrangement between commercial banks.  This allowed for foreign 
exchange receipts emanating from major foreign exchange earners in the energy sector 
to be shared between all banks.  An advantage of this system of sharing is that it 
smoothens the supply of foreign currency between banks and allowed the central bank 
to intervene to stabilise the market where necessary. 
 
In spite of the declaration of a floating exchange rate in 1993, the nominal exchange 
rate remained fairly stable, centred around TT$ 6.3 to US$ 1.00 but occasionally 
fluctuating within a narrow band of TT$ 6.15 and TT$ 6.31 between 1993 to 2009, see 
Figure 12.38 The IMF in its article IV consultation of 1999, recognised the float as being 
heavily managed. Under this arrangement, the capital market was fully liberalised and 
restrictions on payments and current international transactions and transfers were 
eliminated, but the authorities actively intervened in the market to ensure a degree of 
stability in the exchange rate market.  
 
The stable exchange rate is supported by a steady increase in gross international 
reserves reinforced by consistent current account surpluses after 1998, assisted by 
rising energy prices for most of the period. With the central bank being a major 
                                                 
38
 The International Monetary Fund (2007) estimated that the real exchange rate was undervalued in 
2005 by between 15-20 per cent, and is likely to be sustained given improved terms of trade, gains in 
labour productivity and subdued real wages.  However, the report noted that CBTT is reluctant to allow 
for full flexibility, owing to already existing substantial large capital outflows and the segmentation of the 
foreign exchange market. 
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primary supplier of foreign currency in the economy it was able judiciously to supply 
foreign currency in the market to maintain a virtually fixed exchange rate.  
 
Figure 12  Trinidad and Tobago Exchange rate (TT$ in terms of a unit of US$) 
 
Source: Drawn from data obtained from CBTT database. 
 
 
The bulk of foreign exchange came through the central bank rather than through 
commercial banks, see Table 9.  The dominance of the CBTT with respect to foreign 
assets can be gleaned by the fact that the intake of foreign exchange by the central 
bank was in most cases over 70 per cent of total foreign exchange earnings with 
respect to assets and foreign account balances of the combined holdings of the central 
bank and commercial banks.39 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39
 See 2006 Annual Economic Survey. 
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Table 9  Size of Central Bank Holding of Foreign Currency to the Banking System 
Year Percentage of central bank 
foreign assets to total 
foreign assets in the 
banking system.   
(a) 
Percentage of Net 
International Reserves held 
by the central bank to total 
foreign position of the 
banking system.   
(b) 
1997 62.9 80.1 
1998 66.0 77.6 
1999 69.5 86.7 
2000 73.6 91.2 
2001 76.4 101.4 
2002 74.2 97.3 
2003 69.3 101.8 
2004 66.8 82.9 
2005 74.0 89.9 
2006 72.5 81.1 
2007 77.3 85.8 
2008 81.0 86.5 
Source: Tabulated from the CBTT Monetary Statistical Digest 2004 and 2008.   
Notes:  Column (a) is calculated as percentage   and 
column.  
(b) is calculated as a percentage of  
 . 
 
 
5.0   The Conduct of Monetary Policy in Trinidad and Tobago 
 
Since Trinidad and Tobago liberalised its exchange rate in April 1993, the country took 
active steps to convert to the use of market determined instruments of monetary 
policy. In particular, the country sought to develop a market structure that would allow 
for the short term interest rate to move through the term structure of interest rate and 
therefore ultimately impact on demand. As such, the country took active steps to 
develop both money  and capital markets.  The central bank defined the money market 
as  “ (A) market for short-term debt instruments maturing in one year or less.”40    At 
                                                 
40
 See “The Implementation of Monetary Policy in Trinidad and Tobago “.  CBTT (2005). pp 20.  
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the same time, the central bank defined  the capital market as a market in which long-
term debt securities and corporate equity are issued and traded.41   
   
From the latter part of the 1990s, the principal methods of liquidity management 
favoured by the CBTT are open market operations; periodic issuance of bonds; sale of 
foreign exchange to commercial banks.  These methods are supplemented by 
secondary reserve requirements; special deposit facility; reserve requirements; and 
secondary market.   
 
The liberalisation of the exchange rate was accompanied by a transition from the use 
of direct instruments to indirect instruments, as the principal means of fighting 
inflation. To implement this style of monetary programming, the CBTT sought to 
absorb excess liquidity through open market operations.  This involved the regular use 
of auctioning of Treasury bills and the occasional use of bonds. At the same time, the 
bank made use of short-term interest rates, and in more recent times introduced the 
repo rate as the policy rate. 
 
5.1  Liquidity Management 
 
The CBTT defines liquidity as: “the level of cash or near cash assets of financial 
institutions readily available to meet day to day transactions needs.”42  The Trinidad 
and Tobago economy exhibits persistent periods of excess liquidity. Here excess 
liquidity is defined in terms of excess reserves held by banks above statutory reserve 
requirements for commercial banks and non bank institutions.  
 
Chronic excess liquidity presents a potentially major source of difficulty to the 
implementation of the new style of monetary policy, since it may have implications for 
                                                 
41
 See “The Implementation of Monetary Policy in Trinidad and Tobago”, Issue 1, CBTT (2005), pp18.   
 
42
 See, “Inflation”, Public Education Pamphlet Series No. 2 published by the CBTT, 2006. 
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inflation, the transmission of interest rate changes and it potentially weakens the 
predictability of the relationship between interest rate and real-side factors. The major 
indicator of excess liquidity used by the CBTT is excess reserves, that is, deposits in the 
central bank held by commercial banks in excess of the prescribed deposit liabilities of 
the CBTT. However, excess liquidity held by commercial banks can also be gleaned 
from special deposits, the volume of repos and activity in the interbank market. From 
an examination of Figure 13 it is evident that the CBTT has had to grapple with excess 
liquidity in most periods of the study.43   
 
 
Figure 13  Trinidad and Tobago Excess Reserves 
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Source: Plotted using data obtained from CBTT database. 
 
 
 
                                                 
43
 Walsh (2003) observed that excess reserves in the US in June 2002 would have been 3.3 per cent. 
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The CBTT sought to forecast the demand and supply of liquidity in order to decide on 
when and the extent to which it needed to intervene in the market.44 On the supply 
side, the demand for foreign currency and foreign exchange were assumed to impact 
on the money supply. However, the major injection of liquidity to the banking sector 
occurred as a result of government drawdown on its deposits at the central bank to 
finance fiscal expenditure.45 This is attributable to the fact that government is the 
primary earner of foreign exchange in the economy as shown in Table 9.  As a result, 
net fiscal injection is reflected in terms of a drawdown in the deposit base or through 
foreign inflows received by government, such that: 
 
 
.  
 
The plus or minus signs in the equation depends on whether there are net foreign 
inflows or net outflows.  Where there are net inflows, the sign used is negative. The 
rationale for this is that since the emphasis is on domestic fiscal injections, the foreign 
inflows were eliminated from government activities, in that foreign inflows were 
subtracted from government balances.  Conversely, net outflows, are added back in to 
minimise their effect on the government balance. 
 
Given the primacy of energy prices to the government deposits, it can be surmised that 
a possible transmission mechanism on the real side can be   
 
                                                 
44
  Important variables to the forecast of liquidity in the banking system were listed by CBTT as: net 
domestic spending; financing operations of government; changes in commercial bank reserves; net sales 
of foreign exchange and central bank holdings; inflation; money supply; exchange rates; interest rates; 
credit; liquid assets of commercial banks; capital flows and market sentiment. 
45
 This is in contrast to the typical case in emerging markets where the central bank extends net credit to 
the government and therefore creates liquidity, exercise net purchases of foreign exchange from the 
banking system or exercise net credit to the banking system. 
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and on the monetary side, 
 
 
. 
On the demand side, financial institutions may demand reserves to meet settlement 
balances and statutory requirements.  However, in Trinidad and Tobago, there is a high 
degree of demand for reserves beyond the statutory limits, which according to the 
CBTT, can be attributable to many factors, including the length of the settlement 
period associated with the payment system, volatility of claims and receipts as well as 
the sophistication of the market, including the secondary market. However, the 
calculation of the reserve balance as the average of the daily holding of reserves for the 
reserve week lends itself to the smoothing of short-term interest rate in spite of the 
daily volatility of the reserve balance. 
 
 
The government gains revenues accruing to energy companies principally through 
taxation.  Energy companies are taxed quarterly.  These taxes feed into deposits of the 
central government in the central bank.  When government drawdown on these 
deposits to do fiscal injections, it adds high powered money to the stock of money 
supply and therefore creates excess liquidity. Consequently, excess liquidity can build 
up in the short term owing to limited investment options.  
  
 
 
The Central Bank responded aggressively to excess reserves in the banking system in a 
bid to tighten liquidity so as to make the new style of monetary policy effective and to 
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be able to influence lending. The new style of monetary policy was ushered in in 1993 
when the country shifted from a fixed exchange rate to a floating exchange rate.  With 
the new style, the central bank now took measures to move towards market 
determined interest policy rate as opposed to selected interest rate and direct credit 
controls through regulatory devices. 
 
To a large extent the repo rate acts as a signalling rate since commercial banks may not 
have needed to utilise the repurchase window. The idea with respect to the use of the 
repo policy rate was to deepen market sophistication by encouraging the development 
of the interbank market. Accordingly, the central bank uses the sale of open market 
securities and sales of foreign exchange as a component of the weapons of monetary 
policy. 
 
In spite of the movement towards the new style of monetary policy, the central bank 
still has to rely on a blend of the new style with the old style of monetary policy in 
order to grapple with persistent high excess liquidity.  The old style includes 
sterilisation through the creation of special interest bearing accounts inclusive of 
special deposit facility, secondary reserve requirements and primary reserve 
requirements.46 The interest bearing special deposit account can be rolled over from 
time to time in order to contain liquidity.  In addition, the central bank relies on the use 
of excess reserves requirement to assist in containing excess liquidity. 
 
Bonds are issued by the government sector to either finance government activities or 
for liquidity purposes.  In all cases, given the persistent high level of liquidity, these 
bonds were oversubscribed each time they were issued.  Where bonds are issued for 
liquidity purposes, the proceeds from these bonds were locked away from use.  In 
contrast, bonds issued to finance government activities lent itself to a temporary 
                                                 
46
 Sterilising can take place either through the floatation of bonds or creating a special interest bearing 
account at the central bank in which the proceeds are deposited in a block account that is frozen.   
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reduction in excess liquidity, but the reductions were nullified as government spent 
from the proceeds. 
 
5.2  New Approach to monetary Management 
 
Trinidad and Tobago is still trying to fully evolve to the use of indirect instruments for 
the conduct of monetary policy.  The economy is going through the second stage of 
developing the money market by the trading of government Treasury bills as the 
primary instrument for the determination of money market interest rate. Treasury bills 
were first introduced by the creation of the Treasury Bill Act of 1960.  The Act was 
initially set up to meet government short-term financing needs, given the non-
synchronisation of revenue and expenditure. However following steps towards 
financial liberalisation, by the mid 1990s, Treasury bills became an essential monetary 
policy tool, especially for obtaining market determined money market rates.   
 
The Treasury bill is traded as a government security as opposed to a central bank 
security.  They possess the property of been risk free as government payment on these 
instruments are guaranteed.  Consequently, interest on the short-term instruments set 
the floor for pricing of assets.  For these reasons, the Treasury bill is attractive to the 
market so that there is a ready demand on the market for this instrument. 
 
The 91 day Treasury bill was the original tenor introduced by the 1960 Act.  Higher 
tenors were subsequently introduced, but the 91-day tenor remains the most 
frequently traded as it was traded on a biweekly basis. Open market operations are 
used for the competitive determination of the Treasury bill rate.  Open market 
operations of Treasury bills are sold only to primary dealers and these dealers have the 
responsibility of making the secondary market. 
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The prudential criteria for the selection of primary dealers includes the fact that they 
must be supervised by a regularity authority in Trinidad and Tobago, that they have 
demonstrated sound financial capacity, that they reflected adequate management 
capabilities, that they are active market participants and that they are in good standing 
with the primary regulatory authority.  Moreover, the primary dealers are expected to 
be active participants in auctions in the money and capital markets, are expected to 
service the needs of the retail market and they were expected to provide market 
information. In turn, the CBTT expects to gain from the primary dealers, market 
information on interest rate developments, liquidity in the banking system, reserve 
needs, general demand and supply of money market securities and any other money 
market activities particularly with respect to new instruments.47 
 
Secondary markets are desirable since, among other things, it provides for liquidity to 
the primary market.48  Having used the Treasury bill to kick start the development of 
the money market, the central bank has taken steps to develop a secondary market.  
To develop the market the central bank appointed primary dealers to act as 
counterparties to the Central bank.  These dealers are to fulfil the role of primary 
dealers in the primary market for Treasury bills and Treasury notes.49  By 2008, 10 
primary dealers have been appointed, the majority of which are commercial banks.50  
 
Treasury bills are traded through an auction system which was automated in 2004, 
prior to which it was done through underwriting where the underwriter had the 
                                                 
47
 See Guidelines for Second Tier Primary Dealers for Open Market Operations. (mimeo). 
48
 The Central Bank defines the Secondary Market as “(t)he part of the capital market in which securities 
that have already been issued in the primary market are bought and sold”.  P37, Government Securities 
Market in Trinidad and Tobago, Public Education Pamphlet Series No. 4. 
49
 The Central Bank defines Primary Market as “(t)he part of the capital market that deals with the 
issuance of new securities.”.  P37, Government Securities Market in Trinidad and Tobago, Public 
Education Pamphlet Series No. 4. 
 
 
50
 The counterparties for the development of the secondary market for government 
bonds were termed Government Securities Intermediaries (GSIs).  
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responsibility of seeking investors for investment in government bonds.  However, in 
spite of the automated system, the primary dealers were expected to make the 
secondary market by buying and selling bonds. 
 
The Treasury Bill is issued on a discount basis.  The discount basis meant that the final 
price at which the bill is purchased was the bid price less the discounted price, The 
discounted price is calculated such that: 
 
 
  
 
 
so that the final price was calculated as  
 
 
  
 
 
For the competitive market the style of the auction of Treasury bills is a multi-price 
auction system.51   Under this style, the bids at the highest price are first allotted, 
followed by the bids at the next highest price and so on.  As a result, each successful 
bidder pays their bid price.  A window is opened to the public for them to place non-
competitive bids and this is based on the weighted average purchase price of the 
successful bidders.  As a result, the non competitive bid price could be used as the 
representative market determined Treasury bill rate. 
 
 
                                                 
22
 This is in contrast to price discovery of bonds, where the auction system is a single price auction where 
“successful bidders pay the “cut-off” price of the lowest successful bid”.  P15. Public Education Pamphlet 
Series (2009).  The Government Securities Market in Trinidad and Tobago.  CBTT. 
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 5.3  Conduct of Open Market Operations 
 
The CBTT defined open market operations as the sale and purchases of government 
securities (Treasury bills and Treasury notes) by the central bank.52  The primary 
objective of open market operations was to sterilize liquidity derived from foreign 
exchange inflows and fiscal injections. Open market operations currently take place 
through the sale of government securities by the CBTT to primary dealers. All the 
commercial banks were selected as primary dealers owing to the fact that they satisfy 
the prudential criteria. 
  
The instruments traded for the conduct of open market operations are Treasury bills – 
government securities with maturities of under one year; Treasury notes – government 
securities with maturity of between one to five years and securities owned by the 
CBTT.53  Among these, the 90 day Treasury bills are the most regular. These securities 
are usually traded almost in two week intervals and primary dealers were able to place 
competitive bids. In addition to the primary dealers, the CBTT is also engaged in 
establishing a list of second tier primary dealers and they were expected to actively bid 
on eligible auctions. 
 
5.3.1  Auction of open market instruments 
 
Regular open market operations using 3 month Treasury bills has been used since 1996 
to absorb excess liquidity. These bills are issued every other Wednesday in 
denominations of TT$1000.00, while Treasury bills with 6 month maturity are traded 
                                                 
52
 See the Implementation of Monetary Policy in Trinidad and Tobago.  Issue 1. (2005), Public Education 
Pamphet Series. pp 20. 
53
 Treasury bill limits was first set in 1971 by parliament, while treasury notes were first introduced in 
1995. 
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once every other month. Treasury bills are quoted in terms of the discount rate. In 
view of chronic excess liquidity, the CBTT broadened its instruments to absorb liquidity.  
Towards the end of 2005, the CBTT increased its 6-month and 12-month securities, 
along with two year securities in a bid to sterilize liquidity.   
 
Electronic auctions were introduced in December 2004 along with a real-time gross 
settlement system. With regards to auctions, bids are made online, and allocation is 
automatically performed at the close of each auction. Here investors make competitive 
bids and specify the rates or yields they are willing to receive for the use of their funds. 
Successful competitive bidders pay the price equivalent to the rate or yield they bid.54 
The weighted average Treasury bill rate is subsequently published and quoted as the 
Treasury bill rate for that tenor. 
 
Where bonds are traded, the single price auction method is used. In the single price 
system, investors making competitive bids specify the rate or yield they were willing to 
receive for the use of their funds. Successful bidders pay the price equivalent to the 
highest accepted rate or yield regardless of the rate or yield they bid. 55  
 
5.3.2  REPO rate 
 
 
The reverse repurchase agreement (repo rate) was introduced as a device to signal the 
monetary stance of the CBTT, in May 2002.56 For the central bank, the repo rate is the 
rate at which the “central bank purchases a security from a commercial bank with an 
agreement that the bank repurchases the security at a higher price on a specified 
date.”57 Accordingly, the bank defines the repo rate as “The rate that the central bank 
                                                 
54
 Definition is taken from  www.treasurydirec.gov 
55
 Definition is taken from www.treasurydirec.gov 
56
 The reverse repurchases (REPO) are generally overnight transactions placed at the end of the day.. 
57
 Definition taken from “The Implementation of Monetary Policy in Trinidad and Tobago” CBTT, Public 
Education Pamphlet Series, Issue 1, September 2005. 
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charges commercial banks for the use of overnight funds.”58 This security is a short-
term security which provides temporary liquidity to commercial banks when liquidity is 
tight.  In keeping with its use as a signalling device, the CBTT made one month ahead 
announcement of the rate. As a result, the CBTT conveys its policy intentions, as the 
repo is the means by which the CBTT can charge commercial banks for overnight funds. 
Thus, the manipulation of the repo rate is supposed to be transmitted through the 
interest rate term structure and the credit channel, onto the real side of the economy 
and thence to inflation. 
 
The repo instrument was introduced in 2002 so that prior to its introduction the CBTT 
influence on the market interest rate came through the manipulation of liquidity. Given 
that the repo is more effective where commercial banks may be forced to resort to the 
central bank for temporary financing to meet the reserve requirements, the absorption 
of excess liquidity remained critical to monetary policy.59 Thus, whereas theoretically 
the CBTT can raise the repo rate where it would like to restrict credit flows, it must 
combine this with aggressive absorption of liquidity in order to dry up excess 
liquidity.60 Indeed, the likelihood that the policy rate would transmit throughout the 
term structure of interest rate, depended on tight liquidity in the banking sector so that 
banks under such circumstances would be encouraged to first borrow from the 
interbank market before opting to borrow from the CBTT. Figure 14 gives a plot of the 
money market rates available for the money market. 
 
 
 
                                                 
58
 Taken from The Implementation of Monetary Policy in Trinidad and Tobago” CBTT, Public Education 
Pamphlet Series, Issue 1, September 2005. Pp 20. 
 
59
 The existence of persistent excess liquidity allows commercial banks access to idle funds, thus reducing 
the dependency of commercial banks for external financing by borrowing from the central bank. 
60
 The dependence by commercial banks on financing from the central bank can further be weakened 
where the locally based foreign-owned banks have access to external funds located at the overseas 
headquarters, and therefore the resident operations would not need to borrow from the domestic central 
bank. 
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Figure 14  Trinidad and Tobago Money Market Rates 
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Source: Plotted from data obtained from CBTT database. 
 
 
The transmission mechanism that the CBTT considers do not consider the effect of 
international spillovers of disturbances emanating from major trading partners and 
sources of foreign direct investment to Trinidad and Tobago.  The effectiveness of the 
pass through of the repo rate in the context of international spillovers may be an 
empirical matter.  We therefore pursue this investigation in chapter 5. 
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5.4  Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
 
 
Under the new style of monetary policy, the CBTT targets reserve money rather than 
the balance sheets of financial institutions.61 As a result, the bank sought to make the 
transition to the use of indirect instruments.62 In this new style, the CBTT assumes that 
short-term interest rate transmitted throughout the term structure, ultimately 
impacted on spending by households, wealth accumulation and on saving, see Diagram 
1. As a result, the credit channel forms the conduit between interest rate and the real 
side of the economy and inflation. 
 
Diagram 1  Monetary Transmission Assumed by the TTCB 
 
Notes: This transmission mechanism is outlined in the “The Implementation of Monetary Policy in 
Trinidad and Tobago” Public Education Pamphlet Series, no. 1 of the CBTT, September 2005. 
 
 
                                                 
61
 A detailed outline of monetary instruments used by the CBTT can be found in :Monetary and Financial 
Management in Trinidad and Tobago, CBTT (2005). 
62
 See Birchwood (2001) for a discussion on the speed of transition to indirect monetary policy by Central 
Banks in the Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The study used a fixed effects panel estimation 
and concluded that a gradual approach aimed at fine-tuning the economy be adopted with the 
implementation of the indirect monetary policy. 
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We compare the transmission in Trinidad and Tobago with that of the developed 
economies, to see how the transmission mechanisms differ.  Given that Trinidad and 
Tobago is at stage two of the IMF (2004) typology of the transition to the new style of 
monetary policy, it is instructive to compare its transmission mechanism with that of 
the UK and US where the style is more firmly established, see Diagrams 2 and 3. These 
UK and US economies reflect deeper financial markets and they deliberately 
incorporate several transmission mechanisms into the transmission from the policy 
interest rate to inflation and output.  As a result a schema of the transmission 
framework for these countries is deliberately eclectic to reflect multiple transmission 
mechanisms through which the policy rate can impact on inflation and the output gap.  
 
Diagram 2   US Transmission Mechanism 
 
Source: Kuttner and Mosser (2002). 
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Diagram 3   UK Monetary Transmisssion Mechanism 
 
Source: The Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England. Mimeo. 
 
 
The official policy rate for the US is the Federal Reserve rate while for the UK it is the 
repo rate.  Both the US and UK choose the interest rate at which the private sector can 
borrow high powered money at. The repo rate is obtained by lending in the interbank 
market with respect to trading of gilt sale and repurchase agreements in two week 
intervals. 
 
The transmission in the UK and US can be realised through direct effects of the policy 
rate on the wholesale money market.  This consists of money market rates and 
interbank deposit rates.  The transmission also takes place through effects of 
expectations on the economy particularly with respect to savings and investment 
decisions, through changes in asset prices and the exchange rate.  As a result, for the 
UK the transmission goes from the official policy rate through to four alternative 
channels: 1) market rates, asset prices, 2) expectations related to the economy and 4) 
exchange rate. The market rates include deposit rates and mortgage rates. 
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Expectations are a strong influencing factor on asset prices and the exchange rate.  The 
type of expectations includes financial market expectations, expectations with respect 
to labour market dynamics, sales and profits. Mishkin (2007) points to several 
transmission mechanisms running from the policy rate to asset prices. These asset 
prices include Tobin q-theory, Firm Balance Sheet Effects, Household Liquidity Effects, 
Household Wealth Effects, Real Estate Prices and exchange rate effects. 
 
Monetary transmission is not precise in the advanced industrialised countries, since 
while they may have greater control over the policy and deposit rates in the 
intermediation markets, they have less control over expectations associated with asset 
prices and exchange rates. The interpretation of changes in market rates is subjective 
and therefore results in uncertainty.  The transmission mechanisms are built solely on 
the demand side, so that inflationary pressures arise through the demand side. 
 
5.4.1   Comparison of Transmission Mechanism in Trinidad and Tobago with 
that of the UK and US 
 
5.4.1.a  Moral Suasion 
 
The transmission mechanism mechanisms attributed to the developed economies 
show that they are able to use the markets with various transmission mechanism to 
realise the transmission of the policy rate to inflation. Moreover, according to the 
monetary policy committee of the Bank of England (Mimeo), the Bank of England is 
able to use its monopoly with respect to “high powered money” or base money. Given 
the relatively low development of the financial markets and instruments in Trinidad 
and Tobago compared to the developed economies, the country is more reliant on the 
use of moral suasion to navigate the transmission of the policy repo rate. Moral 
suasion can be used in two senses, 1) in terms of an appeal to altruistic sentiments and 
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2) in terms of the threat of coercing market players to comply with the wishes of the 
regulator.  The second meaning is appropriate here. 
 
Here, we suggest that the CBTT is able to use its monopoly as a regulator to imply a 
threat to financial institutions with regards to possible future legislation. This entails 
the policy maker working closely with the financial institutions they wish to apply 
moral suasion to. This is in contrast to the developed countries where the central banks 
rely on market forces to transmit the policy rate through the system. Moreover, we 
also suggest that by working closely with the commercial banks, the central bank is 
able to use information sharing as a sanction to encourage/reward commercial banks 
to be accommodating to changes in the repo rate. 
 
The literature on the use of moral suasion as a policy tool has been sparse. A notable 
exception is Romans (1966). According to him, moral suasion is effective where “cost of 
noncompliance is made to exceed the cost of compliance.”  They argued that under 
specific conditions, the use of moral suasion can be feasible. Two principal conditions 
they noted were the necessity for there to be public support for the desired policy 
action, and the population should be small. To apply their study directly to this study, 
we interpret the public to be in terms of the population of financial institutions 
regulated by the central bank. As a result, the financial institutions must buy into the 
policy measure that the central bank wishes them to follow.  
 
Trinidad and Tobago has a small number of banks: only eight banks are regulated by 
the CBTT.  This is in contrast to the US where 89,697 national commercial banks 
operate, or the UK where 21 commercial banks and 55 building societies operate. A 
large market can make it difficult for moral suasion to be effective as policy makers 
may not be able to meet regularly with individual banks or to stage negative sanctions 
against those that do not comply. Where the market is small we suggest that, while it 
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may not be ideal for efficient market pricing, the smallness may be ideal for the 
application of moral suasion.   
 
As a result of the smallness of the market in Trinidad and Tobago, they are able to 
meet with the commercial banks as a group and individually.  In addition, compliance 
by the majority in a small market increases the opportunity cost of the minority who do 
not comply. Moreover, if commercial banks do not respond as the central bank signals 
with respect to changes in the repo rate, commercial banks would expect that the 
central bank can resort to a range of other tools. However, they know that tools such 
as reserve requirements are more costly to commercial banks when compared to 
responding to the signal of the repo rate. Since non-remunerated reserve requirements 
act as a tax on deposits of commercial banks, it would be more likely for a profit 
maximising bank to cooperate with the central bank by responding to the policy signal 
emitted by the central bank.  
 
Breton (1978) contends that the central bank is able to encourage commercial banks to 
cooporate by engaging in information sharing with the latter. For the CBTT, information 
sharing  takes place through regular meetings by the central bank with the commercial 
banks, three to four times a year, for them to understand the central bank’s thinking 
on monetary developments and for the central bank to obtain feedback from them.  
The meeting takes place at the management level of the commercial banks and at the 
technical level which include the level of traders. 
 
5.4.2   Differences between Transmission Mechanisms 
 
It is interesting to note that the exchange rate is not included in the transmission 
mechanism by the Trinidad and Tobago.  This may be due to the fact that the bank 
concentrates its efforts at managing its exchange rate to keep it stable, so that it would 
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not have to contend with changes in the exchange rate. This is in contrast to the UK 
and US where the rate is a vital part of the transmission mechanism. 
 
Another important difference to note is the high importance of the securities market in 
the advanced industrialised markets, with respect to the transmission of the policy 
rate, when compared to Trinidad and Tobago.  With banks in Trinidad and Tobago 
exhibiting high excess liquidity spurred by limited alternative investments, there is 
excess demand for government instruments. The limited investment alternatives arise 
from the shallowness of the financial markets to accommodate the supply of 
investment funds and low liquidity, given low supply of companies registered in 
Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
Still another difference to note is that the transmission mechanism in the advanced 
industrialised economies is based on a more sophisticated market system where there 
exist developed secondary markets for the trading of existing securities and capital 
markets for the trading of long term instruments which allow for the development of 
yield curves. For Trinidad and Tobago the capital market is thin, given the small number 
of players in the markets.  In addition the interbank market in Trinidad and Tobago 
tends in most cases to contain banks with balance sheets on the same side of excess 
liquidity, thus diminishing the functioning of the market to generate interbank trade. 
 
The relatively low development of the financial markets and instruments in Trinidad 
and Tobago compared to the sample of advanced industrialised countries in the study, 
has left the country more reliant on moral suasion rather than through coercion of 
market forces to influence the pass through of the policy rate.  The CBTT use its 
monopoly as a regulator given its latent threat to exercise negative sanctions if 
financial institutions do not react favourably to the signals conveyed through changes 
by the central bank in the policy rate. 
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The CBTT noted, however, that the implementation of the new style required greater 
development of the money market, given its rudimentary level of development from 
since the time of independence. As noted by Alexander et al (1995), developing 
countries often lack deep financial markets with competitive institutions, substantial 
infrastructure, and a sophisticated legal and regulatory framework. They noted that the 
deepening of the market was kick started in many countries through the staging of 
regular auctions of government securities in a bid to influence bank reserves, where 
the Central Bank was then able to vary the net amount auctioned. The CBTT has 
therefore been taking steps to develop the money and capital markets to allow for the 
new style of monetary policy.  
 
 
6.0  Simple test for the scope for independent determination of money 
market rates in Trinidad and Tobago 
 
Given that Trinidad and Tobago practiced a managed floating exchange rate with 
limited exchange rate volatility, the independence of its money market can be 
questioned given the trilemma argument. Here the trilemma argument is that a 
country would lose its independence to conduct monetary policy where the exchange 
rate is fixed and the capital market is open. In this case we examine whether the 
trilemma argument can be applied to the money market. 
 
Following Obstfeld et al (2004), we did a simple check on whether the managed 
exchange rate as practiced by Trinidad and Tobago leaves sufficient scope for 
independent determination of representative Treasury bill rates through auctioning in 
the money market.  In doing so, we investigate whether changes in the domestic 
Treasury bill rates between Trinidad and Tobago and the US are synchronised. 
 
We first note that the correlation between the Trinidad and Tobago 3-month Treasury 
bill rate and the US Federal Reserve rate for the period 1st quarter of 1997 and the 
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third quarter of 2011 is 0.76. This shows that there is a strong tendency for both 
interest rates to move in the same direction.  However, the degree to which a change 
in the Trinidad and Tobago 90-day Treasury bill rate contemporaneously reflected a 
change in the Federal Reserve rate can be observed using OLS estimation, given the 
time series properties of the data. Using Obstfeld et al (2004) estimation specification, 
the estimation model used is  
 
  
 
where  is the change in the domestic short term interest rate, which in this case is 
the Treasury bill rate and  is the change in the US Federal Rate. Obstfeld et al 
(2004) contended that theoretically, if there is perfect capital mobility and a fixed 
exchange rate peg then  should be obtained so that interest rate parity should be 
derived. 
 
The regression is conducted using quarterly data for the first quarter of 1997 to the 
third quarter of 2008, see Table 10.  In this case, both the US Federal Reserve Rate and 
the Trinidad and Tobago 3-month Treasury Bill Rates are integrated of order one, so 
that the regression is conducted on the first differences of the series in order to 
maintain variable stationarity. The regression results show that  
 
 
Table 10   Dependent variable is a change in the Trinidad and Tobago Treasury Bill Rate 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic 
Change in Federal Reserve Rate 0.35 0.17 2.00** 
Notes:  = 0.08, Durbin Watson Statistic: 1.66, Standard Error: 0.65. OLS regression.   
Quarterly data: 46 data points; 1997q2 to 2008q3.    ** is significant at a 5% level. 
 
The significant  coefficient of 0.35 suggests that changes in the 90-day Treasury bill 
rate in Trinidad and Tobago do not instantaneously and strongly reflect changes in the 
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Federal Reserve rate. Employment of the Wald test shows  to be significantly less 
than one, thus suggesting that capital mobility is not perfect or the exchange rate is not 
a hard peg, so that there is some degree of autonomy for the determination of the 
Treasury bill rate through the auction process. This is further evidenced by the fact that 
the Trinidad and Tobago short-term interest rate reflected significantly higher volatility 
when compared to the US short term rates.63   
 
 
7.0  Links between the Trinidad and Tobago Treasury Bill rate with the US 
Treasury Bill rate 
 
The CBTT closely monitors the spread between Trinidad and Tobago and US Treasury 
bill rates, since it used this as an indicator of the demand for foreign currency in its bid 
to gauge the likelihood of exchange rate pressures. 64 Accordingly, in the view of the 
CBTT, the narrowing of spreads is likely to lead to increased demand for foreign 
currency by domestic agents, particularly for those wishing to invest in US financial 
instruments.65  
 
In actuality, the Trinidad and Tobago 3-month Treasury bill rate is significantly higher 
than both the US federal funds rate and US 3-month Treasury bill rate when examined 
over the period 1997 to 2010, see Figure 15.66 For the period 1997 to 2009 the 
                                                 
63
 The standard deviation of the Tobago Treasury bill rate was 2.90 compared to a standard deviation of  
1.91 and 1.74 with respect to the U.S. Federal Reserve Rate and U.S. 3-month Treasury bill Rate. 
64
 Farrell (1990) pointed out that this policy was exercised since in 1966, as the TTCB recognized that 
capital movements were closely linked to interest rate differentials between the base economy, which was 
the UK at the time, and Trinidad and Tobago.  In those early years the exchange rate was tied to the pound 
sterling, and the CBTT deliberately set out to ensure that the interest rate on the newly created Trinidad 
and Tobago local currency deposits was higher than that of the pound sterling.  
 
65
 See the Monetary Policy Report, April 2007, for an elaboration on this. 
66
 Use of the ANOVA test statistic showed that for the period, the mean Trinidad and Tobago 3-month 
Treasury Bill Rate of 7.69 per cent was significantly higher than the mean US Federal Reserve rate and 
mean U.S. Treasury bill rate which were 3.72 and 3.17 respectively.  
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correlations between the Treasury bill rates for Trinidad and Tobago and the US was 
0.74 and with the Federal Reserve rate is 0.99. 
 
 
The evidence shows that there is a high correlation between the three month Trinidad 
and Tobago Treasury bill rate with that of the US Treasury bill rate. 
 
Figure 15    Relation between US and TT Treasury Bill Rates 
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Source: US Treasury bill rate obtained from http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-
center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yield and Trinidad and Tobago Treasury bill rate 
obtained from CBTT database. 
 
 
We then apply Granger Causality test to see whether the domestic Treasury bill rate 
pattern is informed by the US Treasury bill rate. 
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For the estimation of the Granger Causality,  Granger cause  if the addition of  is 
statistically significant to improving the explanation of  . 
 
 
Consider autoregressive bivariate regressions  
 
 
 
 +             (1) 
 
 
and  
 
               (2) 
 
The null hypothesis is that  do not Granger cause  in equation 1, if 
  
  
The F statistic can be obtained by using  
 
  
 
The residual sum of squares can be compared for equations 1 and 2 to obtain 
;  
 
The F statistic is formed as 
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If the test statistic is greater than the critical value then the null hypothesis is rejected 
and we conclude that  Granger cause . 
 
As shown in Table 11, when the test is applied to the predictability of the TT Treasury 
bill rate based on the US Treasury bill rates we obtain  
 
 
Table 11   Granger Causality Test 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/23/11   Time: 17:14 
Sample: 1997M01 2011M02 
Lags: 4   
    
    
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
    
 US TB Rate does not Granger Cause TT TB Rate  169  4.01749 0.0039 
   
    
    
Source: Author’s Calculation using 3-month Treasury bill data obtained from 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yield 
and 3-month Data obtained from CBTT database. 
 
 
The result shows that the US Treasury bill rate Granger cause the pattern of the 
movement of the Trinidad and Tobago Treasury bill rate, see Table 11. Here the 
evidence obtained show that in spite of the fact that the TT Treasury bill rate is 
obtained from bids by the major market players in Trinidad and Tobago, it predicts that 
the Treasury bill rate in Trinidad and Tobago moves in tandem with that of the US. 
Accordingly, the US Treasury bill rate influences the Treasury bill rate in Trinidad and 
Tobago. The results therefore suggest that the Trinidad and Tobago money market is 
not independent of the US money market rate.  The Granger causality test results show 
that changes in the US Federal rate can help to predict the movement of the Trinidad 
and Tobago Treasury bill rate in Trinidad and Tobago policy, but the influence is not 
very strong in the short run, given the estimation result of 0.35 obtained in Table 10. 
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The results therefore suggest that there is room for independent monetary policy by 
the CBTT in the short run. 
 
 
8.0  Conclusion 
 
We showed that Trinidad and Tobago is a very open economy with a heavy 
dependence on foreign trade.  In particular, the country derived most of its export and 
fiscal revenues from corporation taxes and royalties emanating from the energy 
companies.  As a result, the bulk of foreign exchange inflows were held by the central 
bank on behalf of the government. This improved the capacity of the central bank to 
manage the exchange rate by direct trading of foreign currency in the foreign exchange 
market as opposed to resorting to the use of direct controls or macroeconomic 
measures.  Steady increases in gross international reserves, allowed the CBTT to use 
sales and purchases of foreign exchange to manage the exchange rate and control 
liquidity.   
 
With the accumulation of reserves, the government had the option of drawing down 
on its deposits at the central bank to raise expenditure.  The injection of these funds 
into the economy tended to raise excess liquidity, since the revenues derived from the 
energy sector acted as outside money.  The central bank therefore took measures to 
aggressively dry up excess liquidity where in the short run such injections did not lead 
to increased output.   
 
Given persistent excess liquidity, the central bank aggressively sought to dry up excess 
liquidity in order to give impetus to the interbank market and allow the repo policy rate 
to effectively signal the control of the monetary stance. In this light the central bank 
made efforts to develop primary and secondary markets in order to make open market 
operations effective in drying up excess liquidity. As a result, the repo rate was 
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accompanied by aggressive absorption of excess liquidity with the idea that use of the 
repo policy rate by the central bank would be more effective in an environment of tight 
liquidity, since it is under this condition that commercial banks would be forced to go 
to the interbank market, thereby providing the impetus for the development of this 
market.   
 
The CBTT did not practice strict inflation targeting, but it used an inflation anchor with 
respect to headline inflation.  Moreover, the bank set and published its targeted rate 
rather than acted through an Act of parliament.  Core inflation was also monitored, and 
the difference between these two measures was with respect to food inflation and 
core inflation excluded this variable. The new style of monetary policy pursued by the 
central bank led to it seeking to aggressively dry up excess liquidity in order to make 
the policy rate effective. 
 
A key point raised in the study is that in the absence of an advanced developed 
financial market, Trinidad and Tobago was able to use the smallness of the market to 
its advantage.  In effect it exercised moral suasion upon the private financial sector to 
influence them to respond to changes in the policy rate signal. Thus in effect the 
central bank was able to use the threat of regulatory coercion rather than market 
forces as is done in the advanced industrialised countries. 
 
Another important point to note is that the set up to achieve the market based 
monetary policy was not independent of the trends in the US.  As a result the money 
market rates were very much related to that of the US. Perhaps this could have been 
influenced by the strong trade links with the US and the managed exchange rate 
adopted by Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
It should be noted that a limitation in the monetary policy design with respect to CBTT 
is that it did not formally include the external sector in the monetary policy design. The 
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transmission was simplified compared to the developed economies, as financial 
markets did not feature prominently in its monetary policy design. Yet given the 
openness of the economy, the role of the external sector may be pertinent to 
monetary policy.  In subsequent chapters we investigate whether the overseas sector 
should be included in the assumed transmission mechanism and whether the pass 
through of the policy repo rate to inflation is affected by international spillovers. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Is the central bank policy rate useful under a managed 
float in a resource intensive economy? 
 
 
1.0   Introduction 
 
This chapter is an empirical investigation into whether the augmentation of the Taylor 
(1993) rule by the real exchange rate improves the performance of the monetary policy 
rule when the exchange rate is managed in a small open energy-based economy, such 
as Trinidad and Tobago, where government is a near monopsonist supplier of foreign 
currency.67  The primacy of government in the foreign exchange market stems from its 
domination of foreign exchange inflows from royalties and taxes from energy 
production. The study therefore seeks to fill a gap in the literature by presenting 
empirical evidence on the applicability of Taylor-type monetary policy rules to such an 
economy and the implications of these rules for macroeconomic stability. We check 
the robustness of the policy rule across different measures of inflation with respect to 
traditional and augmented Taylor-type rules. This case study can be instructive as some 
of these economies, such as Qatar, Nigeria and Trinidad and Tobago, are attempting to 
adopt a market approach to monetary policy. 
 
Adapting a simple Taylor-type rule for an open economy can imply two types of 
changes. First, as emphasised by Galí and Monacelli (2005) among others, the open 
                                                 
67
 Managed exchange rates are typical in many economies.  For example Saxena (2008) points out that in 
Asia and Latin America nine out of thirteen economies practice managed floats by intervening in the 
foreign exchange markets. 
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economy may lead to same parameters for the New Keynesian open economy Phillips 
and IS curves. In this vein, Clarida et al (2001) contend that the open economy is 
‘isomorphic’ to the closed economy in that the open economy is described by the same 
variables as the closed economy, even though the size of the parameters may differ. 
Second, it may be optimal for policymakers to respond to more variables in an open 
economy compared to a closed economy, implying a richer form for the optimal 
monetary policy rule. Indeed, studies by Batini et al (2009) and Shi and Xu (2008) 
suggested that the traditional Taylor rule ought to be augmented by the exchange rate.   
 
It is not clear in the theoretical literature that has evolved on open economy monetary 
policy rules, if augmentation by the real exchange rate is optimal compared to the 
traditional Taylor (1993) rule.  Shi and Xu (2008) considered the nominal exchange rate, 
while Batini et al (2009) and Taylor (2001) considered the real exchange rate to be 
potentially improving.  While these papers explored the broad classification of 
exchange rate regimes in terms of hard pegs, managed floats and flexible exchange 
rates, they failed to take account of the fact that managed floats may differ in practice 
across economies. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, the previous literature 
has not considered the case where the government is a near-monopsonist supplier of 
foreign exchange to the domestic market, giving it considerable influence over the 
exchange rate in the short-term. Consequently, we test whether the real exchange rate 
is a suitable candidate to augment the traditional Taylor rule when a managed float is 
adopted with government been the major supplier of foreign exchange to the market.  
 
The open economy also has implications for which measure of inflation should be included in 
the monetary policy rule. The original Taylor (1993) paper used the GDP deflator as the 
measurement of the inflation rate. Galí and Monacelli (2005) also suggest that domestic 
inflation should be the measure used.  In practice inflation targeting countries have chosen to 
target the consumer price index (CPI), which reflects the prices of both domestic and imported 
goods. As a result, discussions have evolved to an examination of the relative merits of 
headline and core inflation.  Saxton (1997) noted that the use of CPI can be attributed 
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to its familiarity, ready availability, minor revisions and convenience in communicating 
with the public. In addition it is a useful measure of the cost of living against which 
wages are negotiated. Further, Guender (2006) showed in an analytical model that in 
an open economy, targeting the CPI index is more likely to bring about stability in CPI 
inflation, the exchange rate and the policy instrument, though it would be less likely to 
bring about stability in the output gap. Consequently, the preferred measure of 
inflation adopted by many countries remains the CPI index. 
 
The CPI index is often measured in two forms, the full CPI index which gives headline 
inflation and one that is trimmed of the most volatile elements to obtain core inflation. 
Since headline inflation contains components which are subject to volatile swings it can 
therefore be misleading with respect to the true level of inflation, see for example, 
Mishkin (2007).68  Rich and Steindel (2005) argues that a significant degree of noise can 
be filtered out of inflation by focussing on core rather than headline inflation, since the 
latter rises more than core inflation in reaction to shocks and may not therefore be 
easily addressed by the policy interest rate.  Moreover, focus on headline inflation may 
involve unnecessary sacrifice of output through tight monetary policy, given the 
temporary nature of increases in headline inflation.  A possible strategy is for the 
central bank to be accommodative to headline inflation but aggressive to core 
inflation, see for example Dhawan and Jeske (2007). In addition, Bronstein et al (2008) 
show that within a monetary framework, rules which respond to core inflation 
outperform those which depend on headline inflation since the latter causes 
unnecessary volatility.    
 
The study is applied to Trinidad and Tobago, an emerging market economy.  The 
economy is foreign exchange constrained given that its currency is not an international 
reserve currency and the government dominates the earning of foreign exchange in 
                                                 
68
 In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, the volatile component in the index is agriculture prices. 
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this economy.69 Moreover, the traditional Taylor (1993) rule is compared to the 
augmented Taylor-type rule where the traditional rule is augmented by an exchange 
rate measure.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. A brief review of the literature is 
presented in Section 2.  Here we examine the debate concerning whether the 
monetary policy rule should be augmented, and if so, whether the real exchange rate is 
a good candidate. We note Galí and Monacelli (2005) argument that supply and 
demand disturbances emanating from the external economy go through the 
parameters of the traditional Taylor rule and therefore the closed economy Taylor 
(1993) rule is also appropriate to the open economy. We then examine the Taylor 
(2001) argument that the rule can be augmented by the real exchange rate, where it is 
shown that the real exchange rate may reduce the variability of inflation and the 
output gap from their targeted values, but that the improvement is only slight at best.  
 
In section 3 we highlight the modelling framework that the empirical investigation is 
based on.   Assuming that the central bank is forward-looking we first derive a target 
interest rate based on economic conditions.  The chosen policy rate is smoothed in 
relation to the target rate, to reduce volatility in the policy rate. We then consider the 
test hypotheses in terms of the candidate Taylor rules. In particular we consider the 
traditional Taylor (1993) rule and the augmentation of the rule by the real exchange 
rate.   
 
Section 4 explains the variables and data employed in the study.  We also discuss the 
inflation measures to be used. In Section 5 we outline the estimation method. In 
particular we estimate traditional Taylor-type rule with respect to domestic and CPI 
inflation in terms of headline and core inflation measures.  We then consider 
                                                 
69
 The dominance of the government in the foreign exchange market is typically the case among oil 
producers such as OPEC member countries, as these governments are the major recipient of royalties and 
other corporate taxes from oil production and sales. 
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augmented Taylor-type rules in Taylor (2001) by including the real exchange rate, 
deviations of the real exchange rate from the long run steady state exchange rate and 
the Federal Reserve rate. The estimates are then reported in Section 6 after which the 
study concludes in Section 7. 
 
2.0  Literature Review 
 
A key issue concerning the incorporation of the open economy into the Taylor (1993) 
rule is how external disturbances are transmitted to the domestic economy.  This has 
implications for whether or not the Taylor (1993) rule should be augmented.  Further, 
the monetary rule assumed, stems from the assumptions behind the construction of 
aggregate supply and demand equations.  
 
From the analysis, the impact of a managed float on inflation in the GM model can be 
deduced. They considered CPI inflation as the weighted average of domestic and 
imported inflation where the latter was defined in terms of the exchange rate by the price 
of foreign goods. Here we note in 4.2.22 that movements in the index of imported goods 
would be directly related to the degree of movements in the nominal exchange rate and 
the degree of movements in the index of foreign prices. If the volatility of the exchange 
rate is constrained because the central bank adopt a managed float, then while changes 
in the foreign price index would be reflected in terms of changes in import prices, the 
exchange rate would be managed and would therefore have limited effect on import 
prices. The managed float would therefore limit the likelihood of an appreciation or 
depreciation of the real exchange rate. Therefore movements in the real exchange rate 
would more likely arise from movements in the terms of trade with respect to relative 
prices, rather than from changes in the nominal exchange rate. 
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2.1    The Galí and Monacelli (2005) model 
 
In this section we use Galí and Monacelli (2005) as the baseline.  For Galí and Monacelli 
(2005), external shocks impact on the structural relationships in the economy and 
therefore do not necessitate the augmentation of the Taylor (1993) rule. They 
constructed their model by assuming that the economy consists of optimizing 
households and firms, with the central bank playing the role of minimizing the 
variability of inflation and the output gap. The household’s problem is to maximize the 
difference between the utility of consumption and disutility of labour constrained by 
income and taxes, while the policy maker sets policy using a monetary policy rule. 
 
The utility function is  
 
              4.2.1 
 
t  is the household’s time discount factor as the household seek to maximise the 
expected present discount value of utility,  is the composite consumption index,  is 
labour hours and and subject to the budget constraint 
 
                                         4.2.2
 
 
where  is the equilibrium price of a riskless bond in foreign currency,  is the 
payoff of the portfolio held in the next period,  is the nominal wage rate,  and  is 
lumpsum taxes and transfers.  is the wage rate,  is the CPI index and  is the 
nominal payoff in period .   
 
The central bank seeks to minimise a loss function. Woodford (2003) showed that the 
central bank objective function is a quadratic second order Taylor series approximation 
to household utility maximisation. In keeping with this, Galí and Monacelli (2005) 
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expressed the social welfare objective as a fraction of steady state consumption such 
that 
 
 
                    4.2.3 
 
where   is social welfare,  is the degree of openness,  is the substitutability 
between a variety of differentiated goods,  is the slope of the Phillips curve,  is 
the domestic inflation rate and  is the output gap.  Also,  is the forecast of 
domestic inflation,  is the disutility of labour and  is the current output gap.  The 
policy function suggests that the policymaker cares about stabilising inflation around 
its target rate and stabilising the output gap.  Full stabilisation requires  
 
.             4.2.4 
 
The zero targets are assumed in order to avoid inflation bias and to avoid sunspot 
equilibrium.  
 
At the limit, if  in (4.2.3), this would suggest that the household would tend to 
value future consumption the same as current consumption.  As a result, deviations 
from full stabilisation in 4.2.4 leads to expected welfare losses where 
 
        4.2.5 
 
Firms are assumed to engage in Calvo pricing:  depends on the discount rate and the 
Calvo adjustment probability .  As is well known, this implies 
 
 .           4.2.6 
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It is important to note that domestic inflation and the output gap are included in the 
loss function, suggesting that the policymaker is seeking to minimise the variance 
between domestic inflation and the output gap.  The model therefore presumes that 
the monetary authorities are pursuing flexible domestic inflation targeting in that the 
policy objective is to minimise the variance of inflation and output deviations from 
their targets. 
 
Following Taylor (1993), the central bank is assumed to be using the rule: 
 
           4.2.7 
 
where  is the policy short term interest rate and  is a constant. The model is based 
on the domestic inflation rate. CPI inflation is not incorporated in the simple rule. 
Foreign disturbances are assumed to be reflected in inflation and output and not 
included directly into the Taylor (1993) rule. 
 
Svennson (2000) observed that all inflation targeting countries target CPI inflation, 
rather than domestic inflation. He suggested that an attraction to this is that the cost 
of living and wage setting are more likely to be influenced by the cost of living index 
which is more readily captured by CPI inflation as it incorporates foreign prices.  
Further, it allows for the effect of exchange rate changes on relative prices of imports 
and it also influences wage setting.  Accordingly, use of the CPI index goes beyond the 
traditional Taylor (1993) rule by allowing for the incorporation of foreign disturbances 
on the cost of living. 
 
The parameters  and  are fixed exogenously.  A critical question which we shall 
investigate is how the sizes of the coefficients in the traditional rule compare to that of 
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the augmented rule. In particular we compare the sizes of  and   for the 
traditional and augmented rules.   
 
A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness of equilibrium is  
 
                                                   4.2.8 
 
where  is the relationship between the output gap and inflation. Taylor 
(1993) recommends  if the central bank is to be aggressive in fighting inflation 
and  if the central bank is accommodative in its monetary policy stance.  Also, 
stabilisation of output requires  .        
 
2.1.a   Implications of aggregate supply for the monetary rule 
 
Galí and Monacelli (2005) derive a linearised Phillips curve, approximated around zero 
average inflation steady state equilibrium, is given by 
 
                4.2.9 
 
where  is the proportional deviation from steady-state real marginal cost.  Real 
marginal cost is the difference between the product price and nominal marginal cost, 
given the mark up by firms in a monopolistic market structure as firms seek to 
maximise profits by minimising cost. Real marginal cost is affected by the ability of 
firms to minimise cost given technology, market demand and price stickiness.  For 
simplicity, technology is assumed to be linear and is given by the production function 
where output is a function of labour and productivity, since labour is assumed in the 
model to be the only factor of production. That is 
 
         4.2.10  
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where  is output and  is productivity. 
 
Approximating 4.2.10 in log terms we obtain 
 
           4.2.11 
 
where ,  and  are the logs of ,  and  in equation 4.2.10. 
 
The closed economy form of the marginal cost stemming from this is 
 
        4.2.12 
 
where  is a government subsidy implemented to counter distortions arising from the 
monopolistic market structure and  is the price of domestic goods. 
 
The CPI index  is defined as 
 
         4.2.13 
 
where  is the price index of domestic goods,   is the import price index,  is the 
index of openness such that . 
 
Adding and subtracting  to equation 4.2.12 gives 
 
.       4.2.14 
 
On the household side, consumption is divided between domestic and foreign goods 
such that 
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       4.2.15 
 
where  is the composite consumption index,   is domestic consumption,  is 
consumption of an index of imported goods,  is the substitutability between domestic 
and foreign goods with .  Further,  
         4.2.16 
 
and  
 
         4.2.17 
 
Here  is the elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods within any country 
and  is the elasticity of substitution between different country imports. 
 
Consumption demand for foreign goods are inversely related to the price of imported 
goods relative to domestic goods, the openness of the economy and the elasticity of 
substitution between imported goods and domestic goods so that   
 
 .         4.2.18 
 
We use  to denote imports of good  and  to denote countries.  The optimal 
allocations on the variety of domestic and imported goods are 
 
         4.2.19 
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and 
 
         4.2.20 
 
so that total expenditure for the domestic and foreign goods is 
 
         4.2.21 
 
thus suggesting that the household must decide on how much to spend on imported 
goods in relation to domestic goods. As a result, external and domestic demand is 
shaped by the preference of consumers foreign over domestic goods, the choice of 
which is influenced by relative prices.  Further, the real exchange rate can influence 
this decision through its impact on relative prices. 
 
The bilateral exchange rate of country  at time  is given by . The price of variety  
exports is given by . Assuming that variety  is sold at producer currency pricing 
then the imported price is .  In log terms, the price index of imported goods 
 is  
 
        4.2.22 
 
Thus as shown in 4.13, the CPI incorporates the effects of the exchange rate. 
Substituting in 4.2.22 gives 
 
          4.2.23 
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where  is the nominal exchange rate and  is the index of foreign prices. The right 
hand side of the expression gives the real exchange rate, .  is the terms of trade, 
which is  
 
                           4.2.24 
 
The relationship between the real exchange rate  and the terms of trade can 
therefore be derived so that  
 
          
  
=            4.2.25 
 
Assuming purchasing power parity holds, then  can be substituted into the CPI 
equation in 4.2.13 to become 
 
          4.2.26 
 
Per-period utility is assumed to be 
 
         4.2.27 
  
The elasticity of the marginal disutility of labour from the utility function is given by , 
while  is the coefficient of risk aversion. 
 
The per unit utility function can be substituted into the overall utility function in 
equation 4.2.1 and maximised subject to the budget constraint in equation 4.2.2. 
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One result that can be obtained is 
 
                             4.2.28 
 
In log terms 4.2.28 can be expressed as 
 
                        4.2.29
 
 
 
Substituting 4.2.29 and 4.26 into equation 4.2.14 gives 
 
            4.2.30 
 
This shows that there is a terms of trade effect, so prices in the world economy affects 
domestic inflation through the marginal cost and the effect is stronger the more open 
the economy (as indicated through the positive impact of a change in  on the 
marginal cost). Thus, considering the growth in prices, equation 4.2.26 becomes  
 
          4.2.31 
 
where  is CPI inflation.  Therefore a change in the terms of trade directly impacts on 
CPI inflation and the terms of trade effect comes through the marginal cost in equation 
4.2.30. Thus a major difference between CPI inflation and domestic inflation is that the 
former is impacted by changes in the terms of trade whereas domestic inflation is only 
affected by changes in marginal cost. 
 
Substituting 4.2.11 and 4.2.27 into 4.2.29 gives the open economy marginal cost as 
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                  4.2.32 
 
This shows that there are two effects of external disturbances on the marginal cost 
curve and therefore on the Phillips curve: the terms of trade effect and output effect.  
 
2.1.b    Aggregate Demand  
 
The focus so far has been on the aggregate supply, but now we consider aggregate 
demand.  The IS curve for the open economy can be represented as 
 
                  4.2.33 
 
where  is the output gap defined as  
 
                      4.2.34 
 
with  and  been the current output and the natural rate of output respectively.  
 
          4.2.35 
 
which is obtained from a first order approximation around a steady state as shown by 
Galí and Monacelli (2005). 
 
This shows that output is directly linked with world output where  
 
          4.2.36 
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Galí and Monacelli (2005) define the natural level of output as the “equilibrium output 
in the absence of nominal rigidities”  (pp 718).70  This is given by 
 
=          4.2.37 
 
With    and  
 
where  is a constant,  and  are the productivity and world output parameters 
respectively, both of which depend on the degree of openness ( ), the elasticities of 
substitution between domestic and imported goods ( ) and between variety of goods 
produced within each country ( ) and the inter temporal demand for goods. It also 
depends on marginal disutility of labour.   
 
There is a critical point here as 4.36 and 4.2.37 shows that both equilibrium domestic 
output and the natural level of output increase when world output increases. However, 
world output has a greater effect on actual domestic output compared to the natural 
level of output which increases by a fraction of world output given that . This is 
a key way in which the open economy affects the model as an expansion of world 
output leads to an increase in the output gap as domestic output increases in greater 
proportion than the natural rate. 
 
 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion in the open economy.  When  the IS 
curve given in 4.3.33 becomes flatter causing changes in interest to have a larger effect 
on the output gap since 
 
           4.2.38 
 
                                                 
70
 Justiano and Primiceri (2010) also points out that the natural level of output is obtained under imperfect 
market structure but with flexible prices and wages. 
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with 
 
         4.2.39 
 
Constant elasticity of substitution and perfect capital mobility are assumed so that 
 given .  This allows the open economy monetary rule to be 
isomorphic to the closed economy monetary rule in that welfare is maximised by a 
common specification of the monetary rule regardless of the degree of openness. This 
therefore suggests that the specification of the monetary rule can be the same in spite 
of the level of openness.   
 
In addition the output gap is positively related to changes in the natural rate of 
interest.71 The natural rate of interest  is given by 
 
     4.2.40 
 
where . 
 
 
2.1.c  Summary of external supply and demand disturbances  
 
Based on GM analysis, for an open economy supply disturbances come through the 
terms of trade effect. These disturbances impact on the marginal cost of domestic curves 
as can be obtained in equation 4.2.30. Also, external demand disturbances act on the 
slope of the IS curve by altering the relationship between output and interest rate as it 
makes the IS curve flatter, as can be gleaned from inserting 4.2.38 in 4.2.33 when 
openness increases. As a result, the effect of increased openness on the economy is to 
make the Phillips and IS curves flatter, therefore altering the relationship between 
                                                 
71
 Woodford (2003) defines the natural rate of interest as:  “the real rate of interest required to keep 
aggregate demand equal at all times to the natural rate of output”.  pp 248. 
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interest rate with either output and or inflation. Therefore, in setting the monetary policy 
reaction function in terms of output and inflation, there is no need to augment the 
monetary rule for the open economy compared to the closed economy. 
 
2.2    Taylor (2001) discussion of the inclusion of the real exchange rate 
in the Monetary Policy Rule 
 
Taylor (2001), borrowing from Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) examines the situation 
where there may not be perfect capital mobility, so the central bank may use the policy 
rate to react to deviations of the real exchange rate from economic fundamentals. The 
inclusion of the real exchange rate is consistent with much of the literature for the 
open economy, see for example, Batini et al (2007), Molodtsova and Papell (2008) and 
Mohanty and Klau (2004). These papers assume that the central bank would be 
motivated to stabilise the exchange rate because external disturbances are expected to 
act on the exchange rate, rather than only through the terms of trade, given the low 
degree of substitutability between foreign and domestic goods.  Moreover, the central 
bank may wish to stabilise the exchange rate since changes in the exchange rate can 
have profound implications for the size of the debt stock and the debt repayment 
required.  
 
An interpretation of exchange rate movements is that the spot exchange rate moves in 
relation to long-run purchasing power parity (PPP).72 In such a case, PPP is treated as 
the key economic fundamental against which spot exchange rate movements are 
benchmarked. The idea here is that the real exchange rate may not converge at each 
point in time thus permitting short term deviations from PPP. As a result, the monetary 
authorities react to deviations of the exchange rate from its long term target in order 
to bring the rate back in line with PPP. 
 
                                                 
72
 According to Taylor and Taylor (2004), purchasing power parity holds if “the nominal exchange rate 
between two currencies should be equal to the ratio of aggregate price levels between the two countries, 
so that a unit of currency of one country will have the same purchasing power in a foreign country”p125. 
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This is different to Galí and Monacelli (2005) where prices are assumed to follow the 
law of one price at each point in time, given perfect capital mobility.  Consequently, the 
real exchange rate was not included in their policy rule as macroeconomic adjustments 
took place immediately as a result of real exchange rate changes. Perfect capital 
mobility allowed the law of one price to obtain and it did not therefore allow for 
exchange rate deviations from its fundamentals owing to speculation.  However, Taylor 
(2001) considers whether the inclusion of the real exchange rate in the monetary policy 
rule would lead to smaller fluctuations of inflation and the output gap around their 
targeted values.  
 
The monetary rule considered is  
 
        4.2.41 
 
where  is the real exchange rate. 
 
Taylor (2001) constructed the equation without an intercept term since he assumes 
that the inflation target rate is zero and interest and exchange rates are measured by 
policy makers relative to their long run steady-state values.  He does not explicitly state 
whether he uses domestic or CPI inflation in the definition of the real exchange rate. 
However, Moldova and Paper (2008) employed CPI inflation using a model similar to 
equation 4.2.41.  We therefore follow and use domestic CPI index ( ) and foreign CPI 
for the foreign price index ( ). 
 
The real exchange rate is defined in foreign currency terms so that  
 
            4.2.42 
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where  is the units of foreign currency per unit of domestic currency.  Accordingly 
, that is, the real exchange rate in log terms. 
 
To the extent that the real exchange rate is important, there are two possibilities: the 
central bank reacts to the current real exchange rate, or the reaction follows an 
autoregressive process.  An advantage of the latter is that the lagged response allows 
the bank to partially offset the effects of initial changes in the policy rate.  
 
From equation 4.2.41, various possibilities can be considered. 
 
           4.2.43 
 
in which case, the model reverts to the traditional Taylor-type (1993) rule outlined in 
4.2.7. 
 
Also, 
 
           4.2.44 
 
where  and . 
 
An interpretation of 4.2.44 is that the central bank reacts to the current exchange rate 
and reverses its action in the second period. For example, the real exchange rate can 
initially rise above equilibrium PPP as a result of an increase in . In such a case the 
central bank can be expected to loosen monetary policy by lowering the policy rate in 
the second period to offset this. Accordingly, the central bank raise its policy rate in the 
first period and then reduces it in the second period. 
 
Another possibility is that  
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           4.2.45 
 
or 
 
           4.2.46 
 
with   while  or  while . 
 
Both 4.2.45 and 4.2.46 allows for partial offsetting of initial policy responses by the 
central bank. An intuitive explanation of the offsetting by the central bank offered by 
Taylor (2001) with respect to 4.2.45 is that if the real exchange rate appreciates above 
the PPP value then the central bank would seek to stimulate domestic demand by 
lowering the policy rate to relax monetary policy.  However, assuming that the 
appreciation has a lagged impact on inflation the central bank would try to partially 
offset the initial effect in the second period. The temporary effect on inflation could 
arise since an appreciation in the real exchange rate would cause foreign goods to be 
cheaper.  As a result, domestic demand would weaken and there is a temporary 
slowdown in inflation.  In the second period the central bank would avoid additional 
easing and instead would raise the policy rate to offset the initial effect of lowering it in 
the first period. By raising the policy rate the central bank is able to curb the excessive 
demand that arose from the first period reaction. The reverse would hold for 4.2.46. 
 
To illustrate, Taylor (2001) used the study by Ball (1999a) where the latter found the 
parameters  and  to be optimal. According to Taylor (2001) an 
interpretation of this result is that if the exchange rate appreciated by 10 per cent, 
then a 3.7 percentage cut in interest rate in the first period combined with a 1.7 per 
cent increase in the second period would lead to a long run reduction in the interest 
rate of 2 percentage points.  Thus the central bank initially loosens monetary policy in 
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an attempt to stimulate domestic demand to counter the fall in demand for domestic 
goods. The central bank partially offsets this by raising the policy rate in the second 
period in order to counter resulting excess demand from the first period. Ball (1999a) 
found that this rule leads to a slightly better performance of inflation and output gap in 
terms of narrowing fluctuations around the respective targets. 
 
Another study which used equation 4.2.41 is Taylor (1999).  Taylor (1999) suggested 
 and  for the European Central Bank.  He found that while better 
performances with respect to inflation and the output gap were found for some 
European countries, performance deteriorated for Germany. As a result, he concluded 
that it is not clear whether the inclusion of the exchange rate in the monetary policy 
rule leads to improved performances in the inflation targeting and the output gap. 
 
Taylor (2001) did not consider the possibility that  and  in 4.2.25; or 
 and  in 4.2.46. An interpretation of this is that the central bank reacts 
through incremental steps in one direction to restore exchange rate equilibrium.  The 
idea here is that exchange rate stability assists in stabilising inflation and output. As a 
result where the exchange rate deviates from it parity relationship, the central bank 
may find it useful to use the policy rate to address this disequilibrium, but it does so in 
small steps.  Diagram 4 gives a hypothetical example of where the RER curve deviates 
from PPP.  If for example RER is at point A on the diagram then the central bank would 
engage in monetary policy to bring RER to point C. However, it does so in a series of 
steps, since its initial policy action only leads the RER to come down to B in the 
diagram. 
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Diagram 4:   Relationship between Real Exchange Rate and Purchasing Power Parity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.0  Model Framework  
 
The empirical investigation is influenced by Clarida et al (2000).  Their strategy is to first 
specify a target short-term interest rate as a function of the state of the economy in 
the form of a Taylor-like policy rule for the target interest rate.  They then consider 
how the policy rate is set by the central bank, taking the target rate into account and 
include the effect of interest rate smoothing, whereby the actual policy rate is a 
weighted average of the target rate and the previous policy rate.  
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153 
 
The smoothing assumption is used to mimic the tendency by the central bank to 
undertake small adjustments in the policy rate, and to make these adjustments in the 
same direction.  Woodford (2003) noted that this might reduce macroeconomic 
volatility since it helps the private sector anticipate interest rate changes. 
 
3.1 Target Rate 
 
We take Taylor (1993) monetary policy rule to be the target rate. In addition, the rule is 
casted in the form of Clarida (2002) to take account of the information set of policy 
makers at the time of prescribing monetary policy.  Further, we distinguish between 
headline and core inflation measures, to see whether they have implications for our 
overall hypothesis that the monetary rule should be augmented by the real exchange 
rate when there is a managed float, with the central bank been the major supplier of 
foreign exchange in the market. We therefore specify the target rate as 
 
=      4.3.1 
 
where  is the target short term interest rate,  is a constant,  is the inflation 
coefficient;  is expected inflation in period ;   represent either headline 
inflation  or core inflation ,  is the inflation target,  is the information set of 
the central bank in the current period,  is the coefficient of the output gap.  The 
specification for inflation is forward looking over one period so the expected inflation is 
operationalised by using .  From henceforward we assume that . 
 
For ease of estimation of the target interest rate, the inflation rate can be combined 
with a constant inflation target such that .  As a result equation 4.3.2 can 
be rewritten as  
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=       4.3.2 
 
where  is domestic inflation, or CPI inflation in terms of headline  or core  
inflation. In so doing, the target rate is dependent on the relative weights the central 
bank places on inflation, output gap and possibly the real exchange rate.  We examine 
real exchange rate in absolute terms and in terms of deviations from steady state level. 
 
To demonstrate the degree of aggressiveness with which the central bank reacts to 
inflation Clarida et al (2000) showed that by expressing the real rate as 
= , this can be substituted into equation 4.3.2 and rearranged to 
become 
 
  4.3.3 
 
where  is the desired real interest rate and   is the long run equilibrium real interest 
rate.  The real desired rate would increase beyond the inflation rate once , thus 
allowing the central bank to pursue an aggressive stance to stabilize inflation. In 
contrast, the central bank would instead be engaging in accommodative monetary 
policy if , in that the bank would allow the policy rate to accommodate changes 
in inflation while accommodating economic growth.  The real interest rate can also be 
affected by the measure of inflation rate, as was shown by Kozicki (1999).73 
 
3.2 Policy Rate 
 
The Central Bank is assumed to make gradual adjustments in its policy rate.  As a result 
the bank engages in interest rate smoothing as the policy rate set by the central bank 
                                                 
73
For  Kozicki (1999), the type of inflation measured affects the policy rule.  Alternative inflation 
measures they considered included CPI, core CPI, GDP price and expected inflation. 
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reflects gradual adjustment to changes in the target rate. Substituting the target rate in 
equation 4.3.3 into the policy rate framework in equation 4.3.4 the model becomes  
 
                     4.3.4  
 
The lagged interest rate term is included to suggest that the policy rate is gradually 
adjusted towards the target rate. ρ represents a smoothing parameter where the 
higher the value of ρ, the greater is the degree of smoothing used by the central bank 
in changing its policy rate. When ρ is significant it suggests that the central bank 
gradually adjusts its policy rate in reaction to prevailing economic conditions as 
captured by the target rate.  Further, we assume the error term  to be identical and 
independently distributed (i.i.d).74   
 
3.3  Empirical Model 
 
We investigate GM model to see whether it is optimum for domestic inflation to be 
incorporated into the Taylor rule as opposed to the incorporation of a CPI inflation 
measure whether it be in terms of core or headline.  In essence, we investigate under 
the scenario where the exchange rate is managed, which measure of inflation is best. 
Moreover, we test whether it matters as to how the real exchange rate is measured, 
whether it be in absolute terms or deviation of the spot rate from steady state target. 
Further, given that the Trinidad and Tobago exchange rate is managed in relation to 
the US exchange rate, we investigate whether the incorporation of the US policy rate 
into the Trinidad and Tobago reaction function may be appropriate. 
 
                                                 
74
 This assumes that the policy rate is not serially correlated, otherwise the error term would be autoregressive such that 
 .  In such a case there would be ‘serially correlated omitted variables’ as 
suggested by Rudebusch (2002), rather than partial adjustment of the policy rate.  However, English et. al. 
(2003) showed that even if Redebusch (2002) observation is correct, there still remains smoothing of the 
policy rate by the monetary authorities.  
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The central hypothesis of this chapter is whether the augmentation of the Monetary 
Policy Rule improves the performance of the rule. Following Taylor (2001) we select the 
most efficient reaction function with respect to the variance of inflation and the output 
gap, with the lower standard deviation indicating stronger stabilisation as a result of 
lower variability. Consequently, we examine whether the variances of inflation and the 
output gap are lower when the monetary policy rule is augmented by the real 
exchange rate. This would indicate whether it is appropriate to augment the rule or 
whether the traditional Taylor (1993) rule is adequate to base the policy rate on. We 
then compare the coefficients in equations 4.3.4 for headline and core inflation.  
 
Here we examine different reaction functions owing to disturbances with respect to 
domestic inflation, CPI inflation, different shocks in real exchange rate and the Federal 
reserve rate. Furthermore, we check the sizes of the parameters to see how they 
compare to the normative prescription outline by Taylor (1993), Taylor (2001), Clarida 
(2000) and Galí and Monacelli (2005).  We also examine the aggressiveness of 
monetary policy conducted by the central bank of Trinidad and Tobago, based on the 
size of .  The aggressiveness is based on Taylor (1993) and Galí and Monacelli (2005) 
assertion that the central bank is aggressive if  . 
 
 
3.3.a   Summary of alternative reaction functions   
 
The generalised reaction function is given by 
 
      
         4.3.5 
 
where  is the degree of smoothing of the policy rate by the central bank,  can either 
be inflation measured in domestic terms (D) or in terms of headline (H) or core inflation 
157 
(C). The alternative ways in which the real exchange rate is measured is in terms of the 
ratio of domestic to foreign prices by either the spot exchange rate (see 4.2.42), 
the deviation of the exchange rate from the median exchange rate  (see 4.3.6) or 
the log deviation of the nominal exchange rate from the trend rate  (see 4.3.7) 
such that  
 
 
;                            `   4.3.6 
 
or 
 
              4.3.7 
 
The size of  suggests the aggressiveness with which the central bank responds to 
inflation. If , then the central bank responds aggressively by raising the policy 
rate to stabilise inflation.  If on the other hand  , then the central bank 
maintains an accommodative stance in support of the expansion in aggregate demand 
to support growth and employment.  Further, the stabilisation of the output gap 
requires its coefficient to be positive such that  . 
 
Given that Gal  and Monacelli (2005) assert that the open economy model is 
isomorphic to the closed economy, in their model inflation and the output gap are 
assumed to be sufficient to determine the policy rate in an open economy. Following 
the pattern discussed by Taylor (2001), the external influences are assumed to act in a 
dynamic manner. In the models we use the forecast of domestic inflation which is 
given by  and the forecast of headline CPI Inflation ( ) and Core CPI inflation 
( ).   
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For the first model we obtain the Taylor Type monetary rule by imposing the restriction 
on 4.3.6 that .  Hence the traditional Taylor (1993) rule is obtained by  
 
      4.3.8a 
 
We then insert CPI inflation in terms of headline and core inflation measures. 
Accordingly we measure  
 
     4.3.8b 
 
and 
 
      4.3.8c 
 
3.3.b    Testing the Taylor (2001) format for augmenting the Taylor Rule 
 
We maintain the same format as in Taylor (2001) to test the augmented rule in 
combination with different measures of inflation. Accordingly, we allow for the 
substitution of the augmented variables both in current and lagged terms.  The three 
measures of inflation employed are domestic inflation, CPI core inflation and CPI 
headline Inflation. The combination of variables and tests are given by the following 
equations below. 
 
The group of augmented rules is given in terms of domestic inflation, headline inflation 
and core inflation respectively.  In the first instance we examine the augmentation of 
the Taylor type rule by the real exchange rate as defined by Taylor (2001) and 
represented by equation 4.2.42. Thus the equations were represented as 
 
    4.3.9a 
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    4.3.9b 
 
    4.3.9c 
 
We then consider the idea that the central bank may try to manage the real exchange 
rate so as to minimise deviations of the real exchange rate from a long run steady state 
which we assumed to be based on the median real exchange rate ( ) calculated as 
4.3.6 above. The Taylor (2001) framework is retained to consider the deviation of the 
dynamics of the real exchange rate deviation from the steady state equilibrium respect 
to domestic, headline and core inflation in the following 
 
 
             4.3.10a
  
       
 
             4.3.10b
        
 
             4.3.10c 
 
 
The deviations of the real exchange rate was also considered in terms of the spot rate 
 to the long-term  trend in the long term rate ( ). Here we assume that policy makers 
 manage the  nominal exchange rate in  such  a way so as to force it to converge to a  
long run trend.  The policy interest rate is therefore assumed to react to changes in the  
real exchange rate accordingly. We therefore incorporate it into the equations to 
 obtain 
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            4.3.11a 
 
 
            4.3.11b 
 
 
            4.3.11c 
 
 
We test the idea that the US Federal policy rate ( ) is significant to the monetary 
policy reaction function in Trinidad and Tobago, given the trilemma argument in the 
literature.  The trilemma argument is that an economy cannot simultaneously maintain 
a fixed exchange rate, capital mobility and monetary independence.  This argument 
implies that monetary independence for Trinidad and Tobago would depend on 
openness of the capital market and the exchange rate regime.  Given the managed 
exchange rate and capital mobility of the economy, the US Federal Rate may be 
significant to the setting of the policy rate by the central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago. 
As a result it would suggest that there is an absence of monetary autonomy of the 
central bank of Trinidad and Tobago.  We test the dynamic reaction of the policy rate 
to changes in the Federal Reserve rate, with the idea that the small open economy is a 
follower and reacts to the policy rate of the large economy. 
 
            4.3.12a 
 
 
            4.3.12b 
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            4.3.12c 
 
 
This argument hinges on the idea that there may be loss of monetary independence, by 
the monetary authorities in Trinidad and Tobago, owing to capital mobility and the 
managed exchange rate where policy makers try to intervene in the market to reduce 
the volatility of the floating exchange rate.75  As a result the US Federal Reserve rate 
can be the major external rate which may influence the monetary policy reaction by 
the central bank of Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
4.0  Variables and Data 
 
The study covers the first quarter of 1997 to the first quarter of 2008 using end of 
quarter data to obtain 44 data points. Data for domestic variables are obtained from 
the CBTT database.  Inflation is defined as the quarter on quarter changes in CPI index 
obtained from the central bank data base. Quarter on quarter changes are used as it is 
assumed that the central bank use a quarterly forecast horizon given that this is the 
highest frequency for which quarterly changes in GDP can be obtained to assess 
demand conditions.  Further reasons for making quarterly forecasts is that the central 
bank would like to fine-tune monetary policy to deal with higher frequency intervals.  
In addition, the longer the forecast horizon the greater would be the margin of error. 
 
Compared to the US Federal Funds Rate which was created in July 1954, Trinidad and 
Tobago only introduced a policy repo rate in the second quarter of 2002. Moreover, 
other markets outside the US have only recently implemented the use of policy rates 
relative to the US. Given the short time span within which many markets have 
implemented the policy rate, so far the relevant literature on emerging markets have 
                                                 
75
 According to Saxena (2006) only a few countries in the world are likely to have independent monetary 
policy. 
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used either of two proxies for the policy rate: the interbank rate and the Treasury Bill 
Rate.76   
 
For Trinidad and Tobago, both the Treasury bill and the interbank rates are highly 
correlated with the repo policy rate – correlation is 0.96 and 0.98 respectively.  The 
correlation of the Treasury bill rate with the repo rate stems from the fact that 
Treasury bills can be used by banks as collateral on the interbank market. When 
liquidity is tight, banks can borrow on the interbank market, using Treasury bills as 
collateral.77  Consequently the price of collateral moves closely with the interbank rate 
as banks are unable to borrow from the interbank market, they may need to borrow 
from the central bank at the repo rate.  The interbank rate would be highly correlated 
with the repo rate as the central bank deliberately sets the repo rate at a margin of 200 
basis points above the interbank rate.   
 
Despite the high correlation of both rates with the repo rate, it is only the Treasury bill 
rate that is available for the entire period of the study, that is, the first quarter of 1997 
to the first quarter of 2008.  The interbank rate data spans the last quarter of 1999 
when it was introduced, to the first quarter of 2008.   
 
Further, the inflation rate is measured in terms of headline (H) and core (C).  The 
difference between both measures in the Trinidad and Tobago case is that core 
inflation excludes food prices, while headline inflation includes the food price index. To 
be consistent with the quarterly availability of GDP changes, we measure both forms of 
inflation on a quarterly Inflation.  
 
The Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago does not formally publish forecasts of the 
inflation rate. Nevertheless, from interviews with some members of the monetary 
                                                 
76
 For example Clarida et al. (1997) used the interbank rate as a proxy for the policy rate for Germany, 
while Söderlind et al (2003) used the 3-month Treasury bill rate as a proxy for the short-term interest rate 
in Sweden.   
77
 Liquidity may be tight as banks in the system may be heavily loaned up. 
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policy committee of the central bank, it was gleaned that the bank informally forecast 
quarterly changes in the inflation rate by using its limited data to make judgements of 
changes in indicators, such as quarterly GDP, the change in government expenditure in 
the economy, movement of liquidity arising from external capital inflows and short-
term factors influencing food prices.  We therefore adopt a one period ahead forecast 
of the inflation rate. 
 
 
5.0  Methodology 
 
Following Clarida (2000), we use Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) for the 
estimation. We put forward the contention that the rational for using GMM is with 
respect to the endogeneity problem owing to possible correlation between explanatory 
variables and lagged interest rate with the error term. In addition, use of the GMM does 
not require prior assumptions about the distribution. Baum et al (2002) posit that GMM 
is useful for getting around heteroskedastic problem of unknown form, by making use of 
orthogonal conditions to achieve efficient estimation. 
  
Expressing our model as  
 
           4.5.1 
 
where Y and   are  vectors,  is a  matrix of explanatory variables and 
 is a  matrix of parameters. If and  are correlated, then consistent 
estimators would not be obtained through a regression.  But suppose we also have 
instruments that are correlated with  but orthogonal to   (the IV method). Let Z be 
the  vector of instrumental variables, with   .  Then by pre-multiplying X by 
Z  
 
            4.5.2 
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or 
 
             4.5.3 
 
where  is ,  is  and  is .  
 
The OLS estimator is chosen to minimise the criterion function 
 
           4.5.4 
 
To minimise the criterion function, the variance matrix must be proportional to the 
identity matrix for the OLS estimator to be efficient. As a result a weighting matrix  
is used to minimise the criterion function such that   
 
.          4.5.6 
 
Here we use a HAC Newey West weighting matrix to find a heteroskedastic and 
autocorrelation consistent estimator for the long-run covariance matrix.   
 
The instruments consist of the intercept term, lags of the endogenous variables and 
two exogenous variables.  These two exogenous variables are oil prices and excess 
reserves.  The number of instruments totalled 22 when the rule is not augmented and 
26 when it is augmented.   
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6.0  Estimation Results 
 
Diagnostic tests showed that the models were over identified and the independent 
variables were orthogonal to the error term. The results exhibited in all the Tables, 
suggested that there is a high degree of interest rate smoothing by the central bank in 
relation to the volatile target rate. The coefficients of the lagged dependent variables 
 ranged between 0.86 and 0.99 thus suggesting that the central bank was highly 
engaged in smoothing the policy rate. As such the results showed that the policy rate 
reacts by 0.14 to 0.01 per cent respectively, to a 1 per cent change in the target rate. 
This shows that the central bank changes the policy rate by small increments relative to 
the target rate.  
 
The inflation coefficient was significantly above one in all regressions, which showed 
that the central bank was aggressive in fighting inflation in all periods regardless of 
inflation measures, see Tables 12-15.  Similarly, the results showed that the output gap 
was significant and above zero for all Taylor-type rule in all regressions. Thus the 
results fit the traditional Taylor –type rule with respect to inflation and output gap. 
 
We test how the size of the coefficients obtained empirically in Tables 12-15 compare 
to the size of 1.5 recommended by Taylor (1993).  Here it is found that the CPI measure 
of inflation was significantly different to Taylor (1993). We then compare the standard 
errors for inflation and output gap for each reaction function of Taylor-type rules. We 
found that in terms of the Traditional Taylor-type rules, core inflation turned out to 
exhibit the lowest variance compared to domestic and headline inflation. At the same 
time, the variances for domestic and headline inflation were 0.99 and 1.01 
respectively. Similarly, in terms of the output gap, we found that the variance was 
lowest for the output gap when the core inflation measure was used. The standard 
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error was 0.11 for core inflation compared to 0.43 and 0.48 when domestic and 
headline inflation were used in the monetary rule respectively.  The result therefore 
suggest that where the Taylor rule is not augmented, the policy makers would do 
better fashioning the policy rule after core inflation targeting since this yielded the 
lowest variances with respect to inflation and the output gap. 
 
 
Table 12   Alternative reaction functions for Traditional Taylor-type rule 
Equations in 4.3.8 
Domestic Inflation 
(a) 
CPI Inflation 
Headline 
Inflation (b) 
Core Inflation 
(c) 
 0.96 (0.01)*** 0.97 (0.01)*** 0.93 (0.01)*** 
 2.17 (1.67)* -14.38 (6.35)** -1.96 (0.90)*** 
 3.30 (0.99)***   
 
 3.31 (1.01)***  
   2.50 (0.23)*** 
 1.12 (0.41)*** 1.82 (0.48)*** 0.90 (0.11)*** 
 0.96 0.96 0.96 
 2.68 2.71 2.72 
 0.56 0.54 0.54 
 11.63 11.11 11.23 
J-Statistic 10.11 9.87 9.16 
Included 
observations 
41 42 42 
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets and are based on Newey West heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation robust estimator.   * indicate significance at a 10% level, ** indicate significance at a 5% level 
and *** indicate significance at a 1% level.  
 
 
In terms of the dynamics, we found that the reaction of the policy rate to changes in 
the real exchange rate was negative in consecutive periods.  This therefore suggested 
that there was no offsetting as noted in Taylor (2001).  Thus a view of this could be that 
policy makers tend to lower the policy rate in reaction to an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, in a bid to ease monetary conditions and stimulate domestic demand. 
The policymaker does this in incremental steps, hence two consecutive periods of 
negative coefficients on the coefficients of the real exchange rate. The idea here is that 
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the policy makers expand demand in order to put pressure on nominal interest rate to 
fall and for the real exchange rate to depreciate towards the purchasing power parity 
fundamentals as in Diagram 4. As a result, there is no offsetting of the policy rate here 
as in Taylor (2001).  
 
We then check the variances for the augmented Taylor rules.  We first check the 
variances when the rule is augmented in terms of the real exchange rate using the spot 
exchange rate as in Taylor (2001), see Table 13. Again, the variances when the core 
inflation measure was used turned out to be the lowest for inflation and the output 
gap.  In particular, the variance for core inflation was 0.15 while for headline inflation 
and domestic inflation it was 0.30 and 0.88 respectively. Thus, the result suggests that 
the best measure was obtained when core inflation was used in the monetary policy 
rule. 
 
 
Table 13   Alternative Reaction Functions for Taylor (2001) real exchange rate 
Equations in 4.3.9 
Domestic 
Inflation (a) 
CPI Inflation 
(b) (c) 
 0.95 (0.01)*** 0.92 (0.01)*** 0.85 (0.01)*** 
 9.53 (11.58) 46.48 (5.87)*** 25.86 (1.71)*** 
 3.21 (0.88)***   
 
 2.18 (0.30)***  
   1.98 (0.15)*** 
 0.92 (0.28)*** 0.69 (0.15)*** 0.48 (0.04)*** 
 -0.07 (0.04)* -0.17 (0.04)*** -0.13 (0.04)*** 
 0.05 (0.03)* -0.07 (0.03)* -0.10 (0.04)*** 
 0.96  0.97 0.97 
 2.68 2.72 2.72 
 0.58 0.53 0.53 
 11.59 9.98 10.20 
J-Statistic 0.97 10.10 10.20 
Included 
observations 
41 42 42 
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets and are based on Newey West heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation robust estimator.   * indicate significance at a 10% level, ** indicate significance at a 5% level 
and *** indicate significance at a 1% level.  
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The result was similar when the rule is augmented by the real exchange rate when it is 
assumed to converge to the median exchange rate, see Table 14.  The core inflation 
and the output gap exhibited the lowest variance of 0.16 and 0.06 respectively. This 
was followed by headline inflation measure which exhibited a variance of 0.39 for 
headline inflation and 0.15 for the output gap. Thus the core inflation measure of 
inflation turned out to be best for the traditional rule and the real exchange rate in 
terms of its absolute value and its convergence to the median exchange rate. 
 
 
Table 14  Alternative Reaction Functions for Deviation of RER from targeted median 
Equations in 4.3.10 
Domestic Inflation 
(a) 
CPI Inflation 
(b) (c) 
 0.97 (0.01)*** 0.93 (0.01)*** 0.86 (0.02)*** 
 -7.20 (9.59) 44.45 (6.53)*** 23.92 (1.65)*** 
 3.27 (1.12)***   
 
 2.39 (0.39)***  
   2.11 (0.16)*** 
 1.30 (0.55)** 0.77 (0.15)*** 0.53 (0.06)*** 
 0.01 (0.02) -0.03 (0.01)** -0.01 (0.02) 
 -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02) 
 0.95 0.96 0.97 
 2.68 2.72 2.72 
 0.58 0.53 0.54 
 11.62 10.22 10.46 
J-Statistic 10.03 10.19 10.56 
Included 
observations 
41 42 42 
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets and are based on Newey West heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation robust estimator.   * indicate significance at a 10% level, ** indicate significance at a 5% level 
and *** indicate significance at a 1% level.  
 
Core inflation and the output gap also turned out to be the best measure of inflation in 
the monetary rule, when the rule was augmented by the deviation of the real exchange 
rate from the trend in the rate, see Table 15.  The variance of the core inflation rate 
was 0.52 and the variance of the output gap was 0.14.  Headline inflation turned out to 
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be the second best given a variance of 3.45 while the output gap turned out to be the 
second best when domestic inflation was used as the inflation measure. 
 
 
Table 15  Alternative Reaction Functions for Deviation of RER from Trend 
Equation 4.3.11 
Domestic 
Inflation (a) 
CPI Inflation 
(b) (c) 
 
0.98 (0.01)*** 0.99 (0.01)*** 0.95 (0.01)*** 
 
-4.80 (6.38) -31.64 (22.80) -4.01 (0.07) * 
 
8.30 (4.49)*   
 
 5.90 (3.45)**  
 
  3.04 (0.52)*** 
 
2.01 (1.11)* 3.40 (1.71)* 1.17 (0.14)*** 
 
-0.42 (0.08)*** -0.26 (0.06)*** -0.28 (0.07)*** 
 
-0.23 (0.05) 
*** 
-0.21 (0.07)*** -0.27 (0.09) 
*** 
 
0.96 0.96 0.96 
 
2.69 2.72 2.72 
 
0.54 0.54 0.54 
 
10.39 10.55 10.31 
J-Statistic 9.93 10.10 10.22 
Included 
observations 
41 42 42 
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets and are based on Newey West heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation robust estimator.   * indicate significance at a 10% level, ** indicate significance at a 5% level 
and *** indicate significance at a 1% level.  
 
 
The results tended to be quite different when the monetary rule was augmented by 
the Federal Reserve rate, see Table 16.  Domestic inflation turned out to exhibit the 
lowest variance of 0.14.  However, the inflation coefficient turned out to be less than 
one, been 0.36.  This suggest that the domestic inflation measure was accommodating, 
rather than been aggressive. Thus, the result suggested that domestic inflation was 
accommodating to US monetary policy.  The output gap was the same for the output 
gap when domestic and core inflation measures were used.    
 
170 
Table 16  Alternative Reaction Functions when Rule is Augmented by US Federal Rate 
Equation 4.3.12 
Domestic 
Inflation (a) 
CPI Inflation 
(b) (c) 
 0.85 (0.01)*** 0.90 (0.03)*** 0.88 (0.01)*** 
 0.89 (0.50)* -1.23 (2.04) -0.59 (1.29) 
 0.36 (0.14)**   
 
 0.45 (0.26)*  
   1.06 (0.29)*** 
 0.27 (0.05)*** 0.40 (0.10)*** 0.41 (0.05)*** 
 0.20 (0.04)*** 0.21 (0.08)** 0.27*** 
 0.02 (0.04 -0.06 (0.09) -0.14 (0.06)** 
 0.96 0.96 0.97 
 2.68 2.72 2.72 
 0.50 0.51 0.50 
 8.88 9.37 9.11 
J-Statistic 10.28 10.26 10.23 
Included 
observations 
41 42 42 
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets and are based on Newey West heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation robust estimator.   * indicate significance at a 10% level, ** indicate significance at a 5% level 
and *** indicate significance at a 1% level.  
 
In general the core inflation measure tended to lead to the best performance of 
inflation and the output gap for most of the regressions. This would have suggested 
that for the traditional Taylor rule and the augmentation by the real exchange rates, 
the policy rate is better at stabilizing core inflation regardless of the inflation measure 
used. However, the Federal reserve rate put a different spin as inflation turned out to 
be accommodating, with domestic inflation been the best measure among inflation 
measures. At the same time the estimated responses to the output gap differed 
between measures of the inflation rate.   
 
Use of the Wald test showed that in most cases, except for where the rule was 
augmented by the Federal reserve rate, the estimated coefficients for inflation was 
larger than the Taylor prescribed 1.5. Generally, the output gap was lowest when core 
inflation was the measure used, but it was not the lowest when the rule was 
augmented by the Federal reserve rate. 
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The dynamics differ somewhat when the rule is augmented by the Federal reserve rate.  
The responses when domestic inflation is used is consistently positive thus suggesting 
that the central bank raises the short term interest rate in response to increases in the 
Federal  Reserve rate.  However, the coefficients are offsetting in the presence of CPI 
inflation in the sense that it is positive in the first quarter but negative in the second 
quarter. As a result, the dynamics to changes in the Federal  Reserve rate is sensitive to 
whether we consider domestic or CPI inflation. 
  
Overall comparing the variances of the regressions, our results showed that core CPI 
inflation not domestic inflation as posited by Galí and Monacelli (2005), that exhibited 
the lowest variability. Moreover, inflation exhibited the lowest variability when the rule 
is augmented by the real exchange rate. In fact the best results were obtained with 
respect to Table 13 when the core inflation measure was used and the rule was 
augmented by the actual real exchange rate.  In addition, we found that domestic and 
headline CPI inflation were accommodative when the rule is augmented by the US 
Federal Reserve rate.  
 
7.0  Conclusion 
 
Certain key findings can suggest empirically supported imperatives for designing a 
monetary policy rule for a resource intensive economy where the central bank is a 
monopsonist supplier of foreign currency to the market and the economy practice a 
managed float as Trinidad and Tobago.  We find that the augmented Taylor rule leads 
to lower variability of inflation and output gap compared to the traditional Taylor rule. 
As such, our results do not support Galí and Monacelli (2005) contention that domestic 
inflation rate is optimal for the Taylor rule. Instead we find that it is superior to 
augment the Taylor-type rule by the real exchange rate in the form as suggested by 
Taylor (2001), if core inflation is targeted.  
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 Accordingly, our results show that the Taylor-type rules when applied to Trinidad and 
Tobago economy is better for stabilising domestic and headline CPI inflation when it is 
augmented by actual real exchange rate.   
 
Further, we found that inflation to be accommodative to the US Federal Reserve Policy 
Rate when traditional and headline inflation are used in the Taylor rule and the rule is 
augmented by the real exchange rate. This is therefore suggestive of a lack of monetary 
independence with respect to US monetary policy when the central bank tries to 
stabilise these forms of inflation.  Rather, the results suggest that policy makers realise 
greater independence in stabilising core inflation rather than domestic and headline 
inflation measures given that the coefficient was close to unity.  
 
Further, we do not find evidence that the central bank offsets its initial adjustment of 
the policy rate when the real exchange moves. Instead we find that the monetary 
authority react to an appreciation of the real exchange rate over two quarters by 
lowering the policy rate. As a result there is no offsetting of the policy rate by the 
authorities to reverse the previous quarter, as in Taylor (2001). 
 
Overall, the evidence suggests that while the Taylor-type rule can still be applied to an 
economy with a managed float that is driven by government acting as a monpsonist 
supplier of foreign currency to the market, it would be more efficient if the rule is 
augmented by the actual real exchange rate.78 Consequently, the evidence obtained 
disputes the conclusions of Clarida et al (2001) and Galí and Monacelli (2005) 
contention that the closed economy form of the monetary rule is isomorphic for the 
open economy, since both speculation on the exchange rate and the loss of monetary 
independence, can impact on the policy rate thereby impacting the macroeconomic 
stability. 
                                                 
78
 Ball (1999b) define efficient rule for monetary policy rule as “one that minimizes a weighted sum of 
output variance and inflation variance.” pp 63. 
173 
  
174 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Pass through of the policy repo rate in the presence of 
persistent excess liquidity and international spillovers in 
an emerging market 
 
 
1.0  Introduction 
  
In this chapter we examine the pass through of the policy repo rate on the credit 
market rate and therefore on aggregate demand, in the presence of both chronic 
excess liquidity and spillovers of disturbances emanating from advanced industrialised 
economies.79  These factors can potentially cause the policy rate to have a less than 
predictable effect on the credit market rate.  Both factors can therefore disrupt the 
effect of changes in the repo rate upon the credit market rate. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study that is testing to see whether spillovers from the 
advanced industrialised countries impact on the pass through from the policy rate to 
commercial bank intermediation lending rate. 
 
Excess reserves and spillover of external disturbances are critical considerations for 
energy producing  countries, such as Trinidad and Tobago, that are trying to make the 
transition to market-based instruments. They can blunt the effectiveness of the policy 
                                                 
79
 We use excess liquidity and excess reserves interchangeably.  Moreover we consider excess liquidity of 
the banking system to be representative of excess market liquidity for two reasons. Firstly commercial 
banks dominate the financial sector and secondly, the central bank during the period of the study only 
regulated the banking sector and therefore its monetary measures were directed at commercial banks. 
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rate of the central bank.80  For example, when excess liquidity is persistent, banks may 
not be forced to return to the central bank to borrow funds and therefore respond to 
the policy lending rate.  In addition, issues regarding the capacity of the country to 
stage independent monetary policy arise, since the pass through of the policy rate can 
be thwarted by spillovers of external disturbances onto the market.  Under such 
circumstances, the market rate could become de-coupled from the repo rate, so that 
the latter would at best act as a signalling rate. 
 
It should be noted that excess reserves are typical of oil commodity producing 
countries such as those in the Middle East, North Africa, and Venezuela. These 
countries tended to record oil related excess liquidity, particularly when oil prices rise.  
Poghasyan and Hesse (2009) contend that for these countries oil prices positively 
impact on exports, government revenues, fiscal balances and GDP growth.  In spite of 
this, energy prices tend to be positively correlated with oil related excess liquidity in 
spite of credit growth. Excess liquidity can occur as the increased inflow of oil revenues 
may be greater than the ability of the real side of the economy to absorb these 
revenue inflows.81   
 
In discussing spillovers of disturbances emanating from advanced industrialised 
countries we focus mainly on external spillovers of monetary policy, trade, prices and 
interest rates.82 This yield insights on the integration and interaction of the Trinidad 
and Tobago financial market with the US and UK markets. As a result, we allow for 
trade linkages and the international determination of prices of resources. Other forms 
                                                 
80
 Other energy producing countries seeking to make the transition to market based monetary policy 
include, Qatar and Nigeria. 
81
 Sanusi (2010) pointed out that in Nigeria, extraordinary oil windfalls between 2004-8 led by heightened 
oil prices, led to high levels of excess liquidity way beyond the capacity of the real sector in the economy 
to absorb.  Also  Saxegaard (2006) observed that rapidly growing excess liquidity presented a challenge to 
monetary policy in  Sub Sahara Africa, where the largest oil producers there are Nigeria and Angola. 
82
In defining spillovers, we benefited from Weyerstrass et al. (2006).  They gave a 
typology of different definitions of spillovers, which included external and internal 
spillovers, shock vs. Policy induced slipover, direct vs indirect spillover and positive vs. 
Negative spllover.  
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of spillovers such as those arising from government debt channel and structural reform 
as were outlined by Weyerstrass et al. (2006) are outside the scope of our analysis. 
 
We point out that the transmission of monetary policy is facilitated by deeper 
integration of financial markets. To this end, we examine whether monetary policy 
disturbances in the UK and the US can spillover onto financial markets in Trinidad and 
Tobago and whether this can impact on the pass through of the policy repo rate. The 
level of financial integration between markets can lead to spillovers of external 
disturbances, and according to Canova (2005), it can be indicative of the level of 
financial integration between countries.  Financial integration between developed and 
less developed countries may stem from the progressive financial liberalisation policies 
that the developing economies have pursued since the 1980s.83 Canova (2005) also 
contended that the more fixed the exchange rate regime of the home country is, the 
greater the spillover of macroeconomic disturbances onto the macro economy.  We 
therefore argue that the significance of the spillover variables would be dependent on 
the degree of financial integration between Trinidad and Tobago and the UK and US 
economies and it would also be dependent on the level of stability of the exchange 
rate. 
 
Spillovers of external disturbances on the retail lending rate may decouple the market 
rate from the policy rate.  The spillovers can occur as a result of increasing financial 
integration of markets so that disturbances in one economy can have a contagion 
effect on interest rates in another economy. This could be manifested through 
disruption of trade and capital flows given the ties that may exist between economies.  
We contend that as markets become more integrated, the spillover effects may 
become stronger and more significant to the transmission mechanism with respect to 
the policy rate to the market lending rate. 
                                                 
83
 Gibson and Tsakolotos (1994)  identified three ways in which financial liberalisation occurred – the 
freeing of national markets thus reducing government intervention in financial market, globalisation of 
markets conditioned on growing liberalisation of national economies and the deregulation in the financial 
sector. 
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In a wider sense we look at the impact of disturbances on the pass through of the 
policy rate, from large to small economies. The transmission is assumed to be 
asymmetric, in that we do not consider common shocks.  We contend that the 
transmission is more likely to take place as economies become more liberalised and 
financial integration increases.  According to Canova (2005), the transmission can be 
manifested in terms of co-movement of interest rates or a shock in the advanced 
industrialised country such as the US can contribute to movements in the domestic 
interest rate. 
 
The repo rate was introduced in March 2002, as the lowest rate at which the central 
bank would lend to commercial banks.84  Working through the transmission 
mechanism it is expected to impact on market lending rates and, through this, on 
aggregate demand. However, the transmission mechanism is expected to work best 
where there are no spillovers of external disturbances or accumulation of excess 
commercial bank cash reserves deposited at the central bank.85  
 
We begin by examining the stylised facts associated with excess liquidity and spillovers 
of foreign disturbances. This is examined by looking at the nexus between excess 
liquidity and the prime lending rate in Trinidad and Tobago. Given possible excess 
reserves and spillover effects we assume that the central bank must take into account 
the magnitude by which commercial banks would adjust their lending rates in reaction 
to changes in the policy rate.  
 
                                                 
84
 Buzeneca (2007) reported that the repo rate is widely used by developing countries as many of them 
seek to transition to direct monetary policy. 
85
 The transmission mechanism was captured in “The Implementation of Monetary Policy in Trinidad and 
Tobago” Public Education Pamphlet Series, no. 1 of the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, September 
2005.  
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The theoretical framework outlined by Martin and Milas (2010) is then discussed in 
Section 3. They allow for the base rate to work sequentially through the system of the 
IS and Phillips curve equations, to stabilise the output gap and inflation around its 
targeted rate. In doing so, they incorporate risk and liquidity measures in order to 
impact on the interbank rate. By applying their model to the UK, they find these 
parameters to be significant to the monetary policy rule. In their framework, the policy 
rate is transmitted through the money market to the Libor rate. Accordingly, they use 
the 3 month LIBOR rate as the benchmark money market rate, which in itself could be 
treated as the floor for lending to the privates sector.86   
 
A limitation of their study is that by confining the transmission mechanism from the 
policy rate to the money market rate, they did not directly capture the cost of 
borrowing by commercial bank customers in the retail credit market. Moreover their 
model did not allow for the effect of spillovers of external disturbances onto the 
domestic market, given that they used the money market rate as the floor rate in the 
credit market.  
 
We add to the literature by considering the pass through of the policy rate in the 
presence of excess bank reserves with spillovers of external disturbances and by 
extending the transmission mechanism to the retail lending market.  By extending the 
transmission we are able to introduce spillover effects and consider different lag 
lengths in the investigation of the pass through effects of changes in the policy rate on 
the prime lending rate. The international spillovers are externalities stemming from 
financial disturbances in the advanced industrialised countries. These externalities may 
take place through cross-border loans to banks, non banks and to government. Foreign 
banks may lend to different segments in the economy so that this would feed into the 
                                                 
86
 The 3 month Libor rate is obtained daily from surveys reported by the British Bankers 
Association based on banks in the interbank market declaring how much they are 
prepared to pay to borrow from each other on the interbank market.  
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banking sector at different speeds. With these there can be different points of contact 
with the domestic financial sector. 
  
In Section 4 we outline the framework and methodology we use to test the hypothesis 
that the pass through of the policy rate to the commercial bank lending rate is sensitive 
to changes in excess reserves and international spillovers.  Here we point out that 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) is the estimation technique used.  We use the 
prime lending rate as the representative commercial bank lending rate. This rate is 
defined as the rate at which commercial banks are prepared to lend to their best 
customers that present the lowest credit risk. It is therefore treated as the floor 
interest rate upon which term interests margins are built on. An important difference 
between the LIBOR rate as used by Martin and Millas (2010) and the prime lending rate 
we used in this study, is that while the former is representative of the cost of credit to 
banks in the interbank market, the latter is the base interest rate cost of borrowing by 
households, firms and government in the economy.  
 
An advantage of the prime lending rate is that its impact on demand is more 
immediate as, theoretically, lending rates impact upon credit demand in the economy, 
so that the eventual effect of changes in the policy rate upon demand is through the 
lending rates. It is critical therefore for the central to be able to gauge the extent to 
which the market rate changes are tied to its changes in the policy rate, in a bid to 
forecast reactionary demand changes.87 
 
We test in section 5 to see if the pass through of the policy rate to the credit market 
lending rate in Trinidad and Tobago is sensitive to external and domestic disturbances. 
The estimation results are reported in that section.  The study is then concluded. 
 
                                                 
87
  Kobayashi (2008) explores the idea that the central bank aims to stabilise the credit market rate in the 
presence of productivity and preference shocks. This stems from the idea that the lending rate follows a 
cost channel. We assume however that the central bank is engaged in policy rate smoothing where it has 
more control, rather than through loan rate smoothing.  
180 
2.0  Stylized Facts 
 
An examination of plots of the repo and prime lending rates can be useful in 
understanding the transmission from the former to the latter.  Figure 16 shows that 
the prime lending converged towards the repo rates during the pre2005 period but 
increased in the post 2006 period. This is evident as the spread between the prime 
lending rate and the repo rate narrowed at the point of inception of the repo rate in 
2002 as the banking sector gained more experience with the repo as a policy 
instrument.  The gap contracted to under 5 per cent by November 2003 and under 4 
per cent by October 2004.  
 
Figure 16 Trend in Lending and Repo rates in Trinidad and Tobago 
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Source: Plotted from data extracted from CBTT database. 
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We argue that the gap at the inception could have been due to recency of its 
introduction, but the subsequent convergence could have occurred as the central bank 
was better able to exercise moral suasion as the banks understood the repo much 
better. This therefore could have been attributable to the learning curve that the 
market went though in this respect. 
 
To deepen our analysis we divided the periods into periods to study the characteristics 
of the gap between the prime lending and repo rates (PIMPREP). The periods are 
formulated from inspection of the plot of PIMREP.  In the first instance the plot was 
compared to excess reserves, see Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17  Excess reserves and Difference between Market rates and Repo Rate 
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Source: Calculated and Plotted from data obtained from CBTT data base. 
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From Figure 16 we observe that the prime lending rate declined from 2002 to 2004 to 
converge to a declining but relatively flat repo rate.  As a result the difference between 
these rates declined, see Figure 17. We therefore use this as the first period.  The 
second period is formulated as the interval between 2005 and 2007. Here the interval 
is relatively flat remaining under 4 per cent.  Then we notice for the brief period in 
2008 the difference between the prime lending rate and the repo rate rises above 4 
per cent, so we use this as the third threshold. A fourth threshold is formulated for 
post 2008 period as the gap between the repo rate and the prime lending rate 
increased in this period.   
 
2.1   Association between PIMREP and Excess Reserves 
 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 17 and PIMREP is plotted in Figure 17. It can 
be noticed that for the second threshold, PIMREP tended to show short bouts of 
instablity as the amplitude of excess liquidity increased. From 2005 onwards PRIMREP 
is more volatile when excess reserves rises to over 3 per cent in amplitude. Moreover 
the gap became wider in the first quarter of 2009 when excess liquidity increased.  As 
excess reserves increased from a median of 0.84 in the 2005-7 period to 6.72 in the 
first quarter of 2009, PIMREP increased from a mean of 3.67 to 4.33 in the 
corresponding periods.  This shows that increases in the amplitude of excess reserves 
were associated with widening of the gap between the prime lending rate and the repo 
rates.  Other factors such as spillovers of external disturbances can be at play here so 
we tests in Section 5 to see the significance of these factors.  
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Table 17 Prime and repo difference to excess reserves 
 2002 – 2004 2005-2007 2008:1 – 2008-
12 
2009:1 – 
2009:3 
Pimrep – excess 
reserves 
correlation 
-0.30* -0.21 0.57* 0.58 
Primrep mean 5.25 3.67 4.00 4.33 
Primrep std 1.07 0.16 0.24 4.50 
Excess 
Reserves 
Median 
0.04 0.84 2.20 6.72 
Excess 
Reserves Max 
0.67 4.75 6.50 6.93 
Note: Primrep is the Prime Lending Rate minus the REPO Rate 
 
2.2  Possible influence of Spillovers of disturbances 
 
In studying the gap between the prime lending and repo rates, we may be able to 
detect the possible influence of spillovers of financial disturbances in the US and UK 
financial markets. Following the onset of the financial crises, a widening of the gap can 
be noticed.  The spread rose to over 4 per cent by March 2008.  This was therefore a 
lagged response, considering that the inception of the crises could be traced to begin in 
the US economy in mid 2007 in the US economy before spreading worldwide.  
Accordingly,  spillover of foreign disturbances may occur with lags on the spreads 
between the prime lending and repo rates.  A contributing factor to the lagged impact 
is that disturbances could have spilled over to different segments of the economy.  
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The likelihood that spillovers of foreign disturbances could have impacted on Trinidad 
and Tobago economy as FDI becomes more important to the economy.  Table 18 
shows how FDI grew from an average of 1.4 per cent in the decade of the 1970s to an 
average of 4.9 per cent in 2000-8. The data show that FDI as a ratio of GDP was more 
significant to the Trinidad and Tobago economy, compared to the US and UK 
economies. In addition it was above the average for Latin America and the Caribbean 
region, given its larger FDI to GDP ratio in each decade. As such, there was deepening 
of financial integration of TT over the decades and across regional terms.  
 
Table 18   Percentage of FDI to GDP 
Country 1970-9 1980-9 1990-9 2000-8 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
1.4 1.7 2.7 4.9 
Upper Middle 
Income 
Countries 
0.0 0.1 0.5 1.2 
High Income 
OECD 
0.5 0.6 1.3 2.7 
High Income 
non-OECD 
0.5 0.7 1.3 2.9 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 
0.7 0.5 1.5 3.2 
UK 0.2 0.8 1.1 1.5 
USA 0.7 0.7 1.8 3.0 
Source: Tabulated from World Development Indicators.  Cited in Birchwood and Brackin (2010) 
 
The significance of FDI to the TT economy spurred exposure of banks in the UK and US 
to support the FDIs in the region, thus leading to even more financial integration 
between Trinidad and Tobago and the global community. Figure 18 shows that the 
degree of exposure of the BIS sample of reporting banks to Trinidad and Tobago.  The 
evidence showed that claims and loans of BIS reporting banks exhibited an upward 
trend over 1998 to 2010. From the BIS data, the onset of the global crises did not 
slowdown the demand for loans but rather it intensified the demand for loans from the 
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sample of banks from the advance developed countries, perhaps as economic agents 
became more dependent on bank financing. 
 
Except for the period 2006-7, the evidence obtained in Figure 19 shows that the banks 
emanating from the advanced industrialised countries were typically more loaned up, 
in terms of loans to deposit ratio, compared to the industry in Trinidad and Tobago. 
This may suggest that there are differences in pressures on the lending rates between 
domestic banks in Trinidad and Tobago compared to banks emanating from the 
industrialised countries. For example, foreign banks could have lent to the higher end 
of the market to finance foreign direct investment for energy based investments, 
where the market is exposed to international competitive pressures.  Consequently, 
there could have been a loosening of the relationship between the repo and the 
lending rates of the banks emanating from the advanced industrialised countries. 
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Figure 18   Trend in Claims on Trinidad and Tobago by BIS Reporting Banks 
 
Source: Tabulated and plotted from Preliminary International Banking Statistics, Bank of International 
Settlements, many issues and Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago database. 
 
 
Figure 19   Comparison of loans to deposit ratio of international banks to domestic bank in 
Trinidad and Tobago 
 
Source: Tabulated and plotted from Preliminary International Banking Statistics, Bank of International 
Settlements, many issues and Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago database. 
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The spillover can also take place through different points of impact giving rise to 
different channels in the economy. Table 19 shows how banks in the advanced 
industrialised countries had exposures to different sectors in the domestic economy. 
The non bank private sector accounted for the highest percentage of claims as over 
two thirds of the claims arose from this sector. This was generally followed by claims 
on the public sector and then by claims on banks.  If we assume that monies going to 
the non-bank and public sectors ultimately find their way to the banking sector but at 
different speeds, this would imply that economic shocks may impact on the pass 
through at differential speeds.     
 
 
Table 19   Percentage Claim on Consolidated Cross-Border and Local Claims in all Currencies 
 
1998 2005 2007 2010 
Claims on banks  6.8 9.9 9.7 5.0 
Claims on non bank private 
sector  83.0 87.7 70.2 66.7 
Claims on public sector  10.2 2.3 20.1 28.3 
Source: Tabulated from Bank of International Settlements 
 
2.3   Trade Effects 
 
Another mode of transmission could have been through the price of key export 
commodities. We consider the energy price index, given that Trinidad and Tobago key 
exports are in oil and natural gas. It is evident that these prices collapsed by mid 2008 
following the onset of the crises, see Figure 20. This could have led to a reduction in 
foreign exchange earnings and therefore slowdown the buoyancy of the economy, 
slowdown real estate prices and therefore negatively spilled over to the financial 
sector.  As a result, loan demand could have been adversely affected thus leading to 
changes in bank lending rates relative to the repo rate. 
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Figure 20  Energy Price Index 
 
Source: Index Mundi online: http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=energy-price-
index&months=60. 
 
 
This is in keeping with Poghosyan and Hesse (2009) who suggested that direct and 
indirect channels of transmissions could arise owing to changes in oil prices.  For 
example they suggested that it could have impacted directly on the banking system 
through oil related lending or through excess liquidity. In addition, it could have been 
indirectly acted through fiscal investments which in turn affect the productive capacity 
in the economy and impact on demand conditions in the economy. We argue, 
therefore, that this can affect the domestic term structure of interest rates in relation 
to the repo rate.  
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3.0  Theoretical Framework by Martin and Milas (2010) 
 
The theoretical model by Martin and Milas (2010) incorporates spreads between 
interbank credit and money market rates. The benchmark interest rate is the Libor 
3month rate.  Their model is specified as 
 
=                       5.3.1 
 
                    5.3.2  
 
                     5.3.3  
 
where   is the inflation rate,  is the output gap,  is a supply shock,  is the 
interest rate at which the private sector can borrow,  is the base rate, and  is a 
demand shock.  They assume that   and  are unknown, while  is known.  
They describe  and  as yield curve factors.88  
 
They further assumed that the base rate is chosen at time t based on information 
available at time t-1, to minimise the loss function with respect to inflation. Martin and 
Milas (2010) assume that the spread is a function of risk and liquidity measures and 
that the responsiveness of the credit interest rate to the money market rate was a 
function of market liquidity.  Consequently they specify: 
 
                                                 
88
 Block and Hirt (1994) defined a yield curve as “A curve that shows interest rates at a specific point in 
time for all securities having equal risk but different maturity dates” p670. 
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                             (5.3.4)  
 
where  is the average 3 month libor rate;  is the spread between the 
unsecured 1 month Libor and secured Gilt Repo rates;   is the spread 
between the unsecured 3-month libor and secured Gilt-Repo rates;  is the UK 
liquidity index. Accordingly, equation (5.3.4) was obtained by substituting the 
parameters in (5.3.3)  with 
 and 
.  We note that the spreads between unsecured and 
secured lending was used to capture lending risk.  Effectively then, Martin and Milas 
(2010) capture risk in the constant term in equation (5.3.3), while the pass through of 
the base rate is captured through its interaction with the liquidity index. 
 
3.1 Lagged effects of International Spillovers on the Pass Through of 
the Short-Term Interest Rate in Trinidad and Tobago 
 
 
Given the embryonic stage of development of the money market in Trinidad and 
Tobago, the model is applied to the market with some modifications. This is done since 
the market did not possess the variety of instruments or maturities of the UK or US 
markets. We contend that use of the prime lending rate can allow the transmission 
mechanism in the model to utilise a larger information set.  This is owing to the fact 
that the prime lending rate can be the ex post representative interest rate to the credit 
market, determined after spillovers of external disturbances and liquidity conditions 
are taken into consideration.  Using the prime lending rate therefore, allows us to 
extend the model to accommodate these influences with respect to the transmission 
191 
of the repo rate to the bank lending rate, to see if these factors can cause the market 
rate to be decoupled from the policy rate. 
 
The transmission mechanism as depicted by the central bank of Trinidad and Tobago 
was outlined in Diagram 1 of chapter 3. For this chapter we are primarily interested in 
the transmission between the policy rate and the interest rate term structure. Given 
the dominance of commercial banks in the financial structure in Trinidad and Tobago, 
we use the prime lending rate as the representative private sector market rate. The 
idea here is that lending rates of commercial banks affects the demand for credit which 
in turn impact on consumption demand.  
 
By considering the prime lending rate, this allows us to examine the effects of excess 
reserves and external spillovers on the transmission mechanism. We therefore use 
Diagram 5 to visualise the hypothesis that the pass through of the policy rate to bank 
lending rates is sensitive to changes in these variables.   
 
 
Diagram 5   Transmission mechanism of repo rate to commercial bank lending rate in  Trinidad 
and Tobago 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Repo Rate 
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Further to Martin and Milas (2010), we investigated whether disturbances that 
occurred in the respective financial sectors of the Uk and US between 2007 and 2009, 
may have been transmitted contemporaneously or with a lag. We contend that the 
temporal nature of the transmission depends on the type of transmission mechanism 
that takes place.  For the study, it is assumed that multiple transmission mechanisms 
may have been at play in transmitting the disturbances in US and UK financial markets 
to the financial sector in Trinidad and Tobago. Moreover, we assume that the 
transmission is done through different points in the economy and therefore work their 
way through to the banking system at different speeds. In so doing, we modify 
equation (5.3.3) to allow for the pass through of the policy rate through excess 
reserves, spillover of foreign disturbances.  
 
The assumption of contemporaneous transmission rests on the presumption that there 
is cross border trading of liquidity between banks headquartered in the UK and US in 
the financing of counterparties in Trinidad and Tobago. Our description of these direct 
links is influenced by the IMF (2009) and Frank et al. (2008).  Here it is suggested that 
financial disturbances are transmitted through the international interbank market as 
well as through changes in financial asset prices. 89  This is generated by the 
dependence of the multinational banks on the wholesale market to source external 
funds rather than just deposits. 90   
 
To apply this model to Trinidad and Tobago financial sector the transmission is 
assumed to take place either through portfolio decisions of international banks 
                                                 
89
 According to the Bank of International Settlement (1983), the international interbank market is an 
informal market where “banks lend funds to each other [and] (t)he amounts are typically large ... 
maturities are short, normally between overnight and six months, although placements up to a year and 
sometimes longer can be arranged.” P7. 
90
 McGuire et al (2008) showed that international interbank claims expanded by 22 per cent over 2002-7, 
driven mainly by interoffice activity between multinational banks.  They showed that net flows were 
strongest from the US to the UK banks, but they were also significant between the UK to the classification 
“others” which included Canada, Australia, Denmark and Norway.  Further, they noted strong net 
outflows from the UK to the Caribbean countries with offshore banks located in Aruba, the Bahamas, 
Bermuda, Cayman islands, Netherland Antilles and Panama. 
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headquartered in the advanced industrialised countries, particularly the US and UK, or 
through direct borrowing from international commercial banks headquartered in the 
UK and US. With respect to portfolio decisions, these international banks are assumed 
to be either using foreign deposits to finance lending activities in Trinidad and Tobago 
or the portfolio management decisions are assumed to be centrally made so that 
externally based branches are treated as part of a global portfolio. 
 
Wherever these arguments hold true, it would suggest that the lending rates of foreign 
banks can take a different growth path to lending rates of domestic banks.  This could 
occur as foreign banks are not restricted to the internal liquidity conditions to generate 
funds. As a result, interest rates applied by foreign banks can be subject to external 
influences, rather than domestic liquidity and the repo rate.  Also, the market lending 
rate ( ) should be seen as a combination of lending rate of domestic banks ( ) 
and the interest rate of foreign banks operating in the domestic market ( ) such that  
 
                                             (5.3.5) 
 
If this functional relationship obtains in the domestic market, it can suggest that the 
transmission of the repo rate can be less than full as the market rate may react with a 
lag since the reaction of the interest rate of overseas banks may be influenced also by 
external influences so that  where  denote foreign disturbances and  
reflect the time lag of 0,1,2... .   
   
We suggest that another mode of transmission can be assumed to take place indirectly 
with a lag.  Here, shocks are assumed to take place through trade links between 
Trinidad and Tobago with the US and UK markets. As such, disturbances in the financial 
sector in the US and UK are assumed to impact through the real side.  In particular, the 
financial sector disturbances in the developed economies are assumed to impact on 
the real side of these economies by causing an economic slowdown which is presumed 
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to impact on their import demand and prices of leading exports of Trinidad and 
Tobago. Given that Trinidad and Tobago is an energy exporter, its fortunes would be 
influenced by the floundering export prices for energy commodities.  As a result of 
depressed commodity prices, this is assumed to cause feedback to the buoyancy of the 
Trinidad and Tobago economy and subsequently the financial sector is impacted. We 
therefore argue that trade effects can cause spillovers so that the trade channel may 
be likely to be an important transmission channel. 
  
Adopting the variables from Martin and Milas (2010), we further specify the variables 
for the spillover of external disturbances as 
 
                     (5.3.6) 
 
where  is the US yield curve, calculated as the difference between the 5 year bond 
rate and the 3 months Treasury bill rate;   is the risk at time t in the UK credit 
market captured by the spread between the unsecured UK interbank rate and the 
secured Gilt Repo rate and   is the UK liquidity index.91  These arguments suggest 
that lags are likely to arise when the transmission is extended beyond the interbank 
market to the bank retail lending market.  
 
3.2   Timing of Spillover of External Disturbances 
 
We assume that the spillover of international disturbances is signalled through the US 
yield curve and the UK risk and liquidity measures, see Figure 21.  These variables may 
be critical to the pricing of funds resulting from the transmission noted above. For 
                                                 
91
 Stock and Watson (2003) cited literature that showed a significant relationship between the positive 
yield curve and an increase in real economic activity, while an inverted yield curve tended to be indicative 
of a recession.  For example, Estrella and Hardouelis (1991) found that a positive slope of the yield curve 
proved useful for forecast of inflation and real economic activity.  
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example, banks may price their loans to compensate for risk and liquidity since risk 
present a cost to financial intermediation. At the same time, the slope of the yield 
curve can influence how banks factor in pricing according to the maturity of funds. 92  It 
can be seen that during the course of 2007 there was a radical departure from the 
underlying trend in the various markets with respect to the three indicator variables. 
Risk increased as captured by the spread between the UK interbank rate minus the Gilt 
Repo rate, the UK end of month liquidity index fell and the US yield curve began 
rising.93   
 
 
Figure 21   International Indicators 
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Within the period of the crises, there were massive jumps in the risk indicator in the 
UK.  This can be captured by the spread between unsecured and secured lending.  In 
Table 20, we compare these jumps with that of Trinidad and Tobago intermediation 
spread.  Thus we form our notion of the transmission of disturbances from the UK to 
the Trinidad and Tobago market through observation.  
 
                                                 
92
 Notwithstanding this, there has been limited debate on the usefulness of the yield curve with respect to 
emerging economies. Debates have raged in the advanced industrialised countries on the usefulness of the 
yield curve as a means of forecasting inflation or economic buoyancy in the US and the UK, see for 
example the literature review of Stock and Watson (2003)
  
 
 
93
 Some central banks , inclusive of the Bank of England, use the yield curve to do inflation rate 
forecasting.  See for example Joyce and Medrum (2008) and Gurbaynak et al. (2007) and Stock and 
Watson (2003) for a discussion on this. 
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A limitation of the Trinidad and Tobago market is that it does not report unsecured and 
secured lending as the UK market does.  As a result we could not substitute spreads 
between secured and unsecured lending in the constant term as did Martin and Milas 
(2010). Instead we use intermediation spreads which we define as the difference 
between the prime lending rate and the risk free prime lending rate.  
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Table 20  Risk Indicators in the UK and Trinidad and Tobago (TT) Financial Markets 
Obs 
Month 
UK 
Lending 
risk 
TT 
Intermediation 
Risk 
Monthly 
change in 
UK 
lending 
risk 
spread  
(basis 
points) 
Monthly 
change in TT 
intermediation 
Risk (basis 
points) 
1 2007M05 0.1 4.7 -2 -24 
2 2007M06 0.14 4.85 4 15 
3 2007M07 0.13 4.84 -1 -1 
4 2007M08 0.72 4.89 59 5 
5 2007M09 0.51 4.78 -21 -11 
6 2007M10 0.52 4.75 1 -3 
7 2007M11 0.94 4.64 42 -11 
8 2007M12 0.55 4.75 -39 11 
9 2008M01 0.37 4.75 -18 0 
10 2008M02 0.55 4.76 18 1 
11 2008M03 0.96 5.25 41 49 
12 2008M04 0.1 5.25 -86 0 
13 2008M05 0.7 5.21 60 -4 
14 2008M06 0.71 5.2 1 -1 
15 2008M07 0.55 5.21 -16 1 
16 2008M08 0.59 5.73 4 52 
17 2008M09 1.39 5.7 80 -3 
18 2008M10 2.28 6.03 89 33 
19 2008M11 2.1 5.96 -18 -7 
20 2008M12 1.47 6.06 -63 10 
21 2009M01 1.1 6.78 -37 72 
22 2009M02 1.37 8.63 27 185 
23 2009M03 0.95 9.74 -42 111 
Source: UK data are extracted from Bank of England data set and Trinidad and Tobago data extracted 
from the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago.  
Notes: UK lending risk is taken as the spread between the unsecured interbank 3-month lending rate 
minus the secured Gilt Repo lending rate.  M denotes months. 
 
 
We search for the length for transmission by first mapping the change in the monthly 
UK risk that is above 30 basis points, with the change in Trinidad and Tobago 
7 M 
9 M 
7 M 
8 M 
5 M 
5 M 
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intermediation risk above 30 basis points.  Varying transmission lengths are obtained 
ranging between 5 and 9 months.  We treat the transmission of 9 months as an outlier, 
and so exclude this from the calculation of the mean lags.  Consequently we obtain the 
mean length of transmission as 6.4 months.   
 
In the same way we also compare the temporal ordering of the large changes in the US 
yield curve with a change in the prime lending rate for Trinidad and Tobago for the 
speriod of the global crises. We considered a large change in the US yield curve to take 
place when the change is over +/-0.45 basis points in magnitude. We compare that 
change with the next change in the prime lending rate, by observing the interval 
between changes.  For the period in the sample that the global crises occurred, we 
show three such points, see Table 21. It can be seen that the interval between large 
changes for the yield curve and the next change in Trinidad and Tobago repo rate are 9, 
6 and 7 months.  The median of these was 6 months and a mean is 6.67.  However, 
since there are only three data points we go with median since the mean number of 
data points would be acutely sensitive to the extreme size of any one of the interval 
points.  The evidence therefore shows that for the UK lending risk and the yield curve, 
a lag length of 6 months may be plausible. 
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Table 21   US Yield Curve indicators and Trinidad and Tobago (TT) Financial Markets 
Obs 
Monthly 
change 
in US 
yield 
curve 
Monthly 
change 
in Prime 
lending 
rate 
2007M05 0.22 0 
2007M06 0.49 0 
2007M07 -0.37 0 
2007M08 0.19 0 
2007M09 0.1 0 
2007M10 -0.01 0 
2007M11 0.12 0 
2007M12 0.1 0 
2008M01 -0.26 0 
2008M02 0.45 0 
2008M03 0.59 0.5 
2008M04 0.33 0 
2008M05 -0.14 0 
2008M06 0.21 0 
2008M07 0.04 0 
2008M08 -0.25 0.5 
2008M09 0.34 0 
2008M10 0.31 0.25 
2008M11 0.06 0 
2008M12 -0.61 0 
2009M01 -0.02 0 
2009M02 0.1 0 
2009M03 0.03 0 
Source: http://www.irs.gov/retirement/article/0,,id=177408,00.html 
Notes: M denotes months. 
 
 
An examination of the evidence for the yield curve measure therefore corroborates the 
results obtained from the risk measure since it suggests that an average lag of 6 
months for both may be plausible.  The result is similar to Canova (2005) who finds that 
the lag with which monetary disturbances emanating from disturbances in USA 
spillover may spillover to Latin America is somewhere within two quarters. He obtains 
9  M 
6 M 
 7M 
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this through the use of impulse response functions using quarterly data for the first 
quarter of 1980 to the last quarter of 2002. Thus our visual inspection corroborates his 
results. Hence for the regression we assume that the turbulence in the UK market is 
transmitted to the Trinidad and Tobago market over an average of 6 months after 
rounding off. 
 
4.0   Model specifications  
 
To find the pass through in the presence of excess reserves and spillovers we formulate 
the general regression as 
 
     5.4.1  
 
The equation is formulated to capture the interaction of the base rate with excess 
reserves and spillovers of foreign disturbances, to see how they impacted on the pass 
through of the repo rate. This reverts to the standard pass through model as in Lowe 
(1995) if we impose  
. In Lowe (1995) equation they examined the degree of pass 
through of the policy rate to the credit market rate where they let  be the degree of 
pass through. Further, it is also implied by Martin and Milas (2010) if we export their 
model outlined in equation (5.3.4) to Trinidad and Tobago, given the non existence of, 
the libor, repo yield curve and UK liquidity index in that country. In effect the 
restriction is set in equation (5.3.4) that . 
 
We use the standard constant spread model as our simple model from which we can 
compare the spillover results. Consequently we relate the repo rate to the prime 
lending rate which is used as the floor rate, the best rate private sector customers can 
borrow at. As such, in the simple model it is assumed that excess reserves and 
spillovers have no effect on the pass through of the repo rate. 
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We relax the assumption that excess reserves and spillovers have no effect on the pass 
through of the base rate at which the private sector can borrow from commercial bank. 
In allowing for spillover effects, we impose two different restriction on the dynamic 
effects.  First we test the regression where  and then we test a separate 
regression where . Thus the former assumes that the central bank react 
contemporaneously to external disturbance, whereas, in the latter it is assumed that 
the transmission of foreign disturbances takes 6 months so that policy makers react by 
a lag of 6 months.  
 
The degree of the pass through of the short-term interest rate can be assumed to be 
dependent on the stability and slope of the yield curve, see for example Baláz et al 
(2006).  As such, the steeper the yield curve, the greater the degree of pass through 
that can be expected.   Like Mehl (2006), we construct the US yield curve by using the 
difference between the 5 year maturity and the 3 month Treasury bill rate.     
 
Martin and Milas (2010) contended that risk can impact on aggregate demand 
independent of the policy rule. They found that higher risk led to a widening of the 
spread between the lending and the base rates which they attributed to be the result 
of a rise in unsecured lending risk. We therefore examine whether the risk has the 
same effect that Martin and Milas (2010) found with respect to the UK, in that the 
spillover of risk lead to a widening of the spread between the policy and lending rates.   
 
The size of the spread between the policy and prime lending rates in Trinidad and 
Tobago is assumed to be influenced by the spillover of liquidity emanating from 
financial markets in the UK. Liquidity in the UK market is indicative of the ease with 
which UK financial institutions can generate income from assets.  This includes the 
ability of financial institutions to raise funds through the money market, which largely 
depend on the liquidity positions of financial institutions. We contend that cross-
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border liquidity is more readily transmitted between markets the more closely 
integrated financial markets are between countries.94 In our case we suggest that such 
integration can take place through cross-border demand for financial assets and cross-
border funding of investments.95  Further, we argue that the demand for investment 
assets by financial institutions in Trinidad and Tobago can be affected by the state of 
liquidity of financial assets in the UK market and this in turn can have an indirect effect 
on excess reserves in the banking sector. 
 
From equation (5.4.1), if then excess reserves impact on the pass through of the 
repo rate onto the lending rate.  Excess reserves represent a cost to commercial banks 
since they receive no interest on it.  Commercial banks may react in two alternative 
ways.  Where there are limited avenues for placing these reserves to gain interest 
revenues, banks may lower lending rates in a bid to increase loan demand.  On the 
other hand, they may opt to raise lending rates in order to compensate for the loss of 
income owing to non remunerated excess reserves.  Both scenarios may depend on the 
capacity of the economy to absorb increasing liquidity stemming from increased 
inflows of energy receipts.   
 
Table 22 shows how correlation signs were inconsistent between the prime lending 
rate and excess reserves as the correlation sign changes between sub-periods from 
negative between 2002-2004 to positive between 2005 to 2009:3.  The other variables 
were consistent with respect to their signs for all periods. For the relation between 
prime lending rate and excess reserves, the direction of the relation is an empirical 
matter, since it depends heavily on prevailing demand conditions, competitiveness of 
the environment and individual bank strategy.  Similarly, if ,  and  
then international spillovers stemming from the US yield curve, UK credit risk and the 
                                                 
94
 See for example Datar et al (2008) for a discussion on cross border liquidiy in relation 
to the spillover in the US and Japanese markets. 
 
95
Cross-border demand can be facilitated by the trading of financial instruments.  For example, Tang and 
Yan (2007) suggested that Credit Default Swaps (CDS) can facilitate cross border demand.  
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UK liquidity index respectively, impact on the pass through of the repo rate.  We 
contend that the signage of these spillover coefficients are largely an empirical matter.   
 
 
Table 22 Correlation with Prime Lending Rate 
 Excess Reserves US yield 
Curve 
UK Credit Risk UK Liquidity 
Index 
2002-
2009:3 
0.31 0.08  0.47 -0.57 
2002-2004 -0.14  0.26  0.02  -0.94 
2005-
2009:3 
0.48 0.17 0.65 -0.66 
 
 
4.1.3   Strength of excess reserves and international spillovers  when Full 
Pass Through is Imposed 
 
To separate the different effects within the interaction terms, full pass through is 
imposed on regressions 5.4.2. Accordingly we impose full pass through of the repo rate 
by modelling the spread between the prime lending rate  and the policy repo rate 
 as the dependent variable.  This would therefore mean that .  As such, from 
equation (5.4.1) we let  and the difference between the lending and the policy 
rates is modelled as the dependent variable.  We therefore formulate the variable 
 as the dependent variable to obtain  
 
 .       5.4.2 
  
The importance of this specification is that the interaction term is dispensed with and 
the relative importance of excess reserves and international spillovers are examined, 
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given a one to one change between the repo and the commercial bank lending rate.
   
5.0  Methodology and Data 
 
Whereas Martin and Milas (2010) would have only considered the pass through of the 
base rate to the borrowing rate, we also add excess reserves and the potential 
spillovers emanating from other international financial markets in the interaction term.  
Both the repo rate and excess reserves are considered to be the domestic variables 
while, following from Martin and Milas (2010), the international variables are taken as 
the US yield curve, UK risk and liquidity indexes. The pass through of the repo rate with 
respect to excess reserves is assumed to be manifested contemporaneously since they 
originate in the domestic financial sector.  On the other hand, allowances are made for 
the pass through of the international variables to either be contemporaneous or to 
take place with a 6 month lag since the disturbance began overseas. 
 
A few departures from Martin and Milas (2010) should be noted.  We use the repo rate 
as the base rate and the prime lending rate as the rate at which the private sector can 
borrow from commercial banks outside of the interbank market. Further we interpret 
 in equation (5.3.3) as the degree of pass through of the repo rate, whereas Martin 
and Milas (2010) interpreted it together with  as determinants of the yield curve.  
Instead we use  as the proxy for the systematic risk.  Moreover, unlike Martin and 
Milas (2010) where the value of the error term in equation 5.3.3 is known, we assume 
that  is a random error term that is identical and independently distributed.  
 
Following Martin and Milas (2008), Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) is used as 
the estimation technique used to find estimates of the parameters.  Further, we 
estimate the model over the full sample period and over a subsample from 2005:1 to 
2009:3.  We therefore examine   
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.          5.5.1 
 
In adopting the model for Trinidad and Tobago, we represent   as the prime 
lending rate reported for the commercial banking industry and  to denote the 
repo rate charged by the central bank. 
 
The general model to capture the pass through is given in regressions 5.5.2 and 5.5.3. 
Systematic risk is captured by .  The pass through of the repo rate is captured by  
along with its interaction with excess reserves.  The interaction of the repo rate with 
the spillover of variables is captured by .  A positive  would suggest the extent to 
which increased financial risk in the UK market would magnify the impact of the pass 
through of the repo rate on the prime lending rate.  The spillover of the US yield curve, 
risk and liquidity in the UK market are captured by   ,  and  respectively.  If  is 
positive, then it would suggest that the yield curve is positively sloped and that 
environment would facilitate upward movement in bank lending rate.  Similarly, if  
and  are positive, then it would imply that increased risk and liquidity in the UK 
market would have magnify the pass through of the repo rate on the prime lending 
rate. The foreign variables are therefore included to obtain 
 
 
     5.5.2 
 
 
     5.5.3 
 
 
Using equation 5.4.2 we set  in 5.5.2 and then  in 5.5.3.   
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We then construct the regression model by assuming full pass through, in order to 
gauge the relative importance of excess reserves to spillover of foreign disturbances in 
impacting on the pass through of the repo rate. Formulating without lags, we express 
the equation  
 
       5.5.4 
  
As in equation (5.4.1), we then allowed for delayed spillovers by assuming that 
international spillovers to  act through 6 lags. As such, 
 
 
        5.5.5 
 
  
Monthly data are used for the period May 2002 following the introduction of the repo 
rate, to March 2009.  As a result, the overall sample contains 77 data points.  Within 
this period, a subsample is extracted to run from January 2005 to March 2009 and it 
therefore contains 51 data points. The equations are therefore tested for the overall 
period and the sub sample periods.   
 
5.1   Instruments and Lags 
 
Martin and Milas (2010) only used lags of endogenous variables as instruments. 
However, we include both endogenous and exogenous instruments. The exogenous 
instrument we include is the growth of loans.  Growth of loans is deemed as exogenous 
since it is not included in the regression of interest. Furthermore, its correlation with 
the prime lending rate turned out not to be significant for the period 2002:2 to 2009:3.  
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However, we assume that the buoyancy of the credit market and therefore interest 
rate would depend on the demand for loans which is indicated by the growth of loans. 
 
Similar to Martin and Milas (2010), the first 6 lags are employed for the overall period 
with respect to the endogenous variables.  We also employ the same number of lags 
for the exogenous variable — the growth of loans. For the subsample, two lags are 
used for the domestic endogenous variables but six lags are maintained for the 
international spillovers. The smaller number of number of lags are used for domestic 
variables, given the need to conserve degrees of freedom owing to the shorter data set 
of the subsample of 51 data points and the idea that the effects of domestic variables  
were believed to be more immediate as they were transmitted internally.  
 
6.0   Results 
 
The regression for the full period is dileanated as (a) and for the subsample we 
annotate as (b). In all cases, better regressions were obtained for the subsample period 
rather than for the full period, given smaller standard errors.   
 
6.1   Simple Model of Pass through effects  
 
The evidence reported in Table 23 show that there is full pass through of the policy 
rate to the credit market rate.  The result is robust to the time period selected so that 
the pass through was 1.05 and 1.02 for the overall and subsample periods, 
respectively. Use of the Wald test reveals that  is not significantly different from 1 in 
both samples. Consequently the results show that there is a one to one pass through 
from the policy rate to the credit rate.    
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Table 23 Degree of Pass through to the credit market for Equation 5 
 Overall Sample (2002:11 to 
2009:03) 
Subsample (2005:1 to 2009:03) 
 Equation 5.5.1a Equation 5.5.1b 
 3.41 (0.315)*** 3.71 (0.033)*** 
 (repo) 1.05 (0.043)*** 1.01 (0.004)*** 
 0.31 0.96 
S.E of 
regressions 
1.12 0.27 
Notes: Dependent variable is the Prime Lending rate for the credit market.  Standard error of parameter estimates are 
placed in brackets. 
 
 
6.2  Impact of excess Reserves and international spillovers on the pass 
through of the policy repo rate to the lending rate 
 
The results obtained for equations 5.4.3 are 5.4.4 are shown in Table 24, where all the 
estimated coefficients turned out to be significant. In the Table we use (a) to signify the 
total sample and (b) to signify the subsample. The evidence reveals that the domestic 
variables have a greater impact on the lending rate compared to the international 
spillovers.  Particularly, the pass through of the repo rate exhibited by  is found to 
have the strongest effect on the lending rate, despite the inclusion of excess reserves 
and international spillovers. 
 
The evidence also suggests that the interaction of the repo rate and excess reserves 
constitute the second highest coefficient as shown for  for both sample sizes and lag 
lengths. However, the results are mixed for the overall sample as the coefficient is 
negative 1 for the contemporaneous spillovers contained in regression 5.4.1, while it is 
positive for the other variables.  Compared to the other regressions, for 5.4.1 there is a 
larger margin of error of (0.075).  Moreover the standard error of the regression is 
higher at 0.82 relative to the subsample where the standard error is 0.18.  Thus, we 
deem the negative coefficient for the overall sample to be less reliable. 
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In contrast, excess reserves had positive effects for the remaining regressions and it is 
0.5 for both the contemporaneous and lagged versions of the subsample.  The positive 
coefficient is in keeping with what was obtained by Martin and Milas (2010). The 
positive results may have suggested either of two things.  Firstly, given that the effect 
of excess reserves is positive in most cases, it may suggest that increases in the repo 
rate amplify the positive effect of excess reserves on the pass through. Thus in this 
case, both the repo rate and excess reserves could have had positive effects on the 
lending rate. On the other hand, the result does not exclude excess reserves having a 
negative effect on the pass through.  In this case increases in the policy rate may 
outweigh the dampening effect of excess reserves.  As a result, even if increases in 
excess reserves acted as a drag on the pass through of the policy rate, the pass through 
effects of changes in the policy rate would have outweighed the dampening effects of 
excess liquidity.   
 
The effects of the international spillover variables on the pass through of the repo rate 
are marginal.  Owing to the marginal effects of spillovers variables, the results show 
that it would have taken more extreme changes in international spillovers of foreign 
disturbances for changes to have noticeable effects on the pass through of the repo 
rate. Consistent signs are obtained for the liquidity spillover, but contrary to the 
positive sign obtained for Martin and Milas (2010) for the domestic UK economy, the 
spillover turned out to be negative thus suggesting that UK liquidity spillover had a 
tendency to make the market lending rate move closer towards the repo rate.   
 
An empirical investigation of the factors that may be at work in influencing the 
transmission of UK liquidity to Trinidad and Tobago financial market may be beyond 
the scope of this study. Rüffer (2006) pointed out that the impact of liquidity spillover 
on pass through is less straight forward to explain compared to internal liquidity 
impact.  Intuitively we offer a tentative transmission here, that as liquidity increased in 
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the UK, funds in Trinidad and Tobago would have been attracted to the UK market and 
therefore was less likely to be retained at home.  Conversely, tight liquidity conditions 
in the UK would make the UK less attractive for financial investments demand by 
Trinidad and Tobago, so that the retention of these funds could lead to an increase in 
liquidity at home. Thus increased liquidity in the UK could have had opposite effects on 
the pass through in the Trinidad and Tobago market to what Martin and Milas 
observed for the UK market.  However, as Canova (2005) suggested, a fuller treat 
would need to take into account relative capital flows, relative price changes, relative 
real exchange rates and improvements in trade balance. 
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Table 24  Interaction of excess reserves and spillovers with repo rate 
 Overall Sample (2002:11-2009:3)  Subsample  (2005:1-2009:3) 
 
Contemporaneous 
Spillovers of 
external shocks 
Equation 5.5.2(a) 
6 month 
lag in 
Spillovers 
of 
external 
shocks 
Equation 
5.5.3(a) 
Contemporaneous 
Spillovers of 
external shocks 
Equation 5.5.2(a) 
6 month 
lag in 
Spillovers 
of external 
shocks 
Equation 
5.5.3(b) 
 4.01 (0.139)*** 5.29 
(0.062)*** 
3.64 (0.010)*** 3.46 
(0.040)*** 
 (repo) 1.02 (0.020)*** 0.83 
(0.009)*** 
1.02 (0.001)*** 1.05 
(0.004)*** 
 (Excess 
Reserves interaction 
with repo rate) 
-1.00 (0.075)*** 0.13 
(0.069)* 
0.05 (0.006)** 0.05 
(0.023)** 
 (UK liquidity 
index interaction 
with repo rate) 
-0.03 (0.002)*** -0.02 
(0.002)*** 
-0.01 (0.000)*** -0.02 
(0.002)*** 
 (UK Risk 
Spread interaction 
with repo rate) 
-0.07 (0.007)*** 0.01 
(0.002)*** 
-0.003 (0.000)** 0.005 
(0.001)*** 
 (US yield 
Curve interaction 
with yield curve) 
0.04 (0.004)*** 0.02 
(0.002)*** 
0.01 (0.000)*** 0.01 
(0.001)*** 
 0.62 0.62 0.98 0.98 
S.E of 
regressions 
0.82 0.84 0.18 0.18 
Notes: Dependent variable is the Prime Lending rate for the credit market.  Standard error of parameter estimates are 
placed in brackets. 
 
 
The spillover of the risk spread was different for differing lag lengths.  As such, the sign 
was negative where the effect of the spillover emanating from risk in the UK market 
was assumed to be instantaneous.  This suggested that increased risk emanating from 
the US financial market had a dampening effect on the pass through of the policy repo 
rate to the lending rate in the Trinidad and Tobago market.  On the other hand, where 
the spillover of risk in the UK financial market was assumed to take place with a lagged 
effect, the impact turned out to have a positive effect on the pass through of the policy 
repo rate onto the lending rate.  At the same time, the spillover of the US yield curve 
remained consistently positive. 
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6.3   Implications of full pass through 
 
Full pass through was imposed in order to decompose the interaction terms in 
equations 5.5.4 and 5.5.5 and the results were reported in Table 25. Excess reserves 
turned out to be negative and significant regardless of sample size.  This may suggest 
that the positive effect of the repo rate and excess reserves that was obtained could 
have occurred as the pass through of the repo rate outweighed the dampening effect 
of excess reserves as banks seek to lower lending rates in a bid to raise loan demand. 
 
Table 25 Imposition of Full Pass Through 
 Overall Sample (2002:11-
2009:3) 
Subsample  (2005:1-2009:3) 
 Contemporaneous 
Spillovers of 
external shocks 
Equation 5.5.4(a) 
6 month lag 
in 
Spillovers 
of external 
shocks 
Equation 
5.5.5(a) 
Contemporaneous 
Spillovers of 
external shocks 
Equation 5.5.4(b) 
6 month lag 
in Spillovers 
of external 
shocks 
Equation 
5.5.5(b) 
 4.09 (0.032)*** 4.10 
(0.06)*** 
3.88 (0.005)*** 4.01 
(0.007)*** 
 (exres) -5.91 (0.647)*** -5.00 
(0.75)*** 
-1.07 (0.161)*** -3.37 
(0.261)*** 
 (UK liquidity 
index) 
-0.21 (0.016)*** -0.43 
(0.06)*** 
-0.15 (0.004)*** -0.36 (0.006) 
*** 
 (UK Risk Spread) -0.42 (0.031)*** -0.25 
(0.08)*** 
-0.05 (0.005)*** 0.13 
(0.01)*** 
 (US yield Curve) 0.26 (0.007)*** 0.29 
(0.023)*** 
-0.01 (0.003)*** -0.03 (0.004) 
*** 
 0.26  0.25 0.52 0.48 
S.E of 
regressions 
0.80 0.80 0.18 0.19 
 
 
The spillover from the UK liquidity index remained negative, suggesting that changes in 
the UK liquidity index tended to have a negative effect on the lending rate relative to 
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the repo rate in Trinidad and Tobago. However, the other spillover variables did not 
consistently reflect the same sign when they were incorporated. Risk in the UK financial 
sector spilled over to reduce the lending rate in Trinidad and Tobago in regressions 
5.5.4 (a), 5.5.5(a) and 5.5.4(b), but it was found to have a positive effect in regression 
5.5.5(b).  
 
The effect of the yield curve was positive for the overall sample period, which 
suggested that in the long term the Trinidad and Tobago market were likely to raise 
their lending rate as the yield curve become steeper. The US yield curve turned out to 
be negative for the subsample when full pass through of the repo rate was assumed, 
which was opposite to the sign it exhibited for the subsample when it was interacted 
with the repo rate.  The slope of the yield curve was -0.01 and -0.03 for the 
instantaneous and lagged responses respectively.  This ran counter to the sub-period 
where the coefficients were positive.  Given the lower magnitude in the yield curve 
coefficients, the results suggest that the spillover of the yield curve diminished in 
importance to the pass through effects in Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
7.0  Conclusion 
 
The results suggest that full pass through of the policy rate to the credit market lending 
rate is robust to excess liquidity and international developments, particularly where 
the prime lending rate reflected an upward trend.  We suggest that this may have been 
as a result of effective moral suasion employed by the central bank.  It would have also 
been possible that the central bank may have tried to sterilise excess liquidity from the 
commercial banking sector before making changes to the repo rate.  
 
From among the other domestic variables, the results show that the predictability of 
the lending rate also depends heavily on the level of excess reserves, given the 
significance of this variable. This variable was revealed as having the potential to 
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dampen the pass through of the policy rate and thereby have a bias towards higher 
levels of demand, once demand increases in reaction to lower interest rates.  As such, 
excess reserves undermined pass through effects.  Based on the findings, the Central 
Bank may find it prudent to take excess reserves into account in setting the repo rate.  
 
 We suggest that multiple transmission of external disturbances may be at work in 
impacting on the pass through.  The results show that shocks could have been 
transmitted via domestic variables, contemporaneously through international banks 
and through lagged effects.  Moreover, the international variables could have some 
effects on the pass through of the policy rate.   Nevertheless, given that domestic 
variables had stronger effects and the marginal significance of the international 
spillovers, the results suggest that the pass through may not be severely undermined 
or strengthened by international spillovers.  Moreover, there is support for the 
financial integration of the Trinidad and Tobago economy with the UK and US 
economies given the significance of the spillover variables, but the integration is not 
strong enough to overshadow the importance of the domestic variables. As such, the 
transmission of external disturbances through important was still overpowered by 
excess reserves and the repo policy rate in the Trinidad and Tobago market. 
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